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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the presence and possibilities of political transnational 
activism stimulated by Vietnamese Americans in Orange County, California. Transnationalism is 
an increasingly dominant phenomenon that characterizes the way in which diaspora groups live 
their lives across borders. In fact, refugee diaspora, like the Vietnamese Americans, signify a 
unique dimension in the arena of transnational political practices, given their potential for raising 
awareness about their country’s political struggles and affecting change. 
The central argument of this dissertation is that a stable and significant transnational field 
of political action connecting Vietnamese Americans with their country of origin does exist. My 
research demonstrates that certain practices – protests, petitions and participation in internet 
forums – emerge as the most frequent forms of transnational political activity that Vietnamese 
Americans engage in. This dissertation adds insights to the transnationalism literature from the 
perspective of a vehemently anti-communist community that fled from political violence or the 
threat thereof – thus, all three forms of political action have a strong anti-communist agenda. 
My dissertation speaks directly to the fact that the dynamics of political transnationalism 
among Vietnamese Americans are not uniform. Rather, demographic, contextual and socio-
economic factors foster or hamper their political mobilization. From the logistic regression 
analyses, political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans is found to be significantly 
associated with age, gender, college degree, arrival in the U.S., English proficiency, employment 
status and income. Vietnamese Americans who are most likely to engage in protesting and sign 
petitions are older males who arrived in the U.S. during the early waves of refugee influx and are 
not very proficient in English. Unemployed Vietnamese Americans with lower incomes are also 
more likely to attend protests, while obtaining a college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam is 
associated with more frequent participation in internet forums related to homeland issues. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Transnationalism is an increasingly dominant phenomenon and characterizes the way in 
which ordinary individuals live their lives across borders. Immigrants and even forced migrants 
who move from one country to another rarely cut off all ties with those left behind. Today, 
attachments to the home country and the maintenance of multiple loyalties are considered a 
normal part of immigrant life and often complementary to assimilation in the host society.  
All this has important implications for the field of refugee studies. The optic of 
transnationalism offers a fresh perspective on refugee studies (Nolin 2006, p.15). This is because 
the transnational character and practices of refugees have kindled a paradigm shift away from 
traditional notions of refugee assimilation and segmented assimilation (Cheran 2006, p.4). 
Refugees, as a class of “transmigrants” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, 1995), now maintain 
transnational relations with their country of origin and in some cases, may even foster nationalist 
activities in their homeland. In fact, refugee diasporas1 today signify a unique dimension in the 
arena of transnational practices, given their potential for raising awareness about their country’s 
political struggles and affecting change. As a class of migrants, refugee diaspora are seen as 
agents of change, who support and promote local development initiatives through hometown 
associations or as active political participants in the country of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003, p. 
1214). As such, they warrant further consideration and examination. 
Refugee transnationalism refers to the social, cultural, political and economic relations 
that refugees in the host country keep with their home states (Sherrell and Hyndman 2006, p. 4). 
1 Refugee diasporas can be generally defined as “those refugee communities living in or belonging to more than one 
national space” (Cheran 2006, p.4). 
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It differs markedly from that of other immigrant classes because of the involuntary nature of 
refugees leaving their home country and possible political violence experienced by them that 
shape their transnational relations. This dissertation focuses on one such group of political 
refugees, the Vietnamese-Americans. Most of them arrived during the three waves of refugee 
influx in the late 1970s and 1980s and settled down around Little Saigon in Orange County, 
California.  
Over the last thirty five years, the complex and sometimes multiple identifications of the 
Vietnamese Americans have ranged from refugee to expatriate and now, to transnational. Despite 
more than two decades of limited communication and another decade of wary maintenance of 
ties between the Vietnamese American community and Vietnam, the former has managed to 
create vast networks and transnational connections (Valverde 2002). My research accordingly 
investigates the presence and possibilities of political transnational activism stimulated by 
Vietnamese refugees in the United States. 
 
Research on transnational activism traditionally encompasses economic activities (such 
as sending remittances), political activities (such as voting in home country elections) and 
cultural activities (such as locally-nurtured musical talent being exported to the home country). 
Since the Vietnamese arrivals were political refugees, it is most interesting to explore their 
political ties with Vietnam. Moreover, on the political front, organized migrant groups are now 
increasingly embracing the role of promoting policy and regime change in their home territories.  
Cohen (1996) describes the evolution of refugee diaspora relations vis-à-vis their 
homeland governments as moving from “victims to activists or even challengers”. For instance, 
in the likelihood of conflict in the home country, diaspora communities may raise money to 
support continuing warfare, promote public opinion and even substantially influence 
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international interventions in support of their cause. Beyond this, migrants (including refugees) 
have become important constituents and advocates for homeland governments. Numerous 
governments allow for dual citizenship or include members of its diaspora as official members of 
their political communities (Brinkerhoff 2009).  
At the same time, an exiled diaspora community also has the ability to act as an 
additional watchdog on homeland governments. Given their potential access, through networks 
on the ground, to local information on policy implementation, regulatory enforcement and 
human rights abuses, diaspora organizations may be well placed to play a monitoring role in 
support of good governance (Brinkerhoff 2009). In extreme cases, a hostile diaspora community 
can sway public opinion against the ruling homeland government or even try to oust it from 
power.  
Diasporas have influence disproportionate to their numbers owing to knowledge, skills, 
and financial capital acquired in the host society. Similarly, diaspora support to homeland 
political campaigns may disproportionately influence outcomes due to relative currency 
exchange rates (Brinkerhoff 2009). Moreover, diaspora communities’ hybrid identities inform 
political considerations and action agendas vis-à-vis the homeland, whether they pertain to 
potential conflict with the homeland government or subgroups of its society, human rights, or 
partisan political schemes. In this way, the collective expression of diaspora hybrid identity 
occurs through transnational activities concerning homeland politics (Brinkerhoff 2009). Thus, 
migrant and refugee groups’ transnational political influence and engagement has potential 
significance, as it raises political consciousness, shapes specific political agendas aimed at the 
homeland and provides forums for the enactment of these agendas in dispersed and 
heterogeneous communities.  
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Conventionally, transnational political participation is measured by electoral indicators. 
Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of 
origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in 
the polity of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003). However, migrants and refugees also seek to be 
represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections 
(Guarnizo et al. 2003). Hence, for the purposes of this dissertation, under the concept of 
transnational political participation, I include both electoral and non-electoral activities aimed at 
influencing conditions in the home country. Such transnational non-electoral political activities 
may involve sending political remittances2 for civic projects in the community of origin, 
membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the hometown, participating in 
campaigns or petitions, and organizing in the host country around political/human rights issues 
concerning their home country.  
 
Such an instance of political transnationalism among Vietnamese refugees as distinct 
from voluntary migrants or other refugee groups is worth investigating for a number of reasons. 
The specific circumstances surrounding refugee migration can affect the level and intensity of 
transnational political linkages; in the case of Vietnamese refugees, their experiences or fear of 
political persecution and the traumatic circumstances of their emigration have an effect on their 
transnational political activism. When they first arrived as destitute, uprooted refugees, the 
Vietnamese lay at the very end of the transnational class hierarchy. Despite these odds and the 
frigid state of the relationship between their host country and Vietnam for nearly two decades, 
2 “Political remittances” here signifies money that is sent to a politically active local NGO or grass-roots 
organization in the home country as part of their fund-raising or contributions to a political party as opposed to 
economic remittances sent to family members or toward a business venture. 
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Vietnamese refugees have displayed considerable tenacity and agency in maintaining 
connections with their home country. However, Vietnamese Americans still consider themselves 
to be refugees-in-exile and identify with the coerced homelessness of a refugee status in spite of 
most of them having attained permanent residency or citizenship. 
This leads us to another unique perspective offered in selecting Vietnamese refugees, 
namely anti-communism. The study of Vietnamese political transnationalism is in the context of 
a home country that is staunchly communist and transnational refugees who are extremely anti-
communist and disapproving of the current regime in their home country. Second to a refugee 
identity, anti-communism is the next common denominator of unity and part of the rhetoric of 
Vietnamese-American cultural identity and transnational activism. Such political 
transnationalism in the context of a communist home state has been studied in the case of Cuban 
Americans (Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez 1997, Grenier 2007); it will, therefore, be interesting 
to investigate the dynamics of transnational political activity in a similar context among 
Vietnamese Americans.  
I investigate the possible determinants of political transnationalism among Vietnamese 
refugees by (1) conducting open-ended interviews (qualitative analysis) with a smaller group of 
refugees in order to establish the kinds of transnational political acts undertaken by Vietnamese 
Americans and (2) conducting a survey (quantitative analysis) among a larger group of refugees 
to gather information on possible determinants of political transnationalism. Thus, research on 
the Vietnamese refugees provides the necessary data and information to people who are 
responsible for making policy decisions dealing with Vietnam, and contributes to a more 
sensitive and accurate understanding of the heritage of an ethnic group which is becoming an 
integral part of the American society (Nguyen, M. H., 1984). 
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Statement of Purpose  
My research investigates the presence and possibilities of transnational political 
engagement aimed at Vietnam stimulated by resettled Vietnamese refugees in the United States. 
Transnational political activism is not solely indicative of specific home country contexts or 
political situation in the home country, but also of specific circumstances that influence 
individual refugee motivations/capabilities and structure their mobilization. To this end, I 
specifically aim to understand the demographic, contextual and resource-dependent factors that 
foster or hamper political mobilization of the Vietnamese refugees and subsequently shape the 
presence, type and intensity of transnational activist projects that are enacted.  
This dissertation is part of the broader research about Vietnamese refugees in the United 
States - the 1975 evacuation and succeeding flows of refugees from Vietnam, the Vietnamese 
community in the United States, their resettlement process and eventual ties with their home 
country - known as Vietnamese American studies, a part of Asian American studies. Soon after 
their arrival in the United States, a growing body of research on the Vietnamese refugees 
emerged, covering a span of topics, including their experiences about the war and flight from 
Vietnam, their initial resettlement patterns, downward occupational mobility, subsequent 
educational and economic achievements, mental health, and the emergence of Vietnamese ethnic 
enclaves around the country, and so on.  
However, the overwhelming majority of all these investigations of Vietnamese American 
experiences have been nation-bound. Thus, the Vietnamese Americans have usually been studied 
either as refugees with high rates of educational and economic mobility or as disenfranchised 
migrants with their youth joining gangs. What has been largely ignored is an analysis of the 
community in a transnational context; in other words, this scholarship largely leaves out the role 
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of Vietnamese Americans as an alternative group with potential for engaging in transnational 
action.  
The one exception is Caroline Valverde’s research on the making of transnational 
Vietnam through money and music. As she puts it, it no longer suffices to think of Vietnamese 
Americans as nation-bound refugees who left their home country to resettle permanently in and 
assimilate into the culture of their host country (Valverde 2002). This still, nevertheless, leaves a 
gap in the research on the political impact of Vietnamese Americans, whose transnational 
practices aim to change the policies of the ruling communist government, improve the human 
rights situation and engender democracy and community empowerment in Vietnam. Today, the 
Vietnamese population in America is one of the fastest growing segments of American 
population. Yet, little research has been conducted that demonstrates any pertinent factors that 
will assist in creating opportunities for transnational political activism.  
My research seeks to fill this lacuna and contribute to the literature on Vietnamese 
American studies by investigating the presence of cross-national political ties among Vietnamese 
refugees as transnational actors rather than assimilated refugees with no transnational agency. 
This transnational paradigm offers me an arena in which to investigate the agency of those 
collectivities which are described as “unbound by national borders” (Goldring 2004). 
Investigating transnational interactions between Vietnam and the Vietnamese American 
community at the individual level of analysis, not only help to fundamentally challenge the ideas 
of the bounded nation-state, but also notions of an essentialist Vietnamese American culture. It is 
through such political means that the overseas Vietnamese community affirms its transnational 
status – this is the making of transnational Vietnam. 
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Argument of the thesis  
The central argument of this dissertation is that a stable and significant transnational field 
of political action connecting Vietnamese Americans with their country of origin does exist. My 
research demonstrates that certain practices – protests, petitions and participation in internet 
forums – emerge as the most frequent forms of transnational political activity that Vietnamese 
Americans engage in. In addition, certain demographic, contextual and resource-dependent 
factors help explain variations in the level of engagement in homeland politics. This section 
highlights my main findings and conclusions from both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. In this way, with a mixed-methods approach, this dissertation aims to bring to light the 
complex nature of Vietnamese Americans as emerging transnational subjects.  
Findings from qualitative analysis of interview data collected in the pilot phase of my 
research indicate that unlike other immigrant groups, at the individual level of analysis, 
Vietnamese Americans do not engage in a broad array of direct transnational political activities, 
such as sending remittances to political organizations back home (Mexican immigrants) or direct 
participation in electoral politics in the home country (Dominican immigrants). Forming exile 
governments and attempting to overthrow the communist leaders in Vietnam has been a popular 
form of political transnationalism in the past, but it was at the organizational rather than 
individual level (example, Government of Free Vietnam). Moreover, such political practices 
have subsided since the decline of violent political acts (arson, assassinations) in the late 1980s. 
Rather, homeland politics among Vietnamese Americans is more indirect and limited in scope – 
the most popular forms of transnational political activity are participating in protests and 
demonstrations, followed by writing to government officials and signing petitions, and 
participation in internet forums.  
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Furthermore, this dissertation adds insights to the transnationalism literature from the 
perspective of a vehemently anti-communist community that fled from political violence or the 
threat thereof – thus, all three political acts mentioned above have strong anti-communist 
agendas. For instance, Vietnamese Americans hold demonstrations in large numbers to 
vehemently protest any display of communist symbols (such as the communist flag or Ho Chi 
Minh’s portrait) in Little Saigon, Orange County. Similarly, signed letters and petitions sent to 
local government representatives in California appeal against continuing arrests and human 
rights abuses in Vietnam, while bloggers and other participants in internet-based forums dealing 
with Vietnamese issues rampantly denounce the ruling communist government in Hanoi. 
This study also speaks directly to the fact that the presence and dynamics of political 
transnationalism among all Vietnamese Americans is not uniform. Although there are common 
forces bearing on all members of the community, the particular circumstances of each individual 
also affect the extent and character of these activities. Findings from quantitative analysis of my 
survey data indicate that transnational political engagement among this group is significantly 
associated with age and differs by gender. Older Vietnamese Americans are more likely than 
younger ones to protest as well as sign petitions while men are more likely than women to 
engage in all three forms of transnational political activism. One significant finding of this study 
is that lack of a college degree – the independent variable for which there was overwhelming 
positive evidence in the theoretical literature – is not significantly associated with transnational 
political activism among Vietnamese Americans. In the case of participation in internet forums, 
what matters is place of college degree obtained - those who have earned a college degree in 
both Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to utilize this medium as a form of transnational 
political expression.  
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The evidence also suggests that it is not just the economically successful or more recently 
arrivals who are most prone to retaining ties with their home country politics. Vietnamese 
Americans who arrived in the U.S. in earlier waves and those who rated their level of English 
proficiency as poor are more likely to participate in protests and sign petitions than more recent 
arrivals and those who are proficient in English. Similarly, unemployed Vietnamese Americans 
and those with lower incomes are more likely to attend protests and demonstrations than 
Vietnamese Americans who are employed and those who have higher incomes. Thus, this 
dissertation also lays to rest any notion of Vietnamese Americans as solely nation-bound 
refugees without the resources, will or imagination to connect with those in Vietnam.  
 
Organization of the study  
 The above material has created a foundation for this study by defining pertinent aspects, 
such as a scope and significance, as well as discussing the argument of the thesis. Chapter Two 
examines the trajectory that has been followed in the literature on transnational studies so far and 
analyzes the major prevailing debates in the field. I develop the theoretical framework, drawing 
from the literature on transnationalism issues that directly relate to Vietnamese Americans as 
migrants and refugees, to political transnationalism and its determinants as claimed by the 
existing state of the art in transnationalism studies and on the basis of which I form my 
hypotheses for this study. In Chapter Three is a concise background regarding the flight of 
Vietnamese American refugees to the U.S. and a detailed description of the research design 
methods. My conceptualization of political transnationalism and possible explanatory factors of 
its variation among individual Vietnamese Americans are explained in the methods section. 
Sampling strategies and a description of the data collection procedures are all regarded in-depth 
as are methodological reasons for selecting variables such as age, gender, college degree, arrival 
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in U.S., English proficiency, employment status and income as they pertain to transnational 
political activism.  
Chapter Four gives a brief history on Vietnamese refugees and their flight to the United 
States, along with highlighting germane aspects of their educational and socioeconomic progress 
as pertinent to transnational activism. In Chapter Five, I provide a detailed quantitative analysis 
of survey data collected and discuss the results and their significance. Chapter Six examines the 
different kinds of transnational political activities the Vietnamese Americans engage in, based on 
my interview data. This chapter also engages in an in-depth, qualitative discussion of the results 
from ordinal regression in the previous chapter as well as compares and contrasts my findings 
with expectations from the theoretical literature. Finally, in Chapter 7, I wrap up with appropriate 
summaries by looking at each question individually and conclude by examining the future of 
Vietnamese Americans political transnationalism.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I provide a broad overview of the state of the art of the literature on 
migrant transnationalism and explore the ways in which refugee transnationalism is distinct 
enough to justify the investigation of transnational activism among Vietnamese refugees. I then 
go on to address the theoretical relevance of studying political transnationalism (as opposed to 
economic and socio-cultural forms of transnational activity) and expand on the ways in which 
transnational political activities affect outcomes abroad. Finally, I highlight those factors that are 
most frequently identified in the literature to explain variation in intensity of political 
transnationalism and that inform the hypotheses I test in this dissertation. 
 Transnational activities are those initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors like 
organized groups or networks of individuals across national borders that require coordination by 
members of civil society (Portes 2001). Many of these activities are informal, that is, they take 
place outside of state regulation and control since they are undertaken on their own behalf, rather 
than on behalf of the state or other corporate bodies. Transnationalism as a process then consists 
of relations and interactions that lead to the emergence of relatively stable and durable 
transnational societal spaces (Pries 2007). According to their level of institutionalization, 
fixedness or strength, Pries (2007, p. 21) distinguishes three types of such societal spaces: 
• At the micro-level, habitual and accountable patterns of action and behavior of 
individuals, households and their social networks in transnational everyday life – for 
example, Mexican immigrants in the U.S. making cash gifts to relatives in Mexico during 
annual homecoming trips;  
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• At the meso-level, transnational organizations as stable and dense loci of cooperation and 
interaction with rules of membership, given structures and processes, and stated goals and 
purposes – for example, non-profit organizations such as Greenpeace and Oxfam with 
decentralized resource structures and, at the same time, intense coordination patterns;  
• At the macro-level, transnational institutions as complex frameworks of routines, rules 
and norms, which structure significant terrains of life – for example, border crossing 
migration systems or societal institutions such as governmental agencies that structure 
transnationality and citizenship. 
In this dissertation, I focus on the micro-level transnational societal space and concern myself 
with patterns of actions and behavior of individual Vietnamese refugees living in the United 
States, who may or may not be members of transnational Vietnamese organizations. 
  
The term ‘transnationalism’ has been used in the social sciences and cultural studies to 
signal an abatement of national boundaries and the development of ideas or political institutions 
that span national borders and include actors that are not states (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, p. 9). 
The term is especially relevant to migration studies; migration scholars locate transnational 
processes within the life experiences of individual migrants and families, constituting the ups and 
downs of daily activities, concerns, fears and achievements (Rouse 1992). Until recently, 
however, in the United States, several generations of researchers (see, for example, Handlin 
1973, Glazer and Moynihan 1970) have viewed immigrants as persons who uproot themselves, 
leave behind broken homes, interrupting a familiar life and ceasing to belong. The history of 
immigration is a history of alienation and its consequence: the immigrants lived in crisis because 
they were uprooted.  
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Refugees take a special interest in this discourse: Gordenker (1987, p. 138) writes that the 
principle of third country resettlement formally implies abandoning any real hope of returning to 
the land of origin. It also implies the re-socialization of refugees into the political and social 
norms of the society (Strand and Jones 1985). What has been uniformly defined as unacceptable 
was a migration in which immigrants or refugees settled permanently in their new country while 
maintaining tie to countries they still saw as homelands (Glick Schiller et al. 1995). And yet this 
is an emerging pattern among migrant populations in the United States.  
 
Migrant Transnationalism  
This section introduces the concept of migrant transnationalism that emerged as a 
discipline of study in the early 1990s and then goes on to attend to two of the prevailing 
questions in the literature, namely (a) how do we define migrant transnationalism and decide 
which activities are encompassed by this concept in terms of intensity of institutionalization, 
degree of movement in the transnational field and involvement in transnational activities; and (b) 
is the phenomenon of migrant transnationalism novel enough or sufficiently distinct to justify a 
new area of investigation? Finally, I also address the question of how immigrant transnational 
practice is relevant in host society integration and significant in that it alters outcomes abroad. 
Starting in the late 1980s, a handful of scholars of contemporary migration rejected the 
prevailing view of immigrants as uprooted persons and took note of the transnational networks of 
immigrants (Glick Schiller 1999a, Vertovec 2001). Calling attention to the fact that a significant 
proportion of the migrants who settle in and become well-incorporated into the United States still 
maintain home ties, they proposed transnational migration or transnationalism as a new paradigm 
for the study of migration across the borders of nation-states. This discovery of transnational 
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practices among immigrants by an enterprising group of anthropologists led by Nina Glick 
Schiller, Cristina Blanc-Szanton, and Linda Basch led to an enthusiastic flurry of activity seeking 
to document the most varied manifestations of this phenomenon. Transnationalism was defined 
by these authors as “the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and 
sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies 
of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross 
national borders” (Basch et al. 1994, p.6).3 
Immigrant transnationalism began as a reactive phenomenon to the forces of 
globalization and nation-state building projects. It continues as an alternative adaptation process 
to assimilation. Nancy Foner (2005, p. 62-63) writes, “In a transnational perspective, the focus is 
on how contemporary migrants maintain familial, economic, cultural as well as political ties 
across international borders, in effect making the home and host society a single arena of social 
action”. In this respect, transnationalism is also about agency. While mainstream/domestic 
politics of minorities is generally a reaction of ethnic communities to the injustices they feel 
from the dominant culture, the transnational political paradigm is a broader concept for political 
empowerment (Valverde 1994). It allows for growth and participation in the host society at large 
and also enhances culture, individual identity and global participation. It encourages ethnic 
awareness, cultural preservation and community security which can best be attained through 
close relations with one’s ethnic community. By combining the local with the international, 
ethnic communities as well as individuals belonging to them can find self-empowerment while 
helping with the growth of the nation (Valverde 1994).  
3 Portes (1997, p. 812) characterizes transnationalism as the formation of dense networks across political borders 
created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. 
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Similarly, Vu Pham (2003) describes transnationalism as actions and experiences that 
occur when migrants politically, economically and socially link two or more nations. These ties 
need not always exist with multiple physical movements by these migrants across national 
boundaries, but can take place through actions such as political lobbying or economic 
remittances (Pham 2003). Immigrants and their home country counterparts organize 
transnational enterprises, mobilize for political action, and transform the character of local 
religious and cultural forms through their continuous back-and-forth exchanges. 
During the 1990s, pioneer research on transnational migration and on transnationalism in 
general, especially when confronted with skeptical criticism, frequently concentrated its efforts 
on proving the mere existence of transnational phenomena (Pries 2007). Today, the expansion of 
immigrant populations in First World cities generate the basis for the future expansion of 
transnational activities; these initiatives are also fostered by the common situation encountered 
by Third World immigrants, namely as occupants of stigmatized low-paid occupations and 
subjects of widespread discrimination (Portes 2001). These difficult conditions offer a strong 
incentive for newcomers, especially the more educated and better connected, to mobilize their 
transnational networks in search of alternatives (See Guarnizo and Portes 2001; Levitt 2001). 
The number and scope of such activities has also continued to expand significantly because, 
unlike the grassroots activism, immigrant transnationalism is not driven by ideological reasons 
but by the very logic of global capitalism (Portes 2001).  
Today, the main task is currently no longer to show that transnational social phenomena 
exist but, rather, as most authors in this research field agree, to demonstrate that the successful 
establishment of transnationalism as a valuable concept has led to new theoretical and empirical 
perspectives (See Portes et al. 1999; Levitt 2001; Vertovec 2003, 2004, Levitt and Jaworski 
17 
 
2007). A transnational approach accents the fact that immigrants construct and reconstitute their 
simultaneous embeddedness in more than one nation-state, thereby affecting the demographic 
and social composition of the nation-state. Aihwa Ong (1999) goes as far as to say that both 
migrants and governments have developed a flexible notion of citizenship. Similarly, Linda 
Bosniak (2006, p. 25) argues that even claims of “transnational citizenship” now seem more 
plausible since many scholars (Keck and Sikkink 1998) have described democratic practices 
engaged across national borders in the form of transnational social movements as citizenship. 
This requires recognition of citizenship practices in the domain of civil society that is not 
nationally bounded but takes transnational form. Hence, rather than viewing migrants as bereft of 
human agency, we ought to regard them, as Arjun Appadurai (1996, p. 190) argues, as engaging 
in a “global production of locality”, in which transnational flows of people, goods, and 
knowledge become imaginative resources for creating communities and virtual neighborhoods. 
Transnational studies have opened opportunities to understand “local realities in a global 
context” (Valverde 2002, p. 6). For instance, scholars on transnationalism have looked at global 
cities and their highly-skilled transnationals (Sassen 1991); the complexity of transnational 
citizenship and their multiple national affiliations (Laguerre 1998, 1999); transnational acts 
circumventing the nation-state (Smith 1994); and the power of information technology in 
creating transnational action (Castells 1996). Other influential studies have highlighted the 
important connections between minorities in the U.S. and other countries, such as the works on 
Mexican transmigrants with their transnational circuits (Rouse 1991); diasporic Chinese 
businessmen negotiating “flexible citizenships” (Ong 1993, 1999); and the transnational flows of 
capital, culture and peoples from Haiti, Grenada and the Philippines (Glick-Schiller et al. 1995). 
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How do we define migrant transnationalism? 
Nancy Foner (2005, p. 63) writes, “Since the early 1990s, a virtual academic industry has 
developed on transnationalism, giving rise to debates on a variety of topics, including the very 
definition of the term itself. Some scholars prefer to speak of transnational practices or networks; 
others of transnational communities or villages; still others of transnational social spaces or 
social fields”. Again, some writers have described transnational entrepreneurs as an exceptional 
breed, whereas others would say that all immigrants participate in the transnational community.  
Sometimes the terms transnational and transnationalism are used so vaguely and 
indistinctly that they are likely to become ‘catch-all and say nothing’ terms, as was the case with 
the globalization concept. In fact, according to Alejandro Portes (2001), the basis for such 
disagreements has to do less with the actual existence of the phenomenon than with 
methodological shortcomings that led to its overestimation in the early literature and the 
conceptual failure to distinguish between cross-border activities carried out by major institutions 
and or multinational activities conducted by private actors in civil society. Of course, one reason 
for the overextended claims of the earlier writings had to do with an understandable enthusiasm 
about the novelty of the phenomenon and, in particular, the ways in which it challenged models 
of immigrant assimilation (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999).   
Strengthening the conceptual foundation for transnationalism then concerns the 
differentiation between transnational and other types of international relations. According to 
Pries (2007) in order to develop a specific and empirically useful approach on transnationalism, 
generally societal spaces are considered transnational only if “they differ from other types of 
international and multinational relations and conform to the following criteria: the distribution of 
resources, culture, interests and power is polycentric and not mono-centric”. In other words, 
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transnationalism need not privilege one nation as a center, since it challenges the concepts of 
“home” and “host” countries as statically defined notions (Pham 2003). This sets transnational 
societal spaces apart from, for instance, simple multinational societal spaces in which the 
distribution is polycentric but coordination is only weak, and from mono-centric societal spaces 
where coordination mechanisms could be strong but distribution is centre-periphery-like rather 
than homogeneous (Pries 2005). In this sense, the proposed concept of transnational societal 
space is narrower than the rather unspecific terms ‘transnational network’ or ‘transnational field’. 
Using these defining criteria it is possible, Pries (2007) argues, to distinguish a 
transnational migration family from a simple emigration/immigration or return migration family. 
In the immigration/emigration case, the ongoing coordination mechanisms for resources (like 
sending remittances) for culture (such as making transnational phone calls once a week or 
sending letters), for interests (like going to school or having a stable working career) and for 
power relations (such as the competency to decide over who goes where and when), become 
more and more centered in the society of arrival while in the case of return migrants all these 
aspects are strongly centered and focused on the society of departure. In contrast, actual 
transnational migration and the corresponding transnational societal spaces span more or less 
homogeneously and without a clear center or point of reference between different locales, 
countries or regions (Pries 2007). 
In response to the predicament of overextended use of the term, Portes, Guarnizo and 
Landolt (1999, p. 219) also offer guiding assumptions to fine-tuning the study of transnational 
activities: 
a) the process involves a significant proportion of persons in the relevant universe (in this 
case, immigrants and their home country counterparts); 
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b) the activities of interest are not fleeting or exceptional but possess certain stability and 
resilience over time; 
c) the content of these activities is not captured by some pre-existing concept.  
 
This, however, still leaves us with a pretty broad interpretation of the concept of migrant 
transnationalism. In fact, Portes et al. (1999) recommend delimiting the concept of 
transnationalism to any occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social 
contacts over time across national borders for their implementation. They argue that within the 
definition of transnationalism, it is possible to accommodate a number of diverse activities, 
ranging from economic initiatives of transnational entrepreneurs who mobilize their contacts 
across borders in search of suppliers and markets to political activities of community leaders 
whose main goals are the achievement of political power in the sending or receiving countries 
and socio-cultural enterprises oriented towards the reinforcement of a national identity abroad or 
the collective enjoyment of cultural events and goods (Portes et al. 1999, pp. 219-221). 
Itzigsohn, Cabal, Medina and Vasquez (1999) differentiate between narrow and broad 
transnational practices as two poles of a continuum defined by the degree of institutionalization, 
degree of movement within the transnational field, and degree of involvement in transnational 
activities. 
“Transnationality in a ‘narrow’ sense refers to those people involved in economic, political, 
social, or cultural practices that involve a regular movement within the geographic 
transnational field, a high level of institutionalization, or constant personal involvement. 
Transnationality in a ‘broad’ sense refers to a series of material and symbolic practices in 
which people engage that involve only sporadic physical movement between the two 
countries, a low level of institutionalization, or just occasional personal involvement, but 
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nevertheless includes both countries as reference points” (Itzigsohn, Cabal, Medina and 
Vasquez 1999). 
Pries (2007, pp. 3-4) opines that instead of ‘viewing transnational relations in any 
corner’, it is necessary to define appropriate units of analysis for transnational societal 
phenomena. The simplest transnational societal unit of analysis, according to him, could be a 
‘transnational social relation’, like the communication and interchange between a migrant and 
his or her family abroad. The units of analysis in transnational studies are most frequently 
individuals, biographies, families, organizations, institutions and identities (Pries 2007). In my 
investigation of transnational political activities of Vietnamese refugees in America, the political 
interchanges between individual refugees and Vietnam would represent the individual unit of 
analysis – whatever the operationalization of the theoretical-analytical concept of political 
transnationalism (explained in greater in the Methodology chapter) looks like.  
At the other end of the spectrum, some scholars propose substantially modifying the 
concept of migrant transnationalism, or even abandoning it altogether in favor of more limited 
concepts. For instance, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004, 2008) argue that delimiting the concept 
of transnationalism, as Glick-Schiller et al. (1992) and Portes et al. (1999) have done, renders it 
so encompassing as to virtually erase the distinction between here and there. Because states seek 
to control movement – exit as well as entry – across territorial borders, to define transnationalism 
in terms of the “regular and sustained cross-border activities of individuals” is to ignore that this 
is a world divided by states, many of them expelling their undesirable residents or closing their 
doors to foreigners. They also claim that while scholars of immigrant transnationalism have 
veered so far toward celebrating transnationalism and depicting the phenomenon as subversive 
and transnationals as grassroots actors challenging the hegemony of states and global capitalism 
from below, this view is hardly evidenced by the past century’s record of producing refugees 
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without home or host, let alone persons without a state. They subsequently advocate adopting a 
much narrower definition of the term transnationalism as “the collision of the social organization 
of migration, and its state-spanning results, with reactive efforts by state and civil society actors 
to produce state-society alignment” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, p. 1186; Waldinger 2008). 
 Similarly, Guarnizo (2003) claims that in order to temper often exaggerated conclusions 
from earlier studies that portrayed virtually every contemporary migrant as transnationally 
engaged, it became acceptable for transnational studies to investigate and analyze transnational 
migration focused only on a specific kind of action (e.g., political participation) or a single 
activity (e.g., participating in transnational civic organizations such as hometown associations). 
He then proposes abandoning it altogether in favor of a more limited concept, “transnational 
living” – defined as an evolving condition contingent on the relationship between migrants’ 
resources and socio-cultural positioning, as well as the historical contexts in the specific 
localities where they live (Guarnizo 2003, p. 670). 
Clearly, not all immigrants are transmigrants. Relative to migration, transnational 
practices are still quite limited in absolute and relative numbers. It is, therefore, more useful to 
conceptualize transnationalism as one form of economic, political, and cultural activities that co-
exists with other, more traditional forms, such as international and multinational activities. 
Although I accept some of the critiques leveled against the indiscriminate application of 
transnationalism, I do not believe that either the concept or the research field should be 
abandoned. On the contrary, I aim to further enrich its conceptualization by extending the 
refugee transnational into the realm of the political, an area of scholarship in which it has only 
recently begun to be applied. Following Pries (2007), I define the level of analysis of 
transnationalism among Vietnamese refugees at the individual level and following Itzigsohn et 
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al. (1999), I refer to their transnational political activities (protesting, petitioning and 
participating in internet forums) in a broader sense of the term when considering degree of 
institutionalization and degree of involvement in transnational activities.  
 
Is migrant transnationalism a new phenomenon? 
Another prevailing debate in the transnationalism literature is: is transnationalism 
actually a new immigration experience or is it rather an extension of the manner in which 
migrants, as they settled in a new society, have always extended their social fields to include 
their home societies? In other words, is there anything new about these types of transnational 
relations that have existed for as long as nations, nation states and national societies have 
existed? Transnationalism has been described anywhere from novel and emergent to being as old 
as labor immigration itself (Portes et al 1999).  
Scholars like Nancy Foner (2005, p. 63) argue that transnationalism is not a new 
phenomenon and that early claims of transnationalism’s “newness” were exaggerated. In fact, 
shortly after the original pronouncements by Glick Schiller and her collaborators on the novelty 
and importance of transnationalism, critics rejected these claims by pointing to the presence of 
similar practices among immigrant groups in the past (Portes 2001). They pointed out that 
multiple historical instances of grassroots cross-border activities exist and have been extensively 
documented. For instance, at the turn of the twentieth century Polish, Italian and Russian 
immigrants had also forged multi-stranded relations linking together their societies of origin and 
settlement by investing in land and businesses back home, crossing the Atlantic to visit families, 
and sponsoring political causes favoring independence or a change of regime (Foner 1997). On 
24 
 
the other side of the world, the overseas Chinese had been creating for decades complex trading 
communities spanning nations across the Pacific Rim (Portes 2001).  
Similarly, Portes et al. (Haller and Guarnizo 2002) note the existence of precedents to 
contemporary transnationalism. They argue that transnationalism was alive and well a hundred 
years ago; what has changed is merely the nature of transnational connections due to advances in 
transportation and communication technologies. Rouse (1991, pp. 12-14) writes that with tight 
networks of continuous circulation of people, money, goods and information, past migrants have 
had little trouble participating in transnational migrant circuits. The point that there was really 
nothing new in the cross-border activities of contemporary immigrants implied that if these 
practices had always existed, then there was no novelty or justification for the introduction of a 
new term.  
To say that transnationalism is not completely new or necessary as a term does not 
invalidate its importance as a conceptual framework. In fact, one of the benefits of transnational 
perspective is that it can shed fresh light on the past, just as it can bring new insights into the 
study of immigration in the present (Foner 2005). Until the concept of immigrant 
transnationalism was coined and refined, the common character and significance of disparate 
historical cross-border activities remained obscure. For instance, the parallels between Russian 
and Polish émigré political activism and the trading activities of the Chinese diaspora, for 
example, could not have been established because there was no theoretical idea that linked them 
and pointed to their similarities (Portes 2001, p. 184). In its absence, the respective events 
remained disparate and isolated from each other, as well as from present instances of immigrant 
transnationalism. 
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On the other hand, some transnationalism scholars argue that transnational migration 
differs significantly from previous migration experiences in terms of the sheer numbers of 
migrants’ involvements in both the home and host societies. It is the scale and intensity of such 
relations that differentiates transnational activities from those of earlier migrants (Portes et al. 
1999, Glick Schiller et al. 1995). Moreover, what distinguishes this immigrant experience from 
earlier remittances and home ties that immigrants have always maintained and makes it truly 
“transnational” is the emergence of a social process in which migrants establish social fields that 
cross geographic, cultural and political borders and make decisions, take actions and develop 
identities within these social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously 
(Basch et al. 1994, p. 7). Hence, a new conceptualization, transnationalism, is needed in order to 
come to terms with the experience and consciousness of this new migrant population that 
maintains multiple relations – familial, social, economic, organizational, religious and political 
that span borders (Glick Schiller et al. 1995).  
Moreover, the above-mentioned transnational social or societal spaces could also be 
conceptualized in a narrow sense. By this, they could be understood as nation states and national 
societies spanning interaction frameworks in the dimensions of (a) intensive and stable social 
practices, (b) systems of symbols, and (c) artifacts (Pries 2007, p. 5). According to Pries, used in 
this more specific sense of transnational spaces, these could be considered as a relatively novel 
topic recently discussed since the last quarter of the 20th century. The development of these 
transnational social spaces was pushed by innovative and cheap international communication 
technologies, such as the telephone, fax-machine, Internet and airplane transportation as a mass 
medium rather than an elite mobility system. 
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According to Glick Schiller et al. (1992, p. 8), an examination of the economic forces that 
structure the flows of international migration today and place the migrants’ responses to these 
forces within the global capitalist context of differential power and inequality enable us to 
experience the differences between past and present migrants. The economic dislocations in both 
the Third World and in industrialized nations resulting from the growing internationalization of 
capital increased migration, and yet made it difficult for the migrants to construct some cultural, 
social or economic bases within their new settings. This vulnerability led migrants to construct a 
transnational existence by continuously translating the economic and social position gained in 
one political setting into political, social and economic capital in another (Glick Schiller et al. 
1992).  
Today’s transmigrants are also different from those of the past as they are more likely to 
come from the peripheral world, be persons of color and include a large number of professionals 
(Rios 1992). Another distinctive feature is that they hold on to their native cultures and 
traditional networks in unprecedented ways. Participants are often bilingual, move easily 
between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two centers, and pursue economic, 
political and cultural interests that require their presence in both (Portes 1997).  
States, on their part, far from withering away in the epoch of transnationalism, are 
promoting the reproduction of transnational subjects by officially incorporating their “officials” 
residing abroad into their newly configured trans-territorial nation-state (Smith and Guarnizo 
2004, p. 5). This political process has been termed by Basch et al. (1994, p. 19) as 
“deterritorialized” nation-state formation – a construct that defines state boundaries in socio-
political rather than geographic terms.  
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In my opinion, transnationalism does mark a new type of migrant existence. While a high 
intensity of transnational exchanges, new modes of transacting, and a multiplication of activities 
that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis are what constitute the true 
originality of the phenomenon, it cannot be denied that the occasional contacts, trips and 
activities across national borders that do not require a high level of institutionalization also 
contribute to strengthening the transnational field. The latter form of transnational activism can 
be said to represent transnationalism in a broader sense of the term and, therefore, is worth 
investigating. 
 
In what ways is migrant transnationalism relevant? 
Theoretically, the significance of studying immigrant transnationalism lies in the fact that 
it alters immigrants’ process of integration to the host society. According to Portes (2001, p. 188) 
transnationalism may actually accompany and support successful integration into the host society 
by offering a viable alternative to bypass both labor market constraints and prejudice of the host 
society. The economic resources created by transnational enterprise can empower immigrants to 
resist exploitation in the labor market and propel themselves and their families into the native 
middle-class. The cultivation of strong networks with the country of origin and the 
implementation of economic and political initiatives based on these networks helps immigrants 
solidify their position in the receiving society and cope more effectively with its barriers. In fact, 
Landolt (2001) argues that transnationalism provides immigrant groups with an extra lift in terms 
of material and moral resources unavailable to those cut off from transnational activities. 
Moreover, to the extent that transnational activities support the successful economic and social 
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integration of immigrant families, they bear positively on second-generation youths (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001, Levitt and Jaworski 2007). 
Another reason why the study of immigrant transnationalism is significant is its bearing 
on the development of sending countries, i.e. it plays an important role in altering outcomes 
abroad. Taking into account the aggregate volume of remittances sent by migrants, their 
investments in the home economy, and their political influence in terms of both contributions to 
parties and candidates in national elections and organized mobilizations abroad, governments of 
sending countries have moved in recent years to intensify their contacts with their respective 
diaspora and involve them in various forms in national life (Portes 2001). Dual citizenship and 
dual nationality laws for emigrants have been passed in many countries; expatriates have been 
granted rights to vote in national elections; and some governments have even explored ways to 
grant emigrant communities representation in the national legislatures (Østergaard-Nielsen 
2001). The visits by party officials and political dignitaries of Third World countries to their 
expatriate communities in the United States or Europe have become commonplace. Further, 
several Third World governments have established agencies and programs abroad targeting their 
emigrants and seeking to provide various services to them (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Landolt 
2001; Smith 2000).  
Thus, for sending country governments, their migrants have become increasingly 
important, not only as sources of remittances, investments, and political contributions but also as 
potential ambassadors or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; 
Levitt 2001). At the local level, the cumulative process of migration and the transnational 
activities of migrants can entirely transform the economic and political structure of towns and 
rural communities in sending countries as well as their culture. Given this impact of immigrant 
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transnationalism, let us now look into the special significance of studying transnationalism 
among Vietnamese Americans as an immigrant group. 
 
Refugee Transnationalism  
An important theoretical significance of studying transnationalism among Vietnamese 
Americans is that they arrived in the United States as refugees. By understanding the difference 
between immigrants and refugees, one can form a clearer picture of the way their 
“transnationalisms” are different (Alkire 2006). Unfortunately, little differentiation is given by 
researchers or the general public between an immigrant and refugee status in the developed 
world, making it even more challenging to appropriately understand either population. The 
following section contends with the question of why refugees are sufficiently distinct from 
immigrants to justify a separate area of transnational research and how their refugee status 
affects the transnational activism of refugees. 
In what ways are refugee transnationals different from immigrants? 
Immigrants are persons who come to a country to take up permanent residence. They are 
voluntary migrants who choose to make the move to another country, usually to join family 
members who already live in that country or to seek work and a better life for themselves and 
their families. On the other hand, numerous arguments have arisen concerning the meaning of 
the word refugee and the conferral of refugee status on an individual or a group of migrants. The 
definition used by the United Nations is a convenient starting point; a refugee is an individual 
who: 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
memberships of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
or her nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
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country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, in unable or, owing to 
such fear, unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 1979). 
 
This definition was applied, unquestioned, to the Vietnamese when they first began 
arriving in the United States. Generals, high and middle level military officers, government 
ministers, employees of the United States Information Agency, the CIA, American corporations 
and contractors and the American embassy – all these people feared for their lives as well as for 
their property and social positions. American embassy officials drew up lists of “high risk” 
individuals to be evacuated in case the government should fall (Kelly 1977). Moreover, the 
Vietnamese boat people left their homes not because they were Catholics, anti-Communists, 
associated with foreigners or upper class, but because the villages they lived in had become free-
fire zones, battlefields and/or razed to the ground by rockets and mortars (Kelly 1977). They left 
home because they knew they would be killed or mutilated if they stayed there. Thus, most 
Vietnamese left out of fear, acting as refugees. 
Scholarship of refugees has traditionally focused overwhelmingly on the so-called 
practical issues of repatriation and integration, or on socio-psychological aspects of assimilation 
in host cultures and the transition of refugees to ‘ethnic minorities’ (Portes and Rumbaut 1996, 
pp. 92-107). At best, the refugee was grafted onto the social body of the host society (Shami 
1996). Refugee communities were thus seen as divorced from any kind of transnational 
existence, unlike immigrant communities who began to be viewed as transnationals starting in 
the 1980s. The principal theoretical implication of studying refugee transnationalism is that it 
might be possible to conceive of refugee communities and transnational communities as co-
existing on a single continuum and that, refugees can move along this continuum to transform 
into transnationals (Koser 2001).  
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Incorporating a transnational analysis recognizes that refugees are simultaneously 
connected to multiple nation-states; they retain and develop multiple relationships both within 
and between the sending and receiving countries (Al-Ali and Koser 2002, Sherrell and Hyndman 
2006). Rogg (1971, pp. 474-481) states that political refugees often tend to be educated and from 
high socio-economic positions. This was true in the case of the first wave of Vietnamese 
refugees. Thus, a transnational lens would allow me to take into account the fact that Vietnamese 
refugees, as a class of transmigrants, also live their lives across national borders and respond to 
the demands and constraints of two or more states. 
Unlike most immigrants, Vietnamese refugees entered the United States with few 
belongings and did not even have the long term goals of gaining citizenship and being able to 
fully access the mainstream American way of life, as immigrants typically do. The migration 
process for Vietnamese refugees began when they entered refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Guam, where they waited from months to years for a representative from a social 
service agency to announce an opening in the U.S. with an organization willing to sponsor them 
(Southeast Asian Archive 1999; SEARAC 2009). The refugees generally arrived in America 
with limited education, few language skills, no income and little exposure to Western culture. 
After arrival, they were totally dependent on their sponsors for food, clothing, money, housing 
and a job until such time as they could become self-sufficient (Desbarats 1986). Residential 
permanency and resettlement in America would come in the form of housing and employment, 
neither of which was readily available at the onset of their arrival. Such an instance of 
transnationalism among refugees as distinct from voluntary migrants is worth investigating since 
the specific circumstances surrounding refugee migration can affect the level and intensity of 
transnational linkages.  
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How does refugee status affect transnational activities? 
It must be recognized that the agency and life choices of uprooted refugees thrown into 
transnational realities, often against their will, are quite differentially situated than those of 
(im)migrants when physical presence is impossible in the home country (Nolin 2002). The 
traditional definition of transnational migration assumes the freedom of choice in the migration 
decision (Peterson 1958, Strand and Jones 1985). Refugee migrants, however, relocate because 
of a threat of political persecution or conflict – this relocation is largely involuntary, often with 
little notice. “It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive motivations to 
settle elsewhere, which characterizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the 
voluntary migrant” (Kunz 1973, p. 130).  
Circumstances in the host country may also affect refugee transnational linkages. For 
instance, Salvadorans in the 1990s were granted temporary protective status (TPS) in the U.S., 
which carried no promises of asylum or temporary residence and restricted access to 
governmental support programs (Bailey et al. 2002, p. 127, 129). In their host country, majority 
of Salvadorans were not recognized as refugees, but were seen as illegal immigrants in search of 
work. Bailey et al. (2002) argue that such TPS-class persons are likely to have very different 
economic, social and political experiences than immigrants or even other refugees. 
The transnational activities of refugees then encompass a host of motivations, influences, 
desires and imperatives quite distinct from voluntary migrants (Nolin 2002). This is because the 
transnational social fields that refugees forge and maintain are decidedly different from those of 
other migrants, who are socially and financially prepared to leave in the first place and who form 
transnational networks in a "quest for economic advancement and social recognition” (Portes 
1997, p. 812). For instance, Catherine Nolin (2002, 2006) in her study on Guatemalan refugees 
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in southern Ontario, Canada, found that Canadian refugee narratives lack a distinct ‘return 
ideology’ found among migrants who travel with two- or three-year work plans, certain of their 
return and, therefore, are motivated to remit in order to guarantee family survival. In contrast, 
many Guatemalans who fled to Canada for survival reasons hold no illusions of return. She 
argues that unlike the lively transnationalism documented in an immigration context, refugee 
transnationalism (she studied traveling and sending money home) operates sporadically and 
poses greater challenges for maintaining significant connections. Varying legal status, the 
continuing instability, impunity and insecurity associated with living conditions in the home 
country, low income levels (in both countries) leading to the lack of communication, and 
physical distance between the two countries inhibiting regular travel, could all work to create 
transnational ruptures rather than transnational flows (Nolin 2002).  
Forced migration is also distinct from voluntary migration in terms of the development of 
transnational relations. Al-Ali et al. (2001a) argue that the immediate concern of new refugee 
arrivals is to try to secure their positions in their new host countries. Few have the financial 
resources and social networks even to re-establish contacts with relatives and friends left behind, 
far less become involved in transnational activities. Sporadic remittances of money or gifts may 
represent the beginnings of transnational activities and relations for recent refugees who are 
struggling to establish themselves in the host society (Sherrell and Hyndman 2006). Over time, 
the very networks, patterns of connections and paths of travel shaped by earlier migrants can 
potentially be appropriated by refugees seeking links with their country of origin.  
It could also be argued that forced migration sometimes leads to ‘forced 
transnationalism’. For example, family responsibilities, social obligation and/or bureaucratic 
affairs, such as a property claim, might push refugees to a substantial involvement with their 
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home country even in the absence of any desire to return (Al-Ali et al. 2001b). Assisting families 
and friends financially or with goods, such as medicine and clothes, is also often perceived to be 
a responsibility, occasionally even a burden. Cindy Horst (2006) in her work amongst Somali 
refugees in the Dadaab camps of Kenya highlights the transnational connections in the refugees’ 
lives when she describes how cultural-religious responsibility of Somali refugees in the U.S. to 
assist family members is central to the livelihoods of Somalis refugees in the first country of 
asylum, Kenya.  
The physical violence (or threat thereof) and political persecution experienced by 
refugees in their home country prior to flight can also shape the trajectory of transnational 
activities undertaken by them. It is likely that refugees who were forced to flee from their 
homeland will be politicized to a greater degree and will want the international community to 
know of their plight, leading to a higher motivation for transnational activism. Thus, by 
incorporating experiences of political violence into the concept of immigrant transnationalism, a 
differentiated sense of refugee transnationalism emerges that is infused by the effects of political 
violence and forced displacement. Given the experiences or fear of political persecution by the 
Vietnamese refugees, it is imperative to keep in mind that the circumstances of their emigration 
may possibly have an effect on their transnational activism. 
Refugee transnational processes seem to be accompanied by the re-inscription of lost 
identity on to the territory of the homeland (Gupta 1992). Though physical mobility may be more 
restricted in the refugee context (especially when the circumstances that led to their flight persist 
in the home country), imaginative, situated identity and social expression metaphorically work to 
suture the many fragments of identity and social relations in the process of reconstructing 
shattered lives and thus, challenge the centrality of mobility to notions of transnationalism (Nolin 
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2002). Thus, in contrast to immigrant transnationalism, refugee transnationalism incorporates a 
conceptual shift from a focus on “connections” to “ruptures and sutures” (Nolin 2002, p. 65) of 
identity and sense of belonging. This makes refugee transnationalism a particularly interesting 
and useful category of migrants to study. My focus, therefore, is on the possibilities offered by 
the transnational optic for studying the Vietnamese refugee diaspora in the United States. 
As transnational actors, Vietnamese refugees have displayed considerable tenacity and 
agency in maintaining connections with their home country despite the odds. According to 
Valverde (2002), there exists a wide spectrum of transnational actors, with some having much 
greater economic and political power than others. At the very top of the transnational class 
hierarchy are elite transnationals – global citizens, who inhabit “global cities” (Sassen 1991) 
made up of highly skilled, wealthy professionals. For example, Aihwa Ong (1993, p. 770) 
describes the wealthy Chinese diasporas in California, who not only live in the most exclusive 
neighborhoods but also, by using shreds of Orientalism “convert political constraints in one field 
into economic opportunities in another, to turn displacement into advantageous positioning in a 
range of local contexts”.  
Needless to say, Vietnamese Americans, when they arrived as refugees, lay at the other 
end of the transnational class hierarchy. Despite this, Vietnamese Americans have forged 
transnational connections in the areas of economics, culture and politics. Today, Vietnam heralds 
its overseas population as bridge builders and a great source of highly skilled professionals, 
calling upon them to contribute their knowledge to help rebuild Vietnam. Thus, the Vietnamese 
experience in the United States has been greatly affected by transnational linkages with Vietnam. 
This dissertation project is by no means an exhaustive account of refugee transnationalism. 
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Rather, my particular questions have led me to illuminate the material conditions characterizing 
Vietnamese Americans as refugees in their political trans-nationality. 
 
Political Transnationalism 
 The following section introduces political transnationalism as one of the many forms of 
transnational activities undertaken by migrants, and defines what constitutes transnational 
political activities and articulates what their relevance in the home as well as host countries’ 
politics is. Political transnationalism has very recently emerged as a growing dimension of 
transnational studies. Research in this field includes studies of migrant hometown associations 
(Caglar 2006, Bada 2003), comparative analyses of diaspora or homeland politics (Ostergaard-
Nielson 2003, Itzigsohn 2000) and determinants of transnational political practices (Guarnizo, 
Portes and Haller 2003). My research seeks to further develop this last field of political 
transnationalism – determinants of individual practices – in the context of Vietnamese refugees 
in the United States.  
Political analysis in the field of transnational studies has been conducted, following 
Smith and Bakker (2008), at four levels of analysis: global civil society, transnational social 
movements, social networks and individual migrants. In discourses on global civil society, 
global-level institutional actors like governmental, international nongovernmental and 
supranational organizations – for example, regional political formations such as the European 
Union – seek to disseminate universal discourses involving issues of human rights, peace and 
international security. The second of these approaches focuses on the activities of transnational 
social movements, advocacy networks and coalitions – for instance, explorations on the social 
movement against the expansion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and specifically, the 
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1999 Battle of Seattle protests. The global civil society as well as transnational social movement 
literatures tend to locate political agency at the level of supranational actors in a top-down 
approach, thereby downplaying or ignoring sub-national actors such as local grassroots forces in 
peripheral societies (Smith and Bakker 2008). 
 The third approach focuses on social networks developed by transnational migrants that 
have developed new conceptualizations of trans-local community development and the 
extraterritorial extension of political parties. Finally, and most germane to my research the fourth 
approach centers on the actual cross-border political practices of international migrants at the 
individual level of analysis. This literature examines the connections between migrant 
transnational politics in countries of origin and immigrant incorporation and ethnic politics in the 
country of settlement, drawing on quantitative survey methods in which the individual level of 
analysis and the factors influencing an individual migrant’s propensity to engage in transnational 
political life are given precedence.  
In this dissertation, I similarly emphasize the importance of highlighting transnational 
efforts of sub-national actors like individual migrants or refugee groups in a bottom-up approach; 
by profiling the case of homeland politics among Vietnamese refugees and their transnational 
political engagement, I seek to contribute to this particular literature on political 
transnationalism. 
 
What constitutes political transnationalism?  
 The field of migrants' transnational practices encompasses a wide range of phenomena 
such as transnational election campaigns and cross-border voting, migrants’ rallies against 
injustices in the country of origin or demonstrations to defend it, or engagement in hometown 
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association projects in the region of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). As opposed to immigrant 
politics which is undertaken to better migrants’ situation in the host country, the political 
activities of migrants (and refugees) pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland 
constitute homeland politics and is the focus of my study of political transnationalism among 
Vietnamese refugees. 
 Following Itzigsohn et al. (1999), the distinction made between narrow and broad 
definitions of migrant transnationalism (described in the section on migrant transnationalism) 
can also be applied to political transnationalism. In terms of transnational political practices, 
then, “narrow” transnationalism refers to direct forms of cross-border participation in the country 
of origin by migrants and refugees (such as voting in elections and direct monetary support to 
political parties), while “broad” transnationalism refers to more indirect participation in meetings 
of political parties or protesting in the host country. In a similar vein, the concept of “core” 
transnationalism defines activities that are a regular, patterned and an integral part of an 
individual's life, while “expanded” transnationalism refers to more occasional practices 
(Guarnizo 2000).  
 I concur with scholars like Portes et al. (2002) and Itzigsohn et al. (1999) that usually, 
migrants engaged in narrow or core political transnationalism are few and far between compared 
to the wider, more sporadic engagements among those who stay in touch with and are 
occasionally mobilized by political events in the country of origin. This dimension constitutes a 
major part of the political activity of migrants and refugees, which means that actual mobility of 
the migrants involved is not a main parameter for the transnationality of the political practices 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Therefore, in this dissertation, I operate with a rather broad definition 
of political transnational practices: indirect forms of transnational political participation by 
39 
 
Vietnamese refugees in the United States, such as protesting, petitioning and participating in 
internet forums. In contrast to economic and social practices, regular cross-border contact, but 
not necessarily actual travel, is a constitutive part of such political transnational practices among 
Vietnamese refugees.   
 
In what ways is political transnationalism relevant? 
This section highlights the relevance of political transnationalism and the ways in which 
transnational political activities of migrants (and refugees) affect outcomes in their home 
country. Due to their attachments to the homeland and the ease of telecommunications, migrant 
diaspora are increasingly apt to insert themselves into political processes vis-à-vis the homeland. 
Cohen (1996) has described the evolution of diaspora relations vis-à-vis their homeland 
governments as moving from “victims to challengers”. For instance, in the likelihood of conflict 
in the home country, diaspora communities may raise money to support continuing warfare, 
promote public opinion and even substantially influence international interventions in support of 
their cause. Beyond this, migrants (including refugees) have become important constituents and 
advocates for homeland governments. Numerous governments allow for dual citizenship or 
include members of its diaspora as official members of their political communities (Brinkerhoff 
2009).  
At the same time, a refugee or exiled diaspora community, such as the Vietnamese 
community in the U.S., also has the ability to act as an additional watchdog on homeland 
governments. While direct transnational political activities might be focused on the home 
country (example, participating in electoral politics or supporting home-grown pro-democracy 
movements), more indirect transnational political activities focus on lobbying in the host country 
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(example, campaigning against human rights abuses in the home country). Given their potential 
access, through networks on the ground, to local information on policy implementation, 
regulatory enforcement and human rights abuses, diaspora may be well placed to play a 
monitoring role in support of good governance (Brinkerhoff 2009). In extreme cases, a hostile 
migrant (or refugee) community can sway public opinion against the ruling homeland 
government or even try to oust it from power. 
Migrant diaspora have political influence disproportionate to their numbers owing to 
knowledge, skills, and financial capital acquired in the host society (Brinkerhoff 2009). 
Similarly, migrant support to homeland political campaigns may disproportionately influence 
outcomes due to relative currency exchange rates. Using their economic power to gain political 
foothold, migrants can, through direct political participation in their home country, constitute a 
positive force for the strengthening of the formal democratic rules of organizing political 
competition. For instance, Itzigsohn and Villacres (2008) claim that electoral and political 
participation of Dominican immigrants in the Dominican Republic and local involvement in 
development projects in El Salvador by Salvadoran immigrants have led to the emergence of 
participatory institutions, dynamism of local political competition and consolidation of 
democracy in these countries.  
Besides consolidating the democratization process in the home country, migrant and 
refugee groups can also play an important role in promoting and reinforcing liberal values, and 
facilitating conflict resolution as they respond to political events in their country of origin. 
Brinkerhoff (2009), in her investigation of digital diasporas among immigrants and refugees 
from Afghanistan (Afghanistanonline), Somalia (Somalinet), Egypt (MyCopticChurch), Tibet 
(Tibetboard ) and Nepal (Thamel.com), explores the ways in which these cyber-grassroots 
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organizations not only support integration into the host society but also contribute to security and 
socio-economic development in the homelands.  
Such transnational political activities provide migrants with opportunities to collectively 
express their hybrid identities (a sense of self that is neither wholly of the homeland nor 
exclusively reflective of the receiving country). Diaspora communities’ hybrid identities in turn 
inform political considerations and action agendas vis-à-vis the homeland, whether they pertain 
to potential conflict with the homeland government or subgroups of its society, human rights, or 
partisan political schemes. In this way, the collective expression of diaspora hybrid identity 
occurs through transnational activities concerning homeland politics (Brinkerhoff 2009). From 
this perspective, political transnationalism is not only about a set of activities through which 
migrants become involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; it also shapes 
collective identities by creating overlapping memberships between territorially separated and 
independent polities (Baubock 2003). Thus, migrant and refugee groups’ transnational political 
influence and engagement has potential significance, as it raises political consciousness, molds 
collective identities, shapes specific political agendas aimed at the homeland and provides 
forums for the enactment of these agendas in dispersed and heterogeneous communities. Given 
this impact of political transnationalism, let us now look into the factors discussed in the 
transnationalism literature that explain the level and intensity of transnational political linkages. 
 
Determinants of Political Transnationalism   
This section identifies some conditions that I see as emerging in the transnationalism 
literature as relevant to explaining variation in transnational political activities. In migrant 
studies, generally, a group of interrelating factors, including demographic factors, origin country 
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mobilization and receiving country institutions are understood to impact the identities and 
transnational practices of migrants (Basch et al 1994; Portes et al 1999; Al-Ali, Black and Koser 
2001; Guarnizo et al 2003). These factors condition the likelihood that migrants will have the 
motivation and capacity to engage in transnational activism. 
Conventionally, transnational political participation is measured by electoral indicators. 
Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of 
origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in 
the polity of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003). However, migrants and refugees also seek to be 
represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections 
(Guarnizo et al. 2003). Hence, for the purposes of this dissertation, under the concept of 
transnational political participation, I include both electoral and non-electoral activities aimed at 
influencing conditions in the home country. Such transnational non-electoral political activities 
may involve sending political remittances4 for civic projects in the community of origin, 
membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the hometown, participating in 
campaigns or petitions, and organizing in the host country around political/human rights issues 
concerning their home country. 
Following Portes and Rumbaut (1996), Leal (2002) and Guarnizo et al. (2003), potential 
determinants of immigrant transnationalism can be drawn from theoretical literatures on: (a) 
classical theories of the role of individual demographic factors; (b) contemporary theories of 
immigrants’ incorporation to host societies. To these, I add another set of determinants – that of 
the dependence of transnational political motivation and action on availability of resources. 
4 “Political remittances” here signifies money that is sent to a politically active local NGO or grass-roots 
organization in the home country as part of their fund-raising or contributions to a political party as opposed to 
economic remittances sent to family members or toward a business venture. 
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Demographic Characteristics 
 Age, gender and education, are the standard features that control for background factors. 
Age - The factor of age has been used by many researchers (Strand and Jones 1985) with 
the intent of measuring resettlement issues in the refugees’ new country. These studies claim that 
older immigrants and refugees find it harder to adjust to conditions in the country of settlement 
and integrate into its culture. This would suggest that older migrants are more likely to continue 
to maintain ties with the country of origin rather than severing all contact. It will, therefore, be 
interesting to see if this nostalgia for the homeland translates into motivation for transnational 
political action. 
Gender – Literature on the relationship between gender and immigration tells us that 
males experience occupational downward mobility upon relocation and may tend to form, 
participate in and lead ethnic organizations whose interests and focus is on the country of origin 
in order to compensate for the loss of status in the host country (Guarnizo et al. 2003). Women's 
experience tends to go the opposite way, as many of them become paid workers for the first time 
in the United States; they are, therefore, more likely to shift their orientation towards the host 
state (Jones-Correa 1998). The hypothesis then is that as men, on average, tend to experience a 
loss in social status as opposed to women, they are more likely to engage in political 
transnationalism. Thus, social status operates through gender to explain variation in transnational 
activism. 
Education –is the individual characteristic that has perhaps been used most often to 
explain variations in relative levels of political activity. In fact, the positive relationship between 
education and political participation is one of the most frequently identified in empirical political 
science (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, Guarnizo et al. 2003). Better engaged citizens are 
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more likely to be aware of and engaged by the political process, and they are more likely to 
become involved in various political activities (Tarrow 2005).  
As educational levels increase, so do the skills and resources that support higher levels of 
political participation (Verba, Schlozmana & Brady 1995). Viewed from a different vantage 
point, individual education provides the intellectual and cognitive skills that reduce the costs of 
participation, thereby shifting the incentives in favor of individual engagement. Well-educated 
citizens are more likely to possess a knowledge base that makes it easier to unravel the 
intricacies of the political process, and they are more likely to possess the cognitive skills that 
make it easier to absorb and process complex political information (Rosenberg 1988).  
Highly educated individuals are also more likely to be surrounded by other highly 
educated individuals or belong to organizations whose members are more fully engaged by 
politics. In this way, conditions are enhanced for the production of social capital through shared 
patterns of interaction among people who are already likely to be politically well informed and 
expert at the individual level (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Therefore, we might say that 
education creates the human capital resources that lead to increased engagement within the 
political system. 
The general importance of education for all migrants is pointed out by Portes and 
Rumbaut (1996, pp. 194-95): The process of ‘learning the ropes’ in the domains of language 
(learning English) and education is vital to attaining self-sufficiency. Only after migrants have 
established themselves in their new society do they start thinking about engaging in 
transnationalism. 
For refugees, resettlement is greatly enhanced by the diversity of their pre-arrival 
environment. Their level of education, for instance, is one of the main factors affecting the 
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entrant’s adaptation into American life. Refugees who have had the equivalent of an elementary 
education in either their home country or in refugee camps where their education continued will 
acculturate faster than those who have been denied such experiences (Strand and Jones 1985).  
The Vietnamese refugee population is well-documented in education (See Portes and 
MacLeod 1996). Of the Indochinese refugees, the Vietnamese were originally considered to be 
the most highly educated, which most likely indicates that they were among the wealthiest in 
their homeland because of increased opportunities of living within the city as well as a heavier 
American influence for a longer period of time (Montero and Dieppa 1982).  
Moreover, the level of education of Vietnamese refugees is a major factor in their 
adaptation to American life (Strand and Jones 1985). This is because levels of education vary 
depending on the time of their arrival, as earlier refuges tended to have more education than later 
arrivals. Existing literature states that the first-wave Vietnamese refugees arriving in 1975 were 
well-educated since they were among the elite – primarily students and professionals (U.S. 
government military, technical and managerial employees) (Kelly 1986). This is due, in part, to 
the geographic location as “the 1975 cohort was relatively well educated by any standard, and in 
South Vietnam they were, for the most part, among the educated elite” (Montero and Dieppa 
1982, p. 74). However, over the years, the trend of high level education among Vietnamese 
refugees tapered off. This is because the second and third waves of refugees consisted mainly of 
family members of those who arrived in the first wave, fishermen and farmers who had few 
skills other than in slash-and-burn agriculture (Kelly 1986). It will, therefore, be interesting to 
explore whether variations in intensity of political transnationalism among Vietnamese refugees 
coincide with variations in their level of education.  
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Contexts of Incorporation  
 Immigrant transnationalism is not only affected by demographic factors but also by their 
contexts of incorporation like length of settlement and English proficiency.  
Length of settlement – is especially important in determining maintenance of 
transnational relations and activities, with recent immigrant arrivals more likely to maintain 
ongoing relationships with the country of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003). The hypothesis then is 
that longer periods of U.S. residence should lead to progressive disengagement from home 
country loyalties and attachments. For example, much like assimilation theory, a lot of the 
existing literature on Latino transnational politics tends to assume that over time and across 
generations political transnationalism weakens as migrants and their descendants shift from a 
homeland-oriented politics to a receiving-society politics (Smith and Bakker 2008, p. 17). In 
fact, for some political scientists, transnational politics and Latinos organizing around local 
politics in the United States constitute alternate social universes (Jones-Correa 2005).  
The competing argument is that the immediate concern of new immigrant arrivals is to 
try to secure their positions in their new host countries. Most lack the financial resources and 
social networks vital to transnational engagement, which are acquired over time (Al-Ali N, 
Nadje, R. Black, and K. Koser 2001). The corollary hypothesis then is that longer periods of U.S. 
residence should lead to more frequent, organized forms of transnational activity. With two 
competing hypotheses vying to explain variation in political transnationalism, it will be 
interesting to see how length of settlement plays out in the case of Vietnamese refugees and 
which hypothesis holds true; in other words, whether integration and transnationalism are 
incompatible with each other or concurrent processes. 
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In the case of Vietnamese Americans, a majority of the refugees arrived in the U.S. 
during the first and second waves in the late 1970s and 1980s. Family members and relatives of 
those already in the U.S. as well as Amerasians continued arriving as immigrants into the mid-
1990s as part of the family reunification and Amerasian programs. Therefore, what will also be 
interesting to explore is whether there is any significant variation in levels of political 
transnationalism between those who fled as political refugees or managed to cross over as boat 
people during the first two waves (1975-1985), and those political prisoners and Amerasians who 
subsequently arrived as immigrants between 1985 and 1995 and even post-1995. While the 
former group had to leave their homeland and belongings soon after the fall of Saigon and flee, 
in many case, with only a few hours’ notice, the latter experienced persecution at the hands of 
the communist authorities in Vietnam and have a stake in influencing homeland politics. Thus, 
while considering length of settlement in the U.S. as a potential factor, the wave/time of arrival 
of Vietnamese refugees will also have to be taken into account. 
English proficiency – The greater the socio-cultural differences between newcomers and 
the host society, the more difficult their process of incorporation. Proficiency in English becomes 
an important factor in influencing assimilation of immigrants. English proficiency is one of the 
most crucial factors in facilitating a refugee’s socioeconomic success in the United States, as 
language communication skills have long been a dominant factor in successful assimilation. 
Language ability – the ability to read and write, as well as speak the language – is often the key 
that opens the doors to a better life in the refugee’s new land of residence. English is required for 
the procurement of the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter as well as functioning 
within the general American culture. In general, we can expect to see higher levels of English 
proficiency leading to greater socio-economic success, and subsequently, more intense 
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participation in political transnationalism (as described below in the next section on resources). 
Socio-economic status, then, seems to operate through English proficiency in affecting 
transnational activism. 
 
Availability of Resources 
 Another explanation for the emergence of variation in transnationalism among 
immigrants is that they try to reconstitute linkages to the country of origin or relatives living in 
other countries, but are unable to do so because they do not have the time, resources or financial 
means to engage in transnational practices. In order to engage in transnational entrepreneurship, 
such as philanthropic acts like organizing a letter-writing campaign to protest against the human 
rights situation in Vietnam, immigrants need to have a stable employment status and have 
accumulated a certain amount of capital. From this point of view, then, those who engage in 
transnational practices are the most economically successful immigrants (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 
2005).  
Employment status and Income – Characteristically, an important part of a refugee’s 
socioeconomic adjustment is obtained through the position held on the job. Once a refugee is 
able to secure steady, permanent employment, rising incomes and lifestyle changes follow. 
Employment status and income are also the most cited efforts of resettlement programs, as a 
refugee cannot be considered to be successfully resettled if he or she continues to receive social 
support (Strand and Jones 1985). The hypothesis then is that being employed and higher income 
levels lead to more intense political transnationalism.  
In many cases of refugee influx where the arriving population is older as in the case of 
later waves of Vietnamese refugees, chronic unemployment and low income levels often 
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characterize these populations. In the case of Vietnamese refugees too, a variety of barriers exist 
for their employment opportunities status, including language difficulties, lack of skills, 
inadequate transportation, and a limited job market as well as more remote problems such as 
health, dress codes, religious convictions and childcare needs  when they first arrived (Alkire 
2006). In addition, two factors of repression are generally evident. The first is the lack of 
representation in the managerial, executive and administrative sectors even though the 
Vietnamese refugees tend to have higher levels of education than other Asian immigrants. The 
second is that of being the token, non-native employee, which inhibits the move to higher 
institutional positions (Alkire 2006). It will, therefore, be interesting to see how employment 
status and income correlate with level of political transnationalism among Vietnamese refugees. 
 
The theoretical perspectives on migrant transnationalism underscored in this chapter 
inform my research in certain significant aspects. For instance, the literature indicates that 
relative to migration, transnational practices are still quite limited in absolute and relative 
numbers – clearly, then, not all immigrants are transmigrants. Nonetheless, a stable and 
significant transnational field of identity and action connecting migrants (and refugees) with their 
country of origin does exist. Hence, while acknowledging some of the legitimate critiques 
leveled against the indiscriminate application of transnationalism, I do not believe that either the 
concept or the research field should be abandoned. I argue instead that it is more useful to 
conceptualize transnationalism as one form of economic, political, and cultural activities that co-
exists with other, more traditional forms, such as international and multinational activities. My 
focus, therefore, is on the possibilities offered by the transnational optic for studying the 
Vietnamese refugee diaspora in the United States. 
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Moreover, I believe that transnationalism does mark a new type of migrant existence. 
While a high intensity of transnational exchanges, new modes of transacting, and a 
multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis are 
what constitute the true originality of the phenomenon, it cannot be denied that the occasional 
contacts, trips and activities across national borders that do not require a high level of mobility or 
institutionalization also contribute to strengthening the transnational field. The latter form of 
transnational activism can be said to represent transnationalism in a broader sense of the term 
and, therefore, is worth investigating.  
I aim to further enrich the conceptualization of and contribute to the literature on 
transnationalism by extending the refugee transnational into the realm of the political, an area of 
scholarship in which it has only recently begun to be applied. Such an instance of 
transnationalism among refugees as distinct from voluntary migrants is worth investigating since 
the specific circumstances surrounding refugee migration can affect the level and intensity of 
transnational linkages. Specifically in the case of Vietnamese refugees, while they arrived in the 
United States frightened and destitute at the very end of the transnational class hierarchy, they 
have displayed considerable tenacity and agency in maintaining connections with their home 
country despite the odds. As Vietnamese Americans continued to forge transnational links with 
Vietnam in the areas of economics, culture and politics, their refugee experience in the United 
States has in turn been greatly affected by their transnationalism.  
While this dissertation project is by no means an exhaustive account of refugee 
transnationalism, my particular questions have led me to illuminate the material conditions 
characterizing Vietnamese Americans as refugees in their political trans-nationality. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I define the level of analysis of transnationalism among Vietnamese 
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refugees at the individual level. I also operationalize transnational political activities (protesting, 
petitioning and participating in internet forums) in a broader, indirect rather than narrow sense of 
the term when considering degree of institutionalization and level of involvement in 
transnational activities. In this manner, I emphasize the importance of highlighting transnational 
efforts of sub-national actors like individual migrants or refugee groups, as opposed to that of 
supranational actors in a top-down approach, and specifically aim to contribute to the particular 
literature on the actual cross-border political practices of international migrants (and refugees) at 
the individual level of analysis. 
Finally, the literature review detailed in this chapter helps to articulate an important 
question: are there patterned differences among migrants (and refugees) in the incidence and 
forms adopted by the phenomenon of political transnationalism? Variation in intensity and 
frequency of transnational activism is linked to the great level of heterogeneity among refugees 
in terms of individual characteristics and contextual factors in the host state that distinguish 
Vietnamese refugees from one another. This dissertation seeks to determine the factors that 
shape the likelihoods and possibilities for the emergence of transnational political fields; in other 
words, explain the variation in level of political activism amongst Vietnamese Americans. To 
this end, the theoretical literature of determinants of political transnationalism offers possible 
explanations and helps to formulate several hypotheses: for instance, I hypothesize that older 
Vietnamese refugees are morel likely to engage in political transnationalism than younger 
refugees. Similarly, women, highly educated refugees and those proficient in English are more 
likely to be transnationally active compared to men, those who are less educated and have poor 
English language skills, respectively. Finally, I hypothesize that employed Vietnamese refugees 
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with substantial incomes are more likely to maintain transnational political links than 
unemployed refugees with frugal incomes. 
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Chapter 3 
Background and Methods 
 
This chapter provides background on the group under research (including a demographic 
profile and look at how communism still politically affects this group), the research question, the 
sampling strategies of the intended research, and the research design, including a summary of the 
data collection methods and an overview of the survey instrument. 
 
Background on Vietnamese Americans  
Basic Demographic Profile 
This research is situated in the Vietnamese community of Southern California. In Orange 
County, the cities of Garden Grove, Santa Ana, Anaheim and Westminster are recognized as the 
core of this ethnic community. The area is centrally anchored by the business and cultural district 
of Little Saigon in the city of Westminster, which has evolved to serve the needs of the 
Vietnamese. Located in the heart of Orange County, the enclave of Little Saigon has the largest 
concentration of Vietnamese outside Vietnam. Since 1980, their population has nearly 
quintupled (Rutledge 1992). 
Before 1988, Vietnamese merchants and shoppers used many different names for the 
Bolsa area, such as khu Bolsa or cho Bolsa (Ha 2002). In the mainstream media, the use of the 
name “Little Saigon” became common as early as 1984 when the Los Angeles Times published 
an article entitled “Boom on Bolsa: Vietnamese Create Their Own Saigon”. However, it was four 
years later that a group of Vietnamese leaders would choose Little Saigon to be the area’s official 
name (Day and Holley 1984). As Dr. Co Pham, president of the Vietnamese Chamber of 
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Commerce in 1991 said in an interview, “We named the area Little Saigon because the 
Vietnamese who lost their nation, those overseas, always hope someday to return to Saigon. 
Therefore, we created the name Little Saigon so that we can remember a day when we can re-
conquer Saigon” (Pham 1991, p. 40). 
Little Saigon is located in a business area of Orange County that is dominated by 
shopping centers, situated next to each other, all located around a few particular streets (namely, 
Bolsa Avenue, Westminster Avenue and McFadden Avenue). It is an area bustling with ethnic 
commerce and community activity. As early as the early 1990s, with over 1,000 Vietnamese 
businesses and over 40,000 Vietnamese, a symbiosis had been created (Rutledge 1992). The 
original hub is the Asian Garden Mall and the two-tiered shopping center directly across the 
street from the mall. With a large pedestrian cross-walk to link the two, any week day is sure to 
find the retail centers around bustling, and weekends are even busier. Freeway-close, and with 
easy access to local suburban neighborhoods, these are the heart of Little Saigon life. 
Little Saigon is home to eight Vietnamese newspapers, including Nguoi Viet (Vietnamese 
People), founded in 1978, the largest Vietnamese newspaper in America (Freeman 1995, p. 12). 
Some newspapers are distributed free; their earnings coming from advertising. Santa Ana in 
Orange County houses Little Saigon T.V. and Little Saigon Radio, which reaches over 200,000 
listeners. Vietnamese from towns all over southern California come to Little Saigon to shop or 
simply to stroll through ornate shopping malls and centers, where they find Vietnamese book and 
video stores, travel agencies that book flights to Vietnam, pharmacies that sell Chinese herbs and 
medicines, noodle shops and restaurants which specialize in Vietnamese regional dishes, night 
clubs and karaoke spots, grocery stores offering an array of Asian foods. They can also find an 
array of Vietnamese-owned services like the offices of physicians, dentists, tax accountants and 
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lawyers, medical clinics, auto repair shops, beauty schools, real estate and insurance offices as 
well as those of community service agencies and refugee rights advocacy groups. 
Although they are barely emerging on the mainstream political arena, within every 
Vietnamese community are countless associations, organizations and clubs that have focused on 
homeland issues. Community politics is still controlled by the first generation, many of who 
were the military and political elites in Vietnam. For them, homeland politics is still of primary 
importance, and adopting fervent anti-Communist ideologies is mandatory (Võ 2003, p. xv).  
 
Why Communism Still Matters 
My study of Vietnamese political transnationalism is in the context of a home country 
that is staunchly communist and transnational refugees who are extremely anti-communist and 
disapproving of the current regime in their home country. Communism has undoubtedly 
achieved remarkable political success in Vietnam. Against Herculean odds, a communist cell of 
nine men had grown by December 1976 into a mass party of one and a half million and had 
come to power having defeated militarily two of the strongest powers in the world (Williams 
1992, p. 19). Indeed, tragically for Vietnam, it was the very success of the communists as 
revolutionaries and fighters that proved to be one of the main reasons of Vietnam’s failure to 
adjust to the more mundane tasks of national development after the end of the war in 1975.  
In Vietnamese society, communism has had no other ideology to contend with. Non-
communist parties faced an almost hopeless situation (Williams 1992, p. 19). The victory in 
1975 was essentially a triumph of revolutionary organization and military strategy, rather than a 
spontaneous popular uprising. Not only was there little popular enthusiasm for the communist 
victory, but that victory itself had been achieved for the main part by regular units of the North 
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Vietnam Army (Williams 1992, p. 21). Very few of the leadership in Hanoi had recent 
experience of South Vietnam which had dramatically changed after a decade of strong American 
influence and had, in essence, become a service economy for the American war effort (Williams 
1992, p. 21). The departure of the Americans and the removal of their substantial buying power 
created severe economic and psychological withdrawal problems for the urban economy and 
especially Saigon. It is, therefore, not difficult to see this in the origins of the “boat people” 
problem. The party leadership was well aware of all this and made every effort to consolidate 
military power. Re-education camps were set up for the internment of tens of thousands of 
soldiers and civil servants of the former South Vietnamese government and the last vestiges of 
autonomy in the South were quickly stripped away (Williams 1992, p. 22). 
The history of the relationship between the United States and Vietnam is a long and 
complex one, centered primarily on that great political force called communism. The Vietnamese 
who came to America were fleeing communism and they, along with their descendants, today 
continue to be affected by it (Williams 1992, p. 22). More than thirty years after the fall of 
Saigon, large numbers of Vietnamese were still desirous of immigrating to the United States 
(Houle 2006). A steady stream of refugees has continued to apply for asylum for a variety of 
reasons. Families who were split apart during and after the war sent their loved ones to reunite 
with their stateside kin in hopes of a better life. Anti-Communist political prisoners continued to 
file appeals for safe passage (Houle 2006). In fact, since 1990, these former South Vietnamese 
civilian and military officials who had been imprisoned in reeducation camps and their families 
have constituted the largest category of Vietnamese refugees admitted to the United States.  
The genealogy of Western, particularly U.S. human rights discourse is intimately tied to 
the discourse of anti-communism. With State Department preference granted to those individuals 
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fleeing “Communist-totalitarian” regimes, the political refugee – a special immigrant status was 
granted to Jews fleeing the Soviet Union, anti-Castro Cuban middle class professionals and 
members of the Hungarian 1957 uprising (Nguyen M. T. 2005, p. 301). Successive 
administrations categorized dissidents and arrivals from communist regimes as freedom fighters, 
while refugees from other countries were often denied asylum because they did not advance a 
U.S. anti-communist agenda. The continuing arrival of the Vietnamese refugees contributed to 
the continuing importance of home country politics – predominantly, anti-communism – in 
existing Vietnamese American diaspora5 communities. 
Of the political forces that have shaped Vietnamese Americans, none has been as 
virulent, omnipresent and empowering as anti-communism. In fact, anti-communism has 
dominated the politics of the community (Ha 2002, p. 35). Burning with grief over the loss of 
their country, many first-wave refugees believed that Communists would soon be overthrown 
and that they would return to Vietnam within a few months. As those months became years, and 
those years turned into decades, the pain of the initial loss decreased but did not disappear. To 
make matters worse, in the first few years following the mass exodus of the 1975 refugees, 
official regard by the Hanoi leadership for the refugee was one of vituperation and portrayal as 
the very dregs of society.  
In the first post-Vietnam War years, the newly unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(SRV) said little officially about refugees, shunting off enquiries with the assertion that no 
problem existed (Pike 1999, p. 36). By 1979, however, that posture could no longer be sustained. 
5 As an analytic category and a social imaginary, the concept of diaspora is understood as a spatially and temporally 
sprawling formation, the transnational condition of people dispersed from a homeland throughout the world and 
linked through diverse locations. (Nguyen, M. T. 2005) The recuperation of the nation or recovery of the homeland 
through the cultural and political productions of the diaspora means that national subjects are often formed in 
transnationality. 
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The official Hanoi position saw the Vietnamese refugee as one of two personality types: first was 
the credulous fool who was “tricked and seduced by the U.S. imperialists and Beijing 
reactionaries” (Pike 1999, p. 37). Second was the “social negative” of which there were two 
types: the worthless lay-about not willing to work for a living and the “social déclassé”, former 
middle class or upper class Vietnamese whose philosophic and political views were so contrary 
to the changed order that there simply was no room for them in the new society (Pike 1999, p. 
37). The term employed for these two groups was “common criminal and incorrigible capitalist” 
(Pike 1999, p. 38). Both groups were seen as a threat to Vietnam’s security. 
All this changed with the advent of the doi moi in 1986. Vietnam’s free market reforms 
gave Vietnamese Americans their first opportunity to reconnect with their home country. This 
began with short visits and the continued transfer of remittances to relatives. After the U.S. lifted 
its economic embargo in 1994, Vietnam launched its campaign to attract overseas Vietnamese 
tourists and investors (Valverde 2002, p. 8). Ever since, the Vietnamese Communist Party and 
State has affirmed that overseas Vietnamese are an inseparable part of the Vietnamese nation 
(Williams 1992). With increasing intensity and openness, Hanoi now encourages refugees to 
return home. This changing attitude of the Vietnamese government regarding their overseas 
population is most interesting: those who left after 1975 were once labeled My Nguy (American 
puppets) and now are referred to by names like Kieu Bao (people coming from the same 
embryonic sack or womb) (Valverde 2002, p. 51). Thus, only in recent years have the 
communists, desperate for international economic assistance, loosened their control, but that’s 
too little, too late for most refugees (Moxley 2003). 
In the meantime, the refugees have participated in the collective building of Little 
Saigons around the country, which came to represent safe haven and the symbolic resurrection of 
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their beloved country. Underlying the naming of Little Saigon was the assumption that everyone 
in the community was a Vietnamese-in-exile. More importantly, they were exiles because they 
feared, hated and had been persecuted by the Communists (Ha 2002, p. 35). 
The use of the term “refugee” by Vietnamese Americans to describe themselves has been 
strategic and specific in its invocation of forced migration as alienation and loss. Within diaspora 
narratives, refugee-ness is more than a legal category. The Vietnamese refugees arrived in the 
United States through widely differing historical circumstances, including the 1975 evacuation of 
many Saigon elites, the waves of boat people and through Orderly Departure Programs. Today, 
although Vietnamese refugees in the United States have for the most part attained permanent 
residency or citizenship, the cessation of legal refugee status does not preclude (even partial) 
identification with the coerced homelessness of a refugee imaginary (Nguyen, M. T. 2005, p. 
20). Here refugee as an identity category is not just a legal category of migration; designating 
and regulating access to resources and rights of citizenship, but also signifies flexible and partial 
belonging to the nation-state (Nguyen, M. T. 2005, p. 21).  
On official diaspora holidays, like Vietnamese Armed Forces Day, and during 
commemorative events, double-sided paper flags of the United States and the former South 
Vietnamese republic as well as commemorative transnational-shirts reiterating refugee thanks 
and recreating national pride hang from steel poles and striped awnings in Little Saigon, 
California. Side by side, these fluttering banners proclaim the ostensible solidarity of 
Vietnamese-Americans, their dual loyalty to two countries, and their commitment to chṍng Cộng 
(anti-Communism) (Ha 2002). Similarly, the regular attendance and honoring of former South 
Vietnamese officers and the flags displayed at full mast at other Vietnamese community 
functions bespeak a nostalgic desire for an impenetrable space. Speaking to a local Los Angeles 
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paper, city council member Tony Lam reiterated, “Even though the international community no 
longer recognizes our country, in our hearts and minds, we recognize the flag” (Nguyen, M. T. 
2005, p. 102). The national anthem, sung lustily not only at commemorative events but also on 
many public occasions, invokes not the existing Socialist Republic of Vietnam, but instead a 
besieged homeland imaginary. 
Thus, refugee-ness, as the condition of becoming forcibly stateless and unmoored from 
native territory, is a definite political identification. Long after resettlement and naturalization, 
refugee persists as a salient form of Vietnamese subjectivity. Moreover, in a context in which 
claims to citizenship and national belonging are paramount, political visibility is a necessarily 
performative act. Through this constitutive role of representation in the social and cultural 
formation of refugee-ness, Vietnamese Americans come to live their identities as transnational 
subjects. 
Second to a refugee identity, anti-communism is the next common denominator of unity 
and part of the rhetoric of Vietnamese-American cultural identity and political denunciations. It 
is a force that can be galvanized to create cohesion. An exilic narrative, privileging anti-
communism as a unifying political signifier for the Vietnamese Americans, is sometimes called 
upon by diaspora writers and activists to represent a displaced collectivity (Nguyen M. T. 2005). 
Drawn together by their universal opposition to the Communists, for example, the Vietnamese-
Americans in the first years of their naturalization voted, for the most part, as Republicans and 
contributed thousands of dollars to organizations planning for an “armed liberation” of Vietnam 
(Ha 2002, p. 35). 
A large number of Vietnamese Americans continue to have a strong disdain for the 
current communist government in Vietnam. Most Vietnamese refugees left Vietnam for fear of 
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persecution under a communist regime. They blame the loss of their country to the communists 
in the North and communist sympathizers in the South (Valverde 1994, p. 105).  This hatred 
often manifests itself in the form of dogmatic, anti-communist actions. A self-appointed exile 
government based in Little Saigon, California regularly issues official condemnations of the 
Vietnamese socialist state (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). Moreover, until recently, anything short of 
complete rejection of communism and leftist thought was intolerable in the Vietnamese 
American communities. Anyone who even appeared to be sympathetic to the current government 
of Vietnam was branded a traitor and a Communist. Business and cultural exchanges, including 
the export of goods and media, and the international travel of performers, artists and writers from 
Vietnam to the United States, have all been targets of such pressures (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). 
When the United States opened diplomatic channels with Vietnam and planned to lift its 
twenty-year old trade embargo, the Vietnamese community was torn on the U.S. government’s 
plans to normalize trade relations. As Ha (2002, p. 38) writes, “politically liberated individuals 
welcomed the development as an opportunity for economic growth, easier travel to Vietnam, 
facilitated communication with relatives, and perhaps increased political freedom for those in 
Vietnam through better access to education and material resources. Others, however, took a more 
hardline conservative stance, believing that Vietnamese-American visits to Vietnam could be 
used as propaganda by the Communists and could destroy their dream of returning to a free 
Vietnam.” Moreover, those who opposed the normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam 
believed that the U.S. establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam fixed the mantle of 
legitimacy, an acceptance of Hanoi status quo (Pike 1999, p. 54). The U.S. embargo on Vietnam 
was something of a buffer between Hanoi and the refugees. When the embargo was dropped in 
February 1994, they claimed that, “We freedom fighters will now put on business suits and go to 
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Vietnam to make business deals, but our real goal will be to carry the message of freedom” (Pike 
1999, p. 46). 
At the same time, however, anti-communism has been a destructive force. Sometimes 
this dogmatism leads to violence and death; even without acts of violence, the community 
members are not completely free to express political dissent (Farragher 1990). In the 1980s, a 
vigilante group calling themselves the Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate the Communists 
and Restore the Nation (VOECRN) claimed responsibility for a string of arsonists and summary 
executions of purported Communist propagandists  (Farragher 1990).  Even though the wave of 
political violence eventually peaked in the late 1980s and then subsided, political protests 
emerged as a new form of political activity condemning Communism in the 1990s (Ha 2002). 
The most publicized occurrence was the protests held against Dr. Co Pham, president of the 
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce in Orange County, because he had hosted two ranking 
members of the Vietnamese Communist Party at his home, which was viewed as a traitorous 
fraternization with the enemy at worst (Christensen 1993).  These incidents showed that voicing 
any kind of deviant opinion, or one vaguely critical of the émigré community, could be construed 
as pro-Communist. The compelling effect of the anti-communist political project thus operates 
consistently as accusation of those who have strayed from the ideal refugee figure produced by 
the memory of homeland and consorted with the socialist republic to disseminate communist 
propaganda (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). 
Mimi Thi Nguyen (2005) writes about a commemorative event in Camp Pendleton, San 
Diego on June 24, 1995, “Operation Homecoming: A 20 Year Commemoration of the 
Vietnamese Refugee Camps” as a particular mode of public recovery and a strategic redemptive 
act. Along with the photographs of U.S. marines standing over huddled groups of refugees on the 
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decks of aircraft carriers, she finds a “black and white photograph of five or seven dead 
Vietnamese, fallen at angles on a palm-lined, cobbled street” (Nguyen, M. T. 2005, p. 85).  A 
bulky, off-duty marine tell her the dead are Viet Cong. Nguyen interprets the commemorative 
event as producing “a model of the disciplined and thus grateful Vietnamese refugee figure 
distinguished from the ‘properly’ murdered Vietnamese by a political abstraction, the apparent 
specter of communism” (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). These performed affiliations between U.S. liberal 
ideology and Vietnamese refugees as potential model citizens have helped in the retention of an 
anti-communist South Vietnamese nationalism as a political identity.  
According to Nguyen (2005), the commemorative production of the Vietnamese subject 
as still “refugee” is also strategic – the moral trajectory implied by refugee status and exile 
mandates a continued incorporation of loss and a particular political agenda by the subject. 
Following Donald Pease (1993) 6, this agenda depends on a dual capacity: to identify dissension 
as a threat to South Vietnam and to characterize such dissension as the work of the communist 
other. The agenda can also take a violent turn as some men pursue coercive means to secure the 
nation – since 1981, there have been more than a dozen politically motivated book burnings, 
arsons, assaults and murders, targeting Vietnamese who support the socialist government, 
advocate diplomatic and economic relations, or simply reported on current social and political 
conditions without extreme bias. At the same time, a much darker logic of a politics of return has 
been actualized in the paramilitary organizing that some male South Vietnamese patriots have 
undertaken to recover homeland. For instance, former South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen 
Cao Ky once operated training sessions in U.S. national parks, asserting, “Give me the guns and 
6 Pease (1993) argues that the cold war’s authority as a consensus formation depended on a dual capacity: to identify 
internal dissension as a threat to the national security and to re-characterize such dissension as the work of the 
national other.  
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we’ll kick the communists out” (Nguyen, M. T. 2005, p. 105). The self-appointed Government of 
Free Vietnam, an exile organization headquartered in Southern California and presided over by a 
former civil engineer, claims to harbor secret bases along Vietnam’s border with Cambodia and 
Laos where rebel fighters are training (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). Others, inspired by tales of 
dishonored fathers and abject nationalisms, have also taken guerilla measures to re-imagine 
active citizenship on the part of the nation-in-exile. On April 4, 1991, four armed Vietnamese 
youth entered a Good Guys electronic store in Sacramento, California and held 41 patrons 
hostage. In negotiations with the Sacramento County’s Sheriff’s Department, the young men 
demanded passage out of the country to Southeast Asia where they sought to defeat once and for 
all the communists who had stolen so much from their fathers (Smith and Tarallo 1995). 
Five years after diplomatic ties between the United States and Vietnam were re-
established, massive anti-communist demonstrations and political rallying took place over the 
course of two and a half months when store owner Truong Van Tran displayed a Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam’s flag along with a portrait of Ho Chi Minh in his HiTek TV and Video 
store in Little Saigon, California. Anti-communist sentiment was so pervasive in Little Saigon 
that Truong Tran’s actions actually served to galvanize the community and to create an 
unprecedented degree of unity. Not only were the protests attended and supported by Vietnamese 
from diverse social groupings, but one of the defining moments of the protests occurred when 
competing leaders of the Vietnamese community of Southern California shook hands (Ha 2002). 
In an editorial published in the Viet Economic Daily News (Việt Báo Kinh Tế) on 
February 1, 1999, Khai Trấn, a journalist articulated the deep and multi-faceted concerns of the 
Vietnamese Americans. Expressing the protestors’ looming paranoia about another Communist 
takeover, he wrote, “We must remain law-abiding and calm because the Ha Noi regime is always 
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trying to infiltrate America, one way or another…. What if the Vietnamese government decided 
to buy several stores along Bolsa Avenue and hung red flags there?” (Trấn  1999) Having lost the 
original Saigon, many Vietnamese feared that Communist Vietnam was monitoring them closely 
and would try to take over, or at least infiltrate their new Saigon (Ha 2002). Their fears were not 
completely unfounded. During the protests, the store owner Truong Tran received telephone calls 
from the Vietnamese Consulate in San Francisco offering him assistance (Ha 2002). The 
government of Vietnam was indeed paying attention to events in Little Saigon.  
Former political prisoners especially oppose the Vietnamese Communist Party on 
grounds that it gives itself the right to leadership of the people without any justifications for 
which this Party could claim itself such rights. They claim that “to promote economic renovation 
in the direction of socialism, the Communist Party executes repressive measures to decimate the 
Vietnamese people’s human and civil rights and repress peaceful evolution…In achieving this 
purpose, it exterminates any opposition that may be detrimental to its monopoly of power and 
leadership” (Nguyen, T. V. et al. 1995, p. 413). They report that the Vietnamese Communist 
Party has strengthened its political powers by restricting the basic rights of the human person and 
tightening religious freedom. Scores of Buddhist priests and believers, spiritual leaders of other 
religions, writers, artists and intellectuals voicing political viewpoints other than those of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party have been imprisoned or detained under house arrest for their 
religious practices and preaching (Nguyen, T. V. et al. 1995).  
For the first decade after the refugees’ arrival, the will to conform and to force others to 
conform to a political and ideological imperative of anti-communism generated a subterranean 
history of anti-communist Vietnamese death squads, paramilitary training for armed return to 
Vietnam, organized boycotts brought to bear upon both public and private transactions. As the 
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violation of civil and human rights of citizens has continued in Vietnam, even today, thirty-five 
years after the fall of Saigon, Little Saigon is a hotbed of activism, offering everything from 
backyard candlelight vigils to large-scale protests, from peaceful hunger strikes to violently anti-
communist floats in the annual Têt parade. Representations of the suffering, pain and loss due to 
the Communist overthrow of Saigon are constantly reproduced through the media, successfully 
keeping a 35 year old experience fresh in the minds of the refugees (Hamatake 2006). Older 
refugees understandably have a difficult time forgetting the past, for they committed their 
younger years to fighting in the war; some spent the next phase of their life in prisons known as 
the “re-education camps”, only to be relocated to another country where they face social, 
economic and political displacement (Võ 2003). Their peers have moved on with their lives, their 
wives have become independent, their children disrespectful and U.S. society does not honor 
their sacrifices (Võ 2003). Therefore, the induced recollections of sorrow and loss still play an 
important role in the lives of older refugees; many of the first-generation refugees find a blurry 
of comfort-sadness in these reproductions of their homeland. 
Ever since the beginning of the 1990s, the Communist rule has tried to convince 
international public opinion, notably the United States and the Vietnamese communities overseas 
of its “open door” and national reconciliation policies (Nguyen, T. V. et al. 1995). Their efforts, 
however, have come to no avail in the Vietnamese communities overseas. On the political front, 
anti-communist passion suggests that exilic political sentiments are still strong. This will persist 
as long as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam exists, but it will undoubtedly lose its historical 
fervor. Like other immigrant groups before them, the Vietnamese refugees retain feelings of 
loyalty to their country of birth, but realize that a gulf of thirty five years now separates them 
from Vietnam. The younger generation of Vietnamese-Americans sometimes perceives the 
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virulent anti-communism of the community as a divisive force with destructive potential. They 
view events like the HiTek protest as red-baiting (branding people as Communists) and 
intolerance towards nonconformists. They could perhaps be successful at channeling their 
community’s anti-communist zeal towards the advocacy of humanitarian, political and economic 
progress for the people of Vietnam. It is the younger generation that will determine the future 
path of the Vietnamese American community.  
 
A note on Viet Kieu – Viet Kieu translated means overseas Vietnamese or Vietnamese 
nationals living abroad. Even though this term has been adopted within media and academic 
circles and used openly in Vietnam, it is not wholly accepted by the overseas Vietnamese 
population. Some Vietnamese Americans disagree with its usage because it has political negative 
connotations (a term created by the communist government) and stereotypes (referring to the 
working class population of Orange County) as a word passed along by Hanoi to refer to its 
overseas population (Valverde 2002).  It also implies that the overseas Vietnamese community is 
peripheral to Vietnam as a nation and no longer has a direct legitimate link or claims to Vietnam 
(Valverde 2002). 
In an interview with Caroline Valverde, a member of an anti-communist group (name 
withheld) asserted, “Using the word Viet Kieu means you accept the Hanoi regime. We 
(Vietnamese overseas) are refugees even if you came over as an immigrant. If you refuse 
communist citizenship, you are not a Viet Kieu…I consider myself Vietnamese and do not accept 
the current regime” (Valverde 2002, p. 84). In this dissertation, I use the term Vietnamese 
American instead, except where the term Viet Kieu appears in a direct quotation/citation. 
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Methodology 
 
Research Question  
The primary objective of this research is to determine whether there are explanatory 
factors that facilitate transnationalism for Vietnamese refugees, and identify the most relevant 
ones. The overall hypothesis of this study is that there are variables that, when coupled, can be 
accurate predictors in determining the level of transnational activism undertaken by Vietnamese 
refugees living in California. These factors condition the likelihood that Vietnamese refugees 
will have the motivation and capacity to engage in transnational political activism. I focus on 
demographic, contextual and economic characteristics of Vietnamese Americans that may 
impact the possibilities of political transnationalism among this refugee population. 
 
Research Design 
The research for this study was carried out in two stages. All respondents in Phase 1 of 
the research participated in interviews and those in Phase II completed a survey questionnaire. 
The data retrieved in this study was subject to mixed methodology analysis. Qualitative 
methodology was applied to the interview data collected during the first phase and the survey 
data collected in the second phase was addressed through quantitative methodology.  
In Phase I, qualitative interviews were conducted among Vietnamese Americans of local 
standing in the community, who were able to give insight on the state of political 
transnationalism among this group of refugees and migrants. Participants in this phase responded 
to open-ended interviews with standardized questions. The purpose of the interviews was two-
fold: first, to help determine which types of transnational political activity are most frequently 
undertaken by Vietnamese Americans. The second aim was to explore all relevant and 
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potentially significant explanatory variables that account for variation in the level of 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans.  
Qualitative analysis that followed the completion of the interviews in the first phase 
informed and benefited the ensuing survey in my quantitative research (Phase II) in the following 
ways. In the first place, analysis of the interview records helped operationalize my dependent 
variable, political transnationalism. By identifying the types of transnational political activities 
(protesting, petitioning and participating in internet forums) most frequently undertaken by 
Vietnamese Americans, I was able to create three dependent variables, Protests, Petitions and 
Internet Forums, and include appropriate questions in the survey to record their level of 
occurrence. Finally, the preceding interviews also helped me determine which independent 
variables to finally include in the survey to be recorded and utilized in the quantitative analysis. 
Ordinal regression analysis was then used to investigate the effect of explanatory demographic, 
incorporation and resource variables on the level of political transnationalism and to explain 
variation in transnational political activities among Vietnamese Americans. 
 
Sampling strategy 
The sample used for this research was a convenience sampling consisting of both 
Vietnamese refugees who engage in political transnationalism and those who do not undertake 
transnational activities. One danger in the field of transnationalism is that empirical studies 
invariably sample on the dependent variables, focusing on those who take part in the activities of 
interest, to the exclusion of those who do not participate (Guarnizo et al. 2003, p. 1213). In my 
study, interview participants were drawn from among those Vietnamese refugees who do 
participate in transnational political activism since the purpose of the qualitative study was to 
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explore how to operationalize political transnationalism as a dependent variable and 
conceptualize what explanatory factors are found to be significant (by asking questions to 
determine how the explanatory factors stimulated / hindered their level of transnationalism). For 
the quantitative survey, however, I included respondents in my sample who do not engage in 
political transnationalism as well (by ensuring a random enough sample). Those who do 
participate in political transnationalism selected “Sometimes” or “Often” on the dependent 
variable questions in the survey, while those Vietnamese Americans who do not engage in 
transnational activities selected “Never” on the dependent variable questions in the survey.   
Qualitative: For the interviews in Phase I of my research, I chose the respondents based 
on my knowledge of the community and by word of mouth. The interviews I conducted were 
with community leaders and prominent members who actively participated in political activities 
and had considerable influence in the Vietnamese community in Orange County. They included 
social service workers at mutual assistance associations (MAAs), educators, journalists and 
bloggers. 
Quantitative: For the surveys in Phase II of my research, a variety of sampling strategies 
were considered in view of the criteria restrictions, such as transportation, availability of research 
sites and accessibility of the desired population. The primary obstacle in identifying the Orange 
County Vietnamese refugee population is the absence of a complete, reliable and current 
population list. Most community-based organizations operate independently of state-run 
institutions and consist primarily of job counseling, placement, housing, senior services and 
financial assistance programs for refugees and their families. Although current and past 
participation at the centers is generally thought to be quite high, the use of these files as a 
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population list would systematically under-sample refugees who do not use the services of the 
centers. 
A Vietnamese community center (Little Saigon Economic, Cultural, & Social Service 
Center) in Little Saigon maintains active files on Vietnamese refugees, who are members and 
utilize the services of the center on a weekly/monthly basis for meetings or other personal 
business. Evidence within these files shows that this population is fairly well represented 
throughout the Orange County area. Therefore, the basic demographic profile of the Vietnamese 
refugee population at the center was assumed to reflect the profile of the general population of 
Vietnamese refugees in Orange County, California. Hence, I chose this center to carry out my 
surveys. In addition, weekly meetings held for Vietnamese community members at the 
Vietnamese Baptist church and American Vietnamese Fellowship provided the sample. The 
convenient sampling was obtained by asking Vietnamese Americans who were present at these 
locations on any given day to fill out the surveys. The process assumed that the Vietnamese 
refugees came to the community center and churches voluntarily, where they were randomly 
chosen to participate in the research. 
 
Description of Research Instrument Used  
Interacting with the Vietnamese refugee population through taped interview sessions was 
chosen in the qualitative study. To understand the true perceptions of the population being 
researched, especially since the population is foreign born, different techniques must be used. 
Qualitative research is ideally suited for this study as it provides a “systematic, empirical strategy 
for answering questions about people in a bounded social context”. (Locke, Spirduso and 
Silverman 1993, p. 99)  
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I conducted 27 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Of these, 19 interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, 1 was conducted over the telephone and 7 interviews were conducted 
over a series of e-mails. The personal and phone interviews varied in length, ranging from half 
an hour to approximately 60 minutes and were usually set up by telephone or e-mail at a time 
and location convenient to the respondent. For face-to-face meetings, I met with the respondents 
in different locations – cafes, universities, churches, public gatherings and offices; most were 
audio-taped. Each session followed a schedule but flexible formatting was employed. The 
participants were told about the proposed research project and the consent form reviewed. The 
body of the interview then proceeded with open-ended questions that encouraged participants to 
talk freely about their own experiences as refugees and describe their transnational political links 
with Vietnam. 
For those interviews conducted in person or over the phone, I read out the questions from 
the interview questionnaire and after giving the respondent adequate time to articulate his/her 
answer either asked additional follow-up questions or moved on to the next set of questions, 
upon gauging the willingness or reluctance of the participant in delving deeper into a particular 
topic. In keeping with IRB protocol, I only asked a question once and did not insist again when 
the respondent indicated that they were uncomfortable sharing a personal detail (like income) or 
answering a politically sensitive question (example, whether they attended the HiTek protest).  
For the interviewees who preferred to have the interview conducted over e-mail, I sent 
them a copy of the interview questionnaire (attached at the end as Appendix A) over e-mail and 
they typed in answers below individual questions at their convenience. While this method of 
interview lacked the advantages of personal interaction, which afforded me the opportunity to 
read into respondents’ silences or immediately ask follow-up questions not in the questionnaire, 
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it had the benefit of allowing participants to think over their response and not trying to fit in all 
questions within a certain time-frame. Moreover, most e-mail interview transcripts were 
finalized after considerable going back-and-forth to clarify points or, in some cases, ask 
additional questions. Again, following IRB protocol, respondents were only e-mailed the 
questionnaire once and not pestered with repeated requests for replies, unless I was specifically 
asked to send remainder e-mails.  
The identities of the interviewees have been kept anonymous except in cases where they 
explicitly allowed me to use their real names. The formal, personal interviews were tape-
recorded or typed into my laptop computer (in one case, the respondent refused to be audio-
recorded). For the telephonic interviews, I usually took some notes by hand or mentally 
remembered the ideas of the conversation and wrote up my notes later that day. In the case of e-
mail interviews, I received respondents’ replies to specific items in the questionnaire by reply e-
mails and was often encouraged to write back in order to clarify points or make sure we were on 
the same page. 
 
It can be difficult to describe the sensitivity and volatility of the Vietnamese American 
community with regard to any transnational political connections with Vietnam. The Vietnamese 
government is highly suspicious of any political activities or conspiracies against the 
administration and this makes Vietnamese Americans reluctant to openly talk about any 
transnational political activities they might be conducting. Many Vietnamese Americans 
frequently go back to visit Vietnam and some even cherish dreams of returning to live there 
some day. As a result, they fear any word of their anti-communist activities in the United States 
reaching the ears of authorities in Hanoi. 
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Vietnamese Americans are also highly suspicious of their own people, fearing the 
presence of spies within their community. I believe my position as an outsider and my looking 
different allowed them to speak on matters they dare not talk about if I were seen as Vietnamese 
American, given the self- or externally imposed censorship on such matters. I attempted to 
empathize with the interviewees and offered a sympathetic ear for many to express their feelings, 
ideas or grievances. Lastly, as a woman researcher of Indian origin, I believe that I was 
considered as less of a political threat than if I were a middle-aged man of Vietnamese origin, 
who could easily be perceived as a communist sympathizer. Moreover, the presence of the staff 
at the churches and community center was beneficial in minimizing bias as a result of my 
position as a cultural outsider. 
 
Operationalization of variables 
Dependent variable: Political transnationalism  
The political activities that currently make up the repertoire of transnational political 
activities stimulated by Vietnamese refugees are the focus of my research. Horst (2006) reminds 
us that the political role of the refugee diaspora should not be underestimated – the financial 
weight of refugees in diaspora and their lobbying power largely accounts for their political 
importance in the home country, besides the fact that many of those in exile belong to the elite 
and thus historically have played a political role. Political transnationalism is a significant 
phenomenon to study to help us understand the ways in which the political activities of 
Vietnamese refugees in the host state are connected to the dynamics of domestic political change 
in Vietnam.  
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In the context of domestic political participation, Verba and Nie (1973, p. 2) employ the 
following definition: “Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are 
more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the 
action they take”. In this study, I apply such a conceptualization of domestic political 
participation in the transnational context. 
Conventionally, transnational political participation is measured by electoral indicators. 
Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of 
origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in 
the polity of origin. (Guarnizo et al. 2003) However, migrants and refugees also seek to be 
represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections. 
(Guarnizo et al. 2003) Hence, for the purposes of this dissertation, under the concept of 
transnational political participation, I include non-electoral activities aimed at influencing 
conditions in the home country. Such transnational non-electoral political activities may involve 
sending political remittances7 for civic projects in the community of origin, membership in 
charity organizations sponsoring projects in the hometown, participating in campaigns or 
petitions, and organizing in the host country around political/human rights issues concerning 
their home country.  
Bearing this broad definition of political transnationalism, I included open-ended 
questions in the interview questionnaire to determine what kind of electoral or non-electoral 
transnational political practices are most popular among Vietnamese Americans. Following my 
archival research and qualitative analysis of the interview data in Phase I, I was able to narrow 
7 “Political remittances” here signifies money that is sent to a politically active local NGO or grass-roots 
organization in the home country as part of their fund-raising or contributions to a political party as opposed to 
economic remittances sent to family members or toward a business venture. 
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down the range of cross-border political activities to the three most frequently engaged in 
activities among Vietnamese Americans – protesting, petitioning and participating in internet 
forums. The following questions in the survey in Phase II then recorded political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans:  
– “Do you take part in protests or demonstrations in Little Saigon?”, 
 
– “Do you write to government officials or sign petitions in support of a Vietnamese person 
or issue?”, and 
 
– “Do you participate in Internet discussion groups on issues important to Vietnam and 
Vietnamese people?” 
 The three dependent variables Protests, Petitions and Internet Forums are categorical 
variables, each measured as “Never”, “Sometimes and “Often”. 
 
Independent variables 
As detailed in my theory chapter, existing literature on empirical studies of transnational 
activities among diasporas informs my research and explains the reasons for choosing my 
variables in this study. The demographic characteristics regarded in this dissertation are age and 
gender of the refugee, level of education. These are the standard demographic variables that 
control for background factors. To these, I add a measure for whether the respondent has earned 
a college degree in Vietnam or in the United States or both. To these, I also include controls for 
incorporation variables: English proficiency and the length of time residing in the United States 
imply incorporation in the host country. Finally, employment status and income level of the 
respondents represent resource dependent variables that can potentially affect level of political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese refugees. 
The following questions in the survey recorded demographic, incorporation and resource 
dependent variables.  
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Demographic variables:  Respondents were asked, “Which age group do you belong to?” 
to measure the independent variable Age, coded as 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64 and 65+ years. 
Gender was recorded and coded as Male=1, Female=2. Education was measured in the survey as 
high school or less, some college, college degree and graduate education/degree. Place of college 
degree received was considered separately – this was measured in the survey as No degree, 
Vietnam, U.S. and both. 
Incorporation variables: Respondents were asked “In which time period did you arrive in 
the United States?” to measure the independent variable Arrival in U.S., coded as pre-1975, 
1975-84, 1985-95 and post-1995. To assess the language skills of the Vietnamese refugees, they 
were asked to rate their proficiency in English. English proficiency was measured on the Likert-
scale as Poor, Fair, Good and Excellent. 
Resource variables: The last two variables regarded in the questionnaire were 
employment status and income. These point to refugees’ and immigrants’ economic 
incorporation and imply their gradually acquiring control over increasingly more resources. 
Respondents’ employment status was measured as employed, temporarily unemployed and 
unemployed. Respondents’ income was measured as <$25,000, $25-40,000, $40-60,000, $60-
75,000 and >$75,000. 
 
Missing values 
There were only two variables with one missing value each. The variable Arrival in U.S. 
had a missing value, which was assigned the modal value of 1985-95 and the variable income 
also had a missing value, which was assigned the modal value of <$25,000. There were no 
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missing values in any of the dependent or other independent variables since this is a relatively 
small dataset. 
 
Data analysis  
All interview data was read and analyzed after the qualitative phase, with special 
attention given to confirming possible explanatory factors to be included in the survey. In the 
quantitative analysis, the process of coding each question and the development of a classification 
system was established for the questionnaire. Answers obtained other than those specifically 
requested on the survey questionnaire were not incorporated into the research. However, for the 
qualitative portion, all demographic, incorporation and resource-dependent factors that were 
mentioned by respondents as important to their transnational activism were considered as such.  
The survey data are categorical in nature; they are discrete in character from one category 
to another, it was assumed that there is no previous relationship between the categories. The 
descriptive statistics for all dependent as well as independent variables were analyzed and 
summarized with results presented in tables and charts. The correlation of political 
transnationalism (the three dependent variables) to each of the independent variables was then 
analyzed using ordinal regression analysis and presented in tabular form, e.g. how political 
transnationalism relates to level of education or how the absence of transnational activism relates 
to gender. This was followed by a detailed analysis of the results obtained from regression 
analysis. 
 
Scope  
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The range of the results for this study is relatively narrow, given the sample was drawn from 
a specific county in southern California rather than a statewide or nationwide level. Keeping this 
in mind, the following limitations were taken into account: 
1. Only Vietnamese refugees living in the Orange County area are included in this study. 
However, that does not mean that these findings are not applicable to other populations of 
Vietnamese refugees. 
2. Only refugees from the community-based organizations and church meetings were used 
to gather survey data, thereby limiting this study to those refugees who came to these 
centers. 
 
In the following chapter, I provide a historical context for my research and trace the 
journey of the Vietnamese refugees from the fall of Saigon to their settlement in Orange County 
in southern California. I also give a brief overview of the age, educational and employment 
profile of the Vietnamese as they arrived as refugees and also as they slowly adjusted to life in 
the U.S., making steady progress towards economic self-sufficiency and successfully integrating 
with the host society. 
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Chapter 4 
Flight into Exile: The Fall of Saigon and Refugee Displacement 
 
In this chapter, I start with a brief overview of the historical causes of the Vietnamese 
refugee exodus to the United States, followed by a detailed look into the three stages or waves of 
Vietnamese refugee arrivals in the U.S. Understanding the different circumstances of the three 
waves as well as subtle differences in the characteristics of the refugees in each wave can help us 
appreciate the demographic diversity of the population that immigrated and its possible impact 
on their transnational activism. This understanding is further aided in this chapter by outlining 
the educational and occupational profile of the Vietnamese refugees when they first arrived in 
the U.S. and then tracing their educational and economic progress as they settled all over the 
country and eventually relocated to California. Charting their economic and cultural adjustment 
over the decades gives us the perspective to then examine how the Vietnamese refugees used 
their economic success to mobilize their political passions and evolve from struggling refugees 
to active transnationals.  
 
Historical Context 
The Vietnamese exodus has its historical background as far back as Vietnam’s first 
military conflict with France, which entered central Vietnam in 1858 with plans of colonizing the 
country. Vietnam remained under French occupation until 1945 when, under the leadership of 
Ho Chi Minh, the Vietminh, a coalition of Vietnamese nationalists created and dominated by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, proclaimed independence and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam was born (Nguyen, D. Q. 1994). 
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After unsuccessful attempts at negotiation between the French and the Vietminh, the first 
Indochina War broke out in 1946 and lasted for eight years (Jian 1993). At the Geneva 
Conference shortly thereafter, the French and the Vietminh signed an agreement that divided 
Vietnam in half (Jian 1993). Soon after, civil war erupted in the divided country in which the 
superpowers became increasingly involved. President Kennedy agreed to send military advisors 
to South Vietnam in 1965 followed by 549,000 troops over the next decade (Nguyen C. 1994, p. 
3). As the war became extremely unpopular among the American public, in 1969, President 
Nixon began to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam. In the next few years, troop withdrawal was 
completed as the war became the solitary burden of the South. In April 1975, North Vietnamese 
troops pulled into Saigon and the Vietnam War officially ended with the fall of South Vietnam, 
opening the floodgates for the massive exodus of Vietnamese refugees to the United States. 
 
Vietnamese refugees – in numbers 
Indochinese refugees from the Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam constitute the largest group of refugees ever to build new lives in the United States. 
Based on State Department figures for the period FY 1975 through FY 2000, about 52 percent of 
refugees arriving in the United States had fled from nations of Southeast Asia (Office of Refugee 
Resettlement 2007). Of these, the Vietnamese (71 percent) continue to be the majority refugee 
group (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2007). Figures 1 and 2 depict the number of Indochinese 
and Vietnamese refugees in the U.S., respectively.  
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Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
 
In total, since the fall of Saigon in 1975, approximately 995,000 Vietnamese refugees 
have immigrated to the U.S. (Nguyen, D. V. 2006,  p. 123). They began to be resettled in the 
United States in 1975 and their numbers increased dramatically in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, with the influx of Vietnamese “boat people”, Amerasians and those arriving under the 
Refugee Arrivals in U.S. (1975-2000)
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Orderly Departure Program (ODP). The largest numbers of Vietnamese now live in Southern 
California, particularly in Orange County (SEARAC 2004). The U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 
reported 1,222,528 Vietnamese living in the United States (Office of Refugee Resettlement 
2000, p. 84). Of these 447,032 were in California with 135,548 in Orange County (1.3% of the 
state’s population)8. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the distribution of the Vietnamese population in 
the U.S. and in California, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
8 Estimates of the Vietnamese population in Orange County vary and are highly disputed by members of the 
community. For a brief overview of this dispute, see Eunice Cluck, “The Vietnamese Community in Orange 
County” (report prepared for United Way of Orange County, August 1994), Southeast Asian Archive, University of 
Irvine library, Irvine, California. The number used here, however comes from the 2000 Census Bureau (Profiles of 
the General Demographic Characteristics 2000: 2000 Census of Population and Housing, California, May 2001, 
U.S. Department of Commerce). 
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Figure 4. 
  
 
Most Vietnamese refugees come from what was once the Republic of Vietnam, known as 
“South Vietnam”, which had its capital at Saigon. Their government, allied with the United 
States, collapsed under military pressure from communist North Vietnam in April of 1975. As 
Saigon fell to the communists, the Vietnamese arrived in the United States in three waves from 
1975 to 1998. In the first wave (1975-77), 130,000 refugees were brought into the United States 
with the help of the U.S. government (Ha 2002, Zhou and Bankston III 2004). During the second 
wave (1978-88), 413,924 Vietnamese refugees arrived in the U.S., many of them by boat (Haines 
1989, Ha 2002). Finally, in the third wave (1989-98), 451,076 Vietnamese refugees crossed over 
into the United States under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), Amerasian Program, 
Humanitarian Operation (HO), Public Interest Parole (PIP) and Resettlement Opportunity for 
Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) programs (Freeman 1995, Zhou and Bankston III 2004). Table 1 
and Figure 5 below show the arrivals of Vietnamese refugees in the U.S. in the three waves. 
 
Distribution of Vietnamese population in California 
(2000 Census)
Total population in California = 447,032
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Table 1. 
Vietnamese Refugees in the U.S. (1975-1998) 
Years 1975-77 1978-88 1989-98 1975-98 
First Wave 130,000    
Second Wave  413,924   
Third Wave   451,076  
Total    995,000 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
       
Vietnamese Refugees in the U.S. (1975-1998)
130,000 413,924 451,076
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
Waves
N
um
be
r o
f R
ef
ug
ee
s
First Wave
Second Wave
Third Wave
86 
 
Three Waves of Refugees 
In what ways were the refugees in the 3 waves distinct? 
On April 30, 1975, the day Saigon fell, and in its immediate aftermath, thousands of 
Vietnamese fled with American soldiers and government employees. While some ten to fifteen 
thousand managed to escape in the ten days before the collapse of South Vietnam, another 
eighty-six thousand Vietnamese and Americans were brought out in the last few days of April; 
most of them air-evacuated (Freeman 1995). In the chaos of the last days of April, 1975, 
helicopters were used in the rescue of about 3,000 (Maclear 1981, p. 346). In those days and in 
the days following the fall of Saigon, another forty to sixty thousand Vietnamese made their way 
in small boats to the American Seventh Fleet or to Vietnamese navy ships in the South China Sea 
(Freeman 1995).  
These individuals constituted the “first wave” refugees, individuals who were relatively 
well-prepared to live in the United States. This wave consisted of Vietnamese who spoke English 
well, were relatively well educated, had skills presumed marketable in the American economy 
and were, for the most part, urbanized and westernized (Kelly 1977). Many had been high-
ranking officials of the South Vietnamese government, military leaders, provincial and district 
chiefs, and mayors. Others were persons who had worked closely with the United States as 
translators, intelligence experts and propagandists or were employed by American corporations 
in Vietnam. 
On the other hand, the second and third wave refugees were persons who had little power 
in Vietnam and were not associated with the American government or with private agencies. 
Among the refugees were not only former enlisted rank and file members of the South 
Vietnamese army and navy, but also lower level Vietnamese government officials, frightened 
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fishermen and farmers, teachers and petty traders. They were not necessarily urban, had few 
skills that were usable in the United States, spoke little or no English, and were totally 
unacquainted with life outside their parishes or villages in Vietnam. 
Moreover, the experience of those who came to America since 1989 i.e., third wave 
refugees, was not at all like that of the first wave refugees or the boat people of previous years. 
First wave refugees arrived at a time when the American and world economic situation was 
better and public sympathy for the refugees was widespread, especially following horrific media 
images of the toll the Vietnam War had taken on innocent civilians there. As a result, the refugee 
programs included three years of financial assistance, English instruction and job training 
(Freeman 1995). The later arrivals had different experiences and also found a different America. 
Those arriving in the third wave, especially, had already endured years of abuse and hardship in 
post-war Vietnam. Some were former reeducation camp prisoners who suffered years of 
starvation and mistreatment. Others spent years in New Economic Zones in Vietnam doing hard 
physical labor. In America, their skills rarely prepared them for work. Refugee assistance, 
English training and job training programs had been drastically cut. The newly arrived 
Vietnamese also faced rising anti-immigrant sentiment (Freeman 1995). 
The reasons for these differences in the profiles of refugees in the three waves as well as 
the discrepancy in the welcome extended to them can be explained by taking a closer look at the 
circumstances surrounding the three waves of refugees and factors accounting for the prolonged 
flow of refugees from Vietnam for so many years even after the war ended, as described below. 
 
First wave 
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The rapid military collapse of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 surprised the 
American government, who began a belated emergency lift to evacuate American citizens; 
mainly military and diplomatic personnel and their dependents, along with some at-risk 
Vietnamese: members of the South Vietnamese army and government, and those who had 
worked for the Americans. The rapid disintegration of the Vietnamese army; the panic that 
seized the population of South Vietnam, many of whom were already refugees either from North 
Vietnam or from the war; and American hesitancy in planning and executing the evacuation of 
Vietnamese civilians all affected the question of who would come to the U.S. 
At the time of the fall of Saigon, there were a modest number of ex-military and 
government officials, students and professionals, Vietnamese who had worked for the U.S. 
during the war and their families who were part of an American-sponsored evacuation (Kelly 
1986). As mentioned before, many had been high-ranking officials of the South Vietnamese 
government and military leaders. Others were persons who had worked closely with the United 
States in Vietnam as secretaries, chauffeurs, translators, intelligence experts, or propagandists. 
Some were employed by American corporations like Chase Manhattan Bank and TWA; still 
others were married to Americans or related to persons married to Americans (Kelly 1977). The 
bulk of these refugees fled due to widespread fears that any association with the collapsing 
Saigon regime or with the American effort in southern Vietnam held the risk of subsequent 
discrimination or punishment (Osborne 1980). 
Prior to the fall of Saigon in 1975, only a small number of Vietnamese had immigrated to 
the United States. Unlike the other Asian groups already in America, the 1975 wave of 
Vietnamese refugees did not choose to come here (Nguyen C. 1994). In fact, they had no 
decision to make, for they were driven out by the powerful events surrounding them. The city 
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shuddered under relentless missile bombardments; homes and buildings were burning 
everywhere. At the street level, panic gripped the people. “On those last days of April,” 
remembered a refugee, “there was a lot of gunfire and bombing around the capital. People were 
running on chaotic streets. We got scared…” (Takaki 2006). The refugees had no time to prepare 
psychologically for the departure; more than half of the refugees later said they were given less 
than ten hours (Nguyen C. 1994). 
The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 marked the end of the virtually constant state of war 
that began with the partitioning of Vietnam in 1954. The first wave of postwar escapees also 
included large numbers of the 1954 North-to-South Vietnam refugees (Knudsen 1995). Of these 
refugees, the majority fled fearing experiences of political and/or religious persecution under the 
new regime. In addition, they were now gripped by the fear of being accused of having been 
members or employees of the previous regime (Knudsen 1995).  
Certainty about the new regime’s antagonistic attitude toward the family constituted one 
major reason for the flight from Vietnam. The war had already divided families, leaving family 
members as opponents in battles defined by international politics (Knudsen 1995). The refugees 
saw their children transformed by the school system and youth brigades, the latter being viewed 
as police forces, whose aim was to report the thoughts and actions of parents, neighbors and 
strangers (Knudsen 1995). In this environment of political oppression and vigilance, many chose 
to flee. 
In all, during the first wave, some 130,000 Vietnamese refugees fled to the United States 
between 1975 and 1977 after the Communists took over Saigon and renamed it as Ho Chi Minh 
City (Haines 1989, p. 3; Nguyen C. 1994, p. 3). By 1977, all 130,000 refugees who had fled 
Vietnam were allowed to settle in the United States on parole status granted by the U.S. 
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government (Zhou and Bankston III 2004, p. 11). As mentioned earlier, those in this initial wave 
of refugees were mostly member of the elite and the middle class who either had access to the 
evacuation arranged by the American military or could afford their own means of flight. At the 
same time, many Vietnamese who could not leave for the United States, afraid of Communist 
brutality, escaped to other countries by land and sea – around 60,000 refugees were held in 
refugee camps in Hong Kong or Thailand (Kelly 1977, p. 36).  
 
Second wave 
The second wave of refugees took place from 1978 to 1988; with a total of 413,924 
Vietnamese refugees entering the United States (Haines 1989, p. 3; Ha 2002, p. 4). These 
refugees were quick to join those in the first wave fearing persecution under the new regime. The 
new regime not only wished to get rid of political opponents but also to purge the private 
economy, since these two were considered to be the main obstacles to the socialist 
transformation of society. In the past 400 years, sizeable Chinese communities had developed in 
Vietnam. The Chinese played an important role in urban business, controlling markets such as 
rice and pepper (Freeman 1995). As conditions in the southern portion of the newly reunified 
Vietnam (former South Vietnam) worsened in the late 1970s, there was a drive by the new 
government to rid the country of its Chinese merchant class by confiscating their wealth (Kelly 
1977). 
Heavy taxes had already been imposed on the peasants, who were also ordered to deliver 
most of their surplus harvest to the state for a fixed price (Knudsen 1995). The government 
established New Economic Zones (NEZ) to increase agricultural production. Another objective 
91 
 
in establishing the NEZ was that the areas constituted an important link in the government’s 
attempt to control the uncertain situation in the former South Vietnam.  
On May 16, 1975, the Communist government in Vietnam ordered all former high-
ranking government officials to register for re-education (Nguyen D.V. 2006, p. 105). An 
estimated 400,000 former South Vietnamese civilians and military officers were sent from 
Saigon to settle in these areas from 1975 to 1976 (Knudsen 1995, p. 15). Among the internees of 
the NEZ and the “reeducation” camps were many who had supported the fight against the 
previous regime in the South. The government also confiscated properties of rich businessmen 
and middle-class citizens and then forced millions of people to move to the new economic zones 
around the country (Ha 2002). The authorities promised a short internment during which the 
“volunteers” would go through a program of reeducation and self-criticism. In reality, for more 
than ten years, thousands remained imprisoned and humiliated (Amnesty International 1987). 
The camps were heavy workplaces in isolated jungles where the people suffered great hardship 
and starvation. The NEZs were poorly organized, with hardly any food supplies and no plans for 
the production of goods. People were abandoned, isolated and starved to death.  
While the heads of household were jailed and suffered in reeducation camps, their family 
members, estimated at one million women and children, without the main breadwinners and no 
resources to maintain themselves, fell into miserable situations in substandard living conditions 
(Ha 2002). As a result, along with thousands of former South Vietnamese government officials 
who had escaped being sent to reeducation camps as well as frightened Vietnamese farmers and 
fishermen, the families of those in reeducation camps sought to perilously escape from the 
country on boats which were not suitable for ocean voyage. Between May 1975 and July 31, 
1979 alone, 292,315 Vietnamese successfully escaped by boat (Freeman 1995, p. 32). In 1976, 
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the number of escapees was 5,247 while in 1977, 15,690 people escaped; in 1978 and 1979, the 
numbers skyrocketed to 85,213 and 185,826 respectively (Freeman 1995, p. 32).  
At this time, thousands of Vietnamese, who refused to cooperate with the Communist 
government, interacted with the Sino-Vietnamese merchant class to seek asylum by boat 
(Nguyen D.V. 2006). Thus, between 1978 and 1980, the majority of the tens of thousands of boat 
people leaving Vietnam were ethnic Chinese, victims of anti-Chinese sentiment fueled by a 
border clash with China in 1979 (Whitmore 1985, pp. 59-76). The refugees brought with them 
reports of how their wealth had been confiscated by authorities before they were allowed to leave 
(Freeman 1995). As the impact of gradual social transformations were felt, including the 
persecution of individuals and suppression of freedoms, more fled. 
Only about 60 percent of these “boat people” survived and reached refugee camps in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Hong Kong (Ha 2002, p. 4; Nguyen D.V. 
2006, p. 106). As for the rest, pirates robbed them, killed men, raped women and young girls, 
and kidnapped and sold girls as prostitutes to other countries. Still others fled overland from 
Vietnam through Cambodia, hoping to reach Thailand; on the way they were hunted by bandits, 
Khmer Rouge soldiers and Vietnamese troops (Freeman 1995). Moreover, as hundreds of 
thousands of refugees fled Vietnam, neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong 
found themselves unable or unwilling to absorb the stream of refugees that threatened to 
overwhelm them. In a number of well-publicized cases, Vietnamese refugee boats attempting to 
land in Thailand and Malaysia were towed back out to sea (Freeman 1995). During this time, the 
U.S. government admitted approximately 400,000 Vietnamese refugees who had fled on boats 
and successfully reached refugee camps in neighboring countries (Office of Refugee 
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Resettlement 1998; Haines 1989, p. 3). Of these, over 200,000 were ethnic Chinese refugees 
from Vietnam (Freeman 1995, p. 32).  
For a lot of these refugees, their defining experience is often said to be their traumatic 
escape by boat. The voyages of the Vietnamese boat people fleeing from persecution were as 
remarkable as they were often tragic. Thousands of people failed in their attempts to escape, 
missing rendezvous, being cheated by people who claimed to be organizing escapes, and being 
caught by security forces while trying to flee Vietnam. Since, according to Vietnamese law, 
leaving the country without permission was a crime, those who were caught were placed in jail, 
women and children in one room, the men in another (Freeman 1995). Despite failures, refugees 
made repeated attempts to escape. If, finally, they succeeded in eluding the shore guards and 
coastal patrols, they still faced the dangerous storms and swirling tides of the South China Sea. 
Their journey, often in small, un-seaworthy vessels, lasted from a couple of days to weeks, and 
the distances they traveled ranged from a few hundred to five thousand miles. The survivors 
weathered fierce storms, attacks by Vietnamese patrols out at sea; they suffered from hunger, 
thirst and dehydration (Freeman 1995). Beyond that, the waters around Thailand and Malaysia 
were infested with pirates who often worked in teams of boats to rape, pillage and murder their 
hapless victims (Freeman 1995). 
 
Third wave 
Reports about piracy and drowning of the “boat people” created growing concern in the 
late 1970s, and the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was able to 
negotiate an agreement under which the government of Vietnam would allow “orderly 
departure” for some of its citizens (Kelly 1986, Nguyen D. V. 2006). In May, 1979, as a tentative 
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solution to worldwide attention attracted by the boat people, the UNHCR established the Orderly 
Departure Program (ODP) (United States Catholic Conference  1984). It initiated the third wave 
of Vietnamese arrivals but slowed down the boat people exodus. The ODP allowed those 
interviewed and approved for resettlement in America by U.S officials in Vietnam to leave by 
plane with their Vietnamese passports.9 
Under the ODP, Vietnamese could enter the United States if they had close relatives who 
had resettled and were living in the United States who applied to bring them over: spouses, sons, 
daughters, parents, grandparents and unmarried grandchildren. The family reunification program 
thereby reunited Vietnamese family members who had been living in the United States and in 
Vietnam. Others who qualified were those who had been employed by Americans or American 
companies in Vietnam, or officials, soldiers, and their close relatives who had been associated 
with the United States (Freeman 1995). 
However, excluded from the ODP until 1984 were those Vietnamese prisoners who were 
sent to re-education camps, where they were detained for many years under harsh and inhumane 
conditions. Concerned about former comrades-in-arms and colleagues, the U.S. government 
pleaded for their release and asked permission for them to emigrate. In 1984, the U.S. and 
Vietnam agreed to allow 10,000 former political prisoners to emigrate overseas to join family 
members in America (Freeman 1995, p. 36). Finally, the U.S. Department of State pledged to 
secure the release and resettlement of the remaining 85,000 reeducation camp prisoners who, 
after 1975, had been incarcerated for at least three and, in some cases, more than fifteen years.  
In 1988, the U.S. State Department reached an agreement with the Vietnamese government that 
9 During this time, the Refugee Act of 1980 became the most comprehensive piece of refugee legislation in U.S. 
history as it provided for an annual number of admissions for refugees, which was designated independent of the 
number of immigrants admitted. 
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would allow them to leave through the ODP (SEARAC 2004; Nguyen D. V. 2006). The 
Humanitarian Operation (HO) program, a subprogram of the ODP, brought in these former 
South Vietnam military and civil employees; most of them had been brought to America by 1995 
(Freeman 1995). Once freed, the former political prisoners also chose to join the close to one 
million refugees who had been forced into exile. The Public Interest Parole (PIP) also brought in 
those Vietnamese who had cooperated with America during the Vietnam War (United States 
Catholic Conference 1984). 
The Amerasian program admitted children in Vietnam who were born to Vietnamese 
women and fathered by Americans during the war years (Kelly 1986, Ha 2002). Since the end of 
the war, many Americans had become concerned about the plight of these so-called Amerasians. 
Because these children were of mixed blood, the Vietnamese government regarded them as the 
dust of life, homeless children (Willis 2000). Under pressure from Vietnam veterans, the U.S. 
agreed to accept Amerasians as refugees. In December 1987, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Amerasian Homecoming Act, under which some 100,000 Amerasians and their immediate 
families were allowed to immigrate to the United States through 1994 as refugees but with full 
citizenship rights and obligations (Nguyen, D. V. 2006, p. 116). The HO, PIP and Amerasian 
programs formally ended in September 2000. Lastly, the Resettlement Opportunity for 
Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) program allowed Vietnamese who voluntarily returned to 
Vietnam from refugee camps in Southeast Asia to enter the United States (Ha 2002). By the mid-
1990s, over 200,000 Vietnamese had been admitted to the United States under the Orderly 
Departure Program and by 1996, the number had grown to over 450,000 refugees (Office of 
Refugee Resettlement 1998; Zhou and Bankston III 2004). 
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Reasons for the prolonged refugee crisis 
Several factors account for the lengthy flow of refugees from Vietnam for so many years 
even after the war ended: first, political repression continued to make life difficult for those 
individuals who were detained at or released from reeducation camps as well as or their family 
members (Zhou and Bankston III 2004). Second, economic hardships, exacerbated by natural 
disasters and poor harvests in the years following the war, created a widespread sense of 
hopelessness. Third, incessant warfare with neighboring countries further drained Vietnam’s 
resources for capital investment and development (Zhou and Bankston III 2004). These severely 
adversarial conditions triggered the second and third exodus of Vietnamese boat people in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  
The Vietnamese came to the United States motivated by events that occurred in Vietnam. 
When they left their country, most believed their departure was temporary lasting only until the 
new government fell; they were not consciously choosing to become part of another society or 
culture (Kelly 1977). As the Vietnamese entered American refugee camps, both in Guam and on 
the U.S. mainland, it became apparent to them that they had left Vietnam for good and that their 
future lives would be shaped by American society. In refugee holding centers, the Vietnamese 
began to adjust to this perspective; they moved into a world that was run by Americans and in 
which their options were molded by what Americans expected of them and arranged for them 
(Kelly 1977). 
Initially, the refugees who came to the United States arrived at four U.S. military bases in 
California, Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Florida (Nguyen D.V. 2006, p. 104). Several national 
voluntary agencies, under the contract of the Department of State, settled the new arrivals in 
communities throughout the country and arranged sponsorships for the refugees. These 
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sponsorships involved the provision of housing and initial support from interested Americans. 
Gradually, most of these refugees resettled themselves in California, particularly in Los Angeles 
and Orange County, because of the familiar climate and support from the large Vietnamese 
community. 
 
The Vietnamese refugee exodus initially began in the aftermath of the fall of Saigon in a 
frenzy of evacuations of not only those Vietnamese considered closest to the American 
government’s military and offices and therefore, at greatest risk of persecution by the communist 
government, but also those considered as the most likely candidates to adjust to life in America. 
As socio-economic conditions deteriorated in Vietnam and political persecution resulted in tens 
of thousands of former South Vietnamese being sent to “reeducation camps”, this triggered an 
exodus of the “boat people” and prolonged the refugee crisis.  Growing concerns about piracy 
and the drowning of those attempting to escape by boat as well as reports coming out of Vietnam 
regarding the plight of Amerasians led the U.S. to establish the Orderly Departure and 
Amerasian Programs and the arrival of the third wave of refugees. The Vietnamese continued to 
arrive in the United States even after 1998 through family reunification programs and 
sponsorships by relatives already in the U.S. – these latter arrivals are considered immigrants, 
not refugees. We can now turn to a brief demographic and educational profiling of the 
Vietnamese refugees. 
 
Profile of arriving Vietnamese refugees 
The refugees who arrived in the first wave of the exodus were extensively profiled as 
they arrived in the United States, both by government agencies providing aid and by scholars for 
98 
 
academic purposes. To give a brief profile of Vietnamese refugees who came to the United 
States in the first wave, they tended to be young, part of a family group and Catholic. 45.9 
percent of all refugees were under the age of 18, and, therefore, likely to be dependents of a 
family while another 35.6 percent were between ages 18 and 34, roughly the ages of military 
service (Kelly 1977, p. 41). Many more men than women left Vietnam and the predominance of 
men was strongest in the age group affected by military service (Kelly 1977). According to the 
1980 Census, the ratio of men to women was 108.8 and 64.8% of male Vietnamese refugees 
participated in the labor force compared to 47.9% of females (US Department of Commerce 
1984, pp. 1-6). 
In terms of education, the Vietnamese in the first wave were relatively well educated 
when they arrived, even by American standards. Vietnamese heads of households looked not too 
terribly different educationally from American heads of households. According to Kelly (1977, 
pp. 47-48), over 27.4 percent of all heads of households (or 19.5 percent of all refugees over age 
eighteen) had some university education or more while another 47.8 percent of heads of 
households (or 37.9 percent of refugees over eighteen) had some secondary education. Only 18 
percent of heads of households (or refugees over age eighteen) had less than secondary schooling 
(Kelly 1977, p. 48). In fact, many younger Vietnamese had been students at the time they came 
to the U.S. Their educational levels indicate that they tended to be urban and from relatively 
well-to-do families.  
The fact that many of the refugees in the first wave were from the South Vietnamese elite 
is apparent not only in the educational backgrounds of immigrants, it is also clear in their 
occupational skills as translated into U.S. Department of Labor job skill categories. 31 percent of 
refugee heads of household had professional, technical or managerial skills, followed by 
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transportation and miscellany into which 17 percent of refugees fell, while 12 percent fell in to 
the category of clerical and sales skills (Kelly 1977, pp. 50-52).  
However, many first wave refugees, despite their educational levels, spoke little English. 
While they awaited sponsorship in refugee camps in California, Arkansas, Pennsylvania and 
Florida into which they were placed, the refugees did attend English as a Second Language 
(ESL) classes and receive introductions to American culture. However, by December 1975, the 
camps were closed and refugee families had been released to their American sponsors (Ryan 
1987). As a consequence, a year after the Vietnamese arrived, 27 percent of all heads of 
households and 65 percent of all refugees still spoke no English at all (Kelly 1977, p. 56). 
As a result of their low proficiency in English, the Vietnamese refugees underwent 
considerable class and occupational change in moving from Vietnam to the United States, 
despite their education. For the most part, when employed, the Vietnamese could only find jobs 
at the lowest end of the American occupational spectrum. The work they found was often 
temporary and tended to offer little or no possibility for advancement. Many Vietnamese worked 
for less than $2.39 per hour, the U.S. minimum wage as of 1976 (Kelly 1977, p. 175). Thus, 
Vietnam’s former managerial and technical elite, while perhaps better acquainted with American 
lifestyles than rural or lower class Vietnamese, lost power, prestige and income in getting 
displaced from Saigon to the United States. 
In contrast to the first wave refugees, the second and third wave refugees were persons 
who had little power in Vietnam and were not associated with the American government or with 
private agencies. Among the “boat people” were former enlisted rank and file members of the 
South Vietnamese army and navy, fishermen, farmers, teachers and petty traders along with the 
impoverished families of those imprisoned in the reeducation camps in Vietnam. The third wave 
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mainly consisted of former political prisoners of the communist government in Vietnam, those 
Vietnamese who had fled to refugee camps in neighboring Southeast Asian countries but had 
been forced to return to Vietnam due to poor conditions and Amerasians, who were considered 
the very dregs of Vietnamese society. These refugees were not necessarily urban, had few skills 
that were usable in the United States, spoke little or no English, and were totally unacquainted 
with life outside their parishes or villages in Vietnam (Ha 2002). 
The majority of the refugees in the second and third waves hailed from Vietnam’s rural, 
lower classes and had little or no education in Vietnam. Refugees in these waves also had next to 
no English language skills upon arrival, irrespective of their educational or employment 
background. Moreover, the first wave refugees had access to at least a few months’ worth of ESL 
training and introduction to American culture at the refugee camps they were held in before 
being released to their sponsor families. By contrast, the “boat people”, former political prisoners 
and Amerasians in the second and third waves were introduced directly into mainstream 
American society and, for the most part, had to fend for themselves. 
However, by drawing out experience from friends in the first wave – who had received a 
higher education in Vietnam and then, in some cases, additional education in the United States – 
second wave refugees acquired stable jobs and eventually secured high salaries. Some refugees 
in the second wave even held their first job long enough to go to school and get an education in 
the United States; others participated in professional graduate training (Ha 2002). Many refugees 
in the third wave, however, did not have enough time to enroll in education in the United States 
because they only had eight months of public assistance and had to rely mostly on their previous 
education in Vietnam to find a job. As a consequence, the majority of refugees in the third wave 
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ended up working in low-skilled jobs in textile factories, beauty shops, restaurants owned by 
Vietnamese in Vietnamese communities, or became self-employed (Ha 2002). 
 
Initial challenges faced by Vietnamese refugees 
The Vietnamese refugees from all three waves had to constantly adjust to the challenges 
of American life and the stress they imposed. The fact that the Vietnamese arrived in the United 
States as refugees meant that they came under the guidance of the U.S. government or voluntary 
resettlement agencies (VOLAGs). Resettlement in the United States initially involved such 
conditions, in which Americans set the range of possibilities within which the Vietnamese could 
act. They struggled with identity crises, mental and emotional problems and family dysfunction. 
Many were separated from their families or left without any extended families. The stability of 
the typical Vietnamese family was eroded as they were influenced by the values and norms of 
Western society (Tran, T V. 1987).  
The cultural clash between the dominant American culture and Vietnamese culture 
presented many adjustment problems to the Vietnamese family because the change came 
abruptly. For adult Vietnamese, husband and wife roles were often reversed and problems related 
to employment and language problems continued to plague them; similarly, children were often 
‘parentified’ and assumed roles and duties that belonged to their parents and becoming the 
family negotiators because of their fluency in the English language (Graham 1998).  
One way to cushion the impact of a new community is for refugees, like many immigrant 
groups, to become part of an ethnic enclave. Stein (1979) suggests that one reason some early 
Vietnamese refugees had a difficult time was because of the lack of an established ethnic 
community to lend support. Resettlement was first arranged in different states so that most 
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Vietnamese began their life in America isolated from one another (Kelly 1977). As a result, all 
Vietnamese coming out of Vietnam or refugee camps to be resettled faced the loss of any 
Vietnamese society. Gradually, the Vietnamese began regrouping within the United States as 
part of the reunification programs of extended families, forming enclaves in several locales and 
thereby making ineffective the earlier government plan to scatter the Vietnamese refugees 
throughout the country.  
Not only did the Vietnamese move closer together, reversing the American-sponsored 
diaspora, they also began organizing themselves into a community. Some of the movement of 
Vietnamese into communities was also part of a conscious effort of the former South Vietnamese 
leadership to reassert itself in the context of an American-Vietnamese community. In those early 
years, some of the organizations were purely social, providing places for Vietnamese to meet 
together; others confined their activities to job placement; and still others emphasized bicultural 
programs such as English language tutoring of school aged children and Vietnamese cultural 
events (Kelly 1977). 
Over the course of more than a decade of adjustment, Vietnamese refugees started 
making progress in integrating into American society. With the aid of public assistance, they had 
time to go to school, study English, participate in vocational training and attend a community 
college or university. From the skills learned at these schools, they obtained employment. Earned 
income helped Vietnamese refugees get off public assistance and become economically self-
sufficient and socially adapted.  
 
Assistance offered to Vietnamese refugees 
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Most Vietnamese who entered the United States from 1975 on were classified upon 
arrival as refugees and received public assistance (Ha 2002). In fact, up to 1983, Vietnamese 
refugees in California were assisted by federal and state programs, directed by the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement at the federal and state levels (Tran, L K. 1986, p. 53). Since 1984, the 
Targeted Assistance Program (TAP) was started and continued through 1988. The goals of the 
TAP program were threefold: 
1. To increase the self-sufficiency of refugees through the reduction of welfare dependency, 
2. To build mutual assistance capacity among refugees towards the goal of refugee self-
sufficiency, 
3. To increase private/business sector commitment to aid in the reduction of welfare 
dependency. 
 
In addition, a business technical assistance program was started by the Vietnamese 
Chamber of Commerce. The primary objective of the program was to assist and train those 
refugees desiring to improve their businesses and/or to start a business by providing the 
resources, technical assistance and access to capital sources and conducting training programs on 
the different aspects of doing business (Tran, L K. 1986). The Vietnamese Chamber of 
Commerce received funds from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Office of 
Refugee resettlement in Washington D.C, enabling it to organize seminars and business sessions 
every month, which were attended by Vietnamese businessmen to gain further business 
knowledge (Tran, L K. 1991).  
After the completion of the programs, they wrote business plans with which the 
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce assisted them in getting a loan from the Small Business 
Administration Office or from banks. After one or two years, they became successful business 
owners and returned to the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce as trainers in the seminars and 
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also received further assistance to expand their businesses (Tran 1991). The concrete benefit to 
the community was that jobs were created for the many Vietnamese refugees who had just 
arrived in the United States and who had not yet received any special training to work in an 
American company. In this manner, with special policies, the government allowed these refugees 
to receive public assistance but encouraged them to adapt to the new society, search for 
employment or get involved in vocational training.  
 
Economic progress of Vietnamese refugees  
The Vietnamese refugees made great efforts to learn skills and gain employment in the 
United States and quickly made steady progress towards English-language acquisition (Dunning 
1979). To give an example, among 1981 (second wave) arrivals, only 18.8% of Vietnamese-
Americans were employed, whereas among the 1975 arrivals who had been in the U.S. for 7 
years by then, the percent employed climbed to 64.2% (Ryan 1987, p. 118). With monthly 
income as indicators of economic adjustment, the mean family income of second-wave 
Vietnamese refugees in 1978 was $755; by 1981 this increased to $1,220 a month (Ha 2002, p. 
137). 
Similarly, over time there was a marked general improvement in the English-speaking 
ability of the Vietnamese refugees, from 9.2% among 1981 arrivals to 76% among 1975 arrivals 
(Ryan 1987, p. 121). Among 1981 arrivals, only 2.9% of Vietnamese refugees owned homes 
whereas this number rose to 65.4% among 1975 arrivals (Ryan 1987, p. 131). Finally, as time 
spent in the U.S. increased, a sharp drop occurred in the percentage of adult Vietnamese refugees 
receiving Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) from 81.9% among 1981 arrivals to 13.9% among 
1975 arrivals (Ryan 1987, p. 134). 
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Their progress continued well into the third decade of their resettlement in the U.S. 
Census data shows that between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of Vietnamese who did not speak 
English very well had decreased from 42% to 34% (Zhou and Bankston III 2004, p. 15). The 
proportion of college graduates among adults aged 25 and over was 17%, up from 13%; while 
the poverty rate stood at 24%, down from 35% (Zhou and Bankston III 2004, p. 15). Meanwhile, 
the Vietnamese also preserved their own culture and established their own communities. In 
building their communities, like Little Saigon in California, the Vietnamese created many kinds 
of jobs for themselves, raised their economic status by earning income and produced an 
appearance of prosperity in the United States. 
Thus, Vietnamese refugees quickly entered the U.S. labor market, and their employment 
rate steadily improved with the length of their resettlement. According to Ryan (1987), overall, 
time spent in the U.S. was the greatest single factor in accounting for economic adjustment of the 
Vietnamese refugees; the longer the refugees had been in the U.S., the greater were the chances 
for successful adjustment. The ability to speak English, a higher education from their country of 
origin, as well as such factors like age and gender, have also shown to have had a significant 
influence upon Vietnamese refugees’ success within the U.S. labor market (Graham 1998).  
It should also be acknowledged that certain cultural values such as hard work ethics and 
family cohesion have facilitated the economic and educational success of Vietnamese refugees in 
the U.S. Kibria (1994) notes that the economic stability of the Vietnamese refugee households 
was shaped by an ideological sense of family collectivism that encourages the “sharing of 
individual social and economic resources within the household”. In this way, the Vietnamese 
refugees gradually became self-sufficient, then progressed to higher economic adjustment, and 
adapted well to the new society. 
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Diversity of Occupations among Vietnamese refugees 
Vietnamese Americans started working in all branches of economic activities to attain 
economic self-sufficiency. They worked in factories, in professional and nonprofessional 
agencies, in trade companies, in local and central government and in the military, providing 
services in both the private and public sectors. Overall, the occupation of the employed refugees 
reflected a high number of Vietnamese in skilled labor using technical skills and manual 
dexterity. In Orange County, for example, 5 percent of the refugees worked in electronics (Ha 
2002, p. 136).  
A majority of Vietnamese refugees with a strong motivation to rebuild their careers 
became entrepreneurs. In a survey conducted among Indochinese entrepreneurs, 39% had 
completed high school, 49% had college degree, 7% had a graduate degree and only 5% had no 
formal schooling (Tran 1986, pp. 84-85). The study found that entrepreneurial initiative came 
from people who were educated, but not at high level; who were seeking from business not only 
money, but also freedom and achievement which would earn them a high status in American 
society and who were willing to move from one occupation to another (Tran 1986). 
After more than thirty years in America, the Vietnamese today hold a wide variety of 
occupations based on their education, length of time and location in the United States. In many 
communities, the Vietnamese are in relatively low level and low paying blue collar occupations, 
such as waiters, cashiers, cooks, fishers and textile sewing machine operators (Zhou and 
Bankston 1994, p. 830). At the same time, they have established Chambers of Commerce and 
many professional associations, such as the Association of Vietnamese Press and Media in the 
U.S., the Vietnamese Employee Association of Los Angeles and the National Institute of 
Administration Alumni Association (Ha 2002). In addition, becoming U.S. citizens, the 
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Vietnamese established the Vietnamese-American Voters Association to engage in local and 
federal political processes. Some Vietnamese were elected to city councils and nominated for 
congressional elections while many hold high positions in the private sector, in United States 
government agencies, in NASA and even in the White House (Ha 2002).  
 
Vietnamese Refugees in California  
Most of the Vietnamese were initially resettled in or gravitated towards California; this 
concentration in California was a result of several factors. Before details of American 
government policy towards refugees from Vietnam were worked out, the Vietnamese refugees, 
both adults and orphaned children, were often flown to Travis Air Force base in California and 
released directly into American society (Manney 2006). The second factor contributing to heavy 
resettlement in California was the presence of Camp Pendleton, the first and largest of the 
holding centers to open on the U.S. mainland. Camp Pendleton, staffed by a host of volunteers, 
was the point of entry for the Vietnamese in California and it was soon inundated by American 
news media and curious private citizens. Many United States military veterans lived in Orange 
County, and some sponsored refugee families of South Vietnamese soldiers beside whom they 
had fought (Dewilde 1996). Also, Orange County, a bastion of political conservatism, was the 
first to initially welcome the South Vietnamese as refugees from communism (Weiss 1994). 
Along with these socio-political ties, in the mid-1970s the county’s work force lacked a large 
ethnic minority population to perform any menial tasks the economy required (Dewilde 1996). 
Thus, many refugees in the first wave were able to take those jobs and gain entry into the local 
economy.  
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The third factor that led to a Vietnamese concentration in California was Vietnamese 
preference. By the time the first boat people arrived in the United States, the first wave refugees 
had begun clustering, forming small enclaves through secondary migration after their initial 
government-orchestrated dispersal (Weiss 1994). Many of the latter refugees who arrived 
subsequent to the first wave also exhibited the same secondary migration pattern of gravitation 
from dispersed locations to form enclaves or clusters in order to live near other members of the 
same ethnic group. The reasons for their moving included family reunification and better job 
opportunities, real or perceived. The climate seemed hospitable and since large numbers of 
Vietnamese had already settled there from the early influx into the country, many Vietnamese 
anticipated less isolation there than in Nebraska or Wisconsin (Dewilde 1996, Vietnamese 
Chamber of Commerce 1991). Thus, strong cultural bonds, weather similar to tropical Vietnam 
and former network ties attracted more Vietnamese to concentrate in California.  
Orange County, California absorbed a tremendous number of Vietnamese refugees, who 
in turn have greatly influenced the county’s cultural landscape and impacted its government 
services. As early as the 1980 Census, Orange County had 19,333 Vietnamese and nearly half of 
the Vietnamese refugee population of Orange County lived in the area which came to be known 
as Little Saigon (Weiss 1994, p. 5; U.S. Census Bureau 1980). By 1990, it was estimated by the 
U.S. Census Bureau that approximately 70,572 Vietnamese resided in the county (Dewilde 1996, 
p. 3; U.S. Census Bureau 1990). According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000, the number of 
Vietnamese living in Orange County had risen to 135,548 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000, Ha 2002). 
Figure 6 below illustrates this meteoric rise in the Vietnamese population residing in Orange 
County over the past three decades. 
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Figure 6. 
  
Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, first and second wave Vietnamese refugees found 
employment in California’s growing defense industries in jobs such as electronic assembly 
(Weiss 1994, p. 32). Their sons and daughters were able to take advantage of the state’s 
inexpensive higher educational system, training for professional careers while adult Vietnamese 
were able to adapt gradually to their new country’s language, customs and job market (Dewilde 
1996). 
Orange County in the early 1980s had a thriving and diversified economy with more than 
1.3 million workers employed in industries ranging from high technology electronics to 
construction, agriculture, retail and financial service industries (Tran, L K. 1986, p. 35).  Because 
of the county’s strong economic growth, the employment outlook for Vietnamese refugees was 
extremely good. Third wave refugees and those Vietnamese immigrants sponsored by their 
relatives, entering the United States since 1990s, further contributed to the growth and the county 
continued to grow in population and commerce in to the 1990s. Gradually, the number of 
Vietnamese businesses, including stores, offices and restaurants, in Orange County grew to over 
2,000 (Dewilde 1996, p. 12). 
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Sociologist Steven Gold suggests that the development of an enclave such as Little 
Saigon fulfills important needs for some Vietnamese people. Little Saigon began to attract 
Vietnamese refugees as the place where job opportunities were created and where aid was 
offered in the resettlement of Vietnamese newcomers. Businesses in Little Saigon were often 
started by people who spoke little English and maintained little contact with American society, 
and in some cases wanted to keep it that way. They preferred to limit their contacts with an 
unfamiliar culture, to provide employment for relatives and provide a positive setting for their 
families to develop in the United States, and finally, to enjoy the relationships that come from 
living and working within the refugee community and immersing themselves in Vietnamese 
culture (Gold 1992). In Little Saigon, they could speak the Vietnamese language, retain old 
customs, and interact with people with whom they share common values and feel at ease. 
 
Conclusion   
The Vietnamese refugees arrived in the United States in the aftermath of the fall of 
Saigon in three waves covering the following time periods. In the first wave (1975-77), the 
exodus began in a frenzy of evacuations of those Vietnamese associated with the American 
government and, therefore, at greatest risk of persecution by the communist government. During 
the second wave (1978-88), the “boat people” comprised of Vietnamese escaping deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions and political persecution in Vietnam as well as families of those 
imprisoned in reeducation camps. The third wave (1989-98) witnessed the prolongation of the 
refugee crisis as the U.S. established the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) along with its 
subprograms and the Amerasian program following continued attempts by the Vietnamese to 
immigrate to America. 
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Over the decade from 1975, when people had left out of fear, the refugee movement had 
transformed itself into an expression of far broader socioeconomic grievances and desires. In the 
early days after the fall of Saigon, there was a frenzy to escape Vietnam as many former South 
Vietnamese military leaders and those associated with the American government feared for their 
lives as the communists took control of their country. However, by the 1980s, boarding a boat 
was no longer a response to specific fears: for many, it constituted an act of resistance to the 
communist government, and a radical rejection of the difficulties the government expected 
people to endure for a cause in which they no longer believed (Hardy 2003). Thus, the 
Vietnamese refugees were already highly politicized when they came to the United States. 
Over the years, the Vietnamese refugees have not simply adjusted to America, but rather 
have made it their home. From 1975 to 2000, the Vietnamese mobilized their education and job 
skills received in Vietnam as well as in the United States and utilized their cultural values and 
experiences to win against all odds, survive and live in happiness. During their first decade in the 
United States, the top priority of the Vietnamese was simply to survive and recover from the 
refugee experience. In the second decade, another phase of adjustment began; expansion from 
mere survival to economic strength and self-sufficiency. In the third decade, the Vietnamese 
developed new and distinctive ways of retaining or reconfiguring values and traditions in 
American social settings and strengthening their ties with Vietnam as their relatives continue to 
arrive from Vietnam and resettle in America, not as refugees but as immigrants. 
Vietnamese culture demonstrates the endurance of the Vietnamese on both sides of the 
Vietnam War. Since April 1975 to date, over thirty years, the Vietnamese who live outside their 
country have continued to fight in many ways to preserve the Vietnamese culture against the 
domination of Marxist values while at the same time pursuing their new Western values of 
112 
 
freedom and democracy. Right from the early days of their settlement, along with surviving and 
recovering from the refugee experience, the refugees expressed vocal opposition to the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, which they blamed for the refugee crisis and their plight.  
The level of forces in fighting for freedom and democracy has been high over time. For 
example, the Vietnamese refugees have spent a lot of time and energy to keep the flag of the 
Free Vietnam before 1975 waving everywhere, especially at official ceremonies that the 
Vietnamese refugees participate in, such as the annual International Culture Day organized at the 
United Nation’s office in New York (Los Angeles Thoi Luan 2001). They have also successfully 
prevented Vietnamese Communists from waving their flag in Vietnamese communities. Finally, 
they have organized many political organizations, even a Government of Free Vietnam, to 
promote freedom and democracy in Vietnam. 
The hard line public opposition to Vietnam continues among refugees, although 
privately, a growing number of Vietnamese in America are sending money to relatives in 
Vietnam, visiting Vietnam, and doing business in the land of their birth. From their earned 
income, the Vietnamese send back money, about 2/3rd of total remittances to Vietnam (US$6.8 
billion in 2007), to help their relatives in Vietnam, who under the Communist regime, are 
unemployed and hungry (Tran 2008). Despite this, an overwhelming majority of Vietnamese 
living in the United States still consider themselves to be refugees and have strong emotional ties 
with Vietnam (South Vietnam, as they knew it); they still think of themselves as Vietnamese 
rather than Vietnamese Americans.  
The Vietnamese refugees were already highly politicized when they came to the United 
States. Over the years, their political fervor and anti-communism has persisted and found 
expression in the ethnic enclaves they have built all around the country, notable in Little Saigon.  
113 
 
Hence, the Vietnamese refugees in California constitute a compelling case-study for examining 
what kinds of political ties they maintain with Vietnam. With this in mind, we can now turn to 
look at transnational political activities among Vietnamese refugees and examine the 
determinants of such political transnationalism in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Determinants of Political Transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans – A 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
The Vietnamese American community appears to be invested not only in U.S. – domestic 
but also homeland politics. My interviews with members of the Vietnamese American 
community in Orange County, California during the course of my archival and qualitative 
research brought three main forms of transnational political activities to the forefront: protests 
and demonstrations, signed petitions and written letters to government officials, and participation 
in internet forums10. In this chapter, I investigate the determinants of political transnationalism – 
in other words, the possible factors that explain the odds of participation in these three activities 
by Vietnamese Americans.  
Treating immigrants from the same country or even a certain group of migrants as 
homogenous does not lead to an accurate explanation of the specific individual factors relating to 
home country and resettlement contexts that foster or hamper transnational practices that are 
enacted. Variation in intensity and frequency of transnational activism is linked to the great level 
of heterogeneity among immigrants (Al-Ali 2002).  Likelihoods and possibilities for the 
emergence of transnational political activities among Vietnamese Americans, such as protesting, 
signing petitions and participating in internet forums, are thus shaped by factors which 
distinguish immigrants from one another. Such factors include individual (demographic) 
characteristics, incorporation in host society and resources available. Based on hypotheses in the 
10 These three forms of transnational political activity among Vietnamese Americans are discussed in greater detail 
in the next (qualitative) chapter.  
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theoretical literature as well as my own interview data, age, gender, education, place of college 
degree, arrival in the U.S., English proficiency, employment status and income are the most 
relevant factors in explaining odds of engaging in political transnationalism among Vietnamese 
Americans. 
In the following sections, I explain my quantitative methodology; give a brief overview 
of the data and then go on to conduct quantitative analyses on the survey data collected in Phase 
II of my research, examining the effect of the above demographic, incorporation and resource 
dependent explanatory variables on political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. 
The results show that gender is significantly associated with all three forms of political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans - men are more likely than women to engage in 
transnational political activities. Age and English proficiency are significantly associated with 
both protesting and petitioning, while arrival in the U.S., employment status and income help in 
explaining the odds of protesting among Vietnamese Americans. College degree, one of the 
variables for which overwhelming evidence existed in the theoretical literature, is significantly 
associated only with participation in internet forums.  
Thus, Vietnamese Americans who are most likely to engage in protesting and sign 
petitions and letters to government officials dealing with Vietnamese issues are older males who 
are not very proficient in English. Unemployed Vietnamese Americans with lower incomes and 
those who arrived in the U.S. during the early waves of refugee influx are also more likely to 
attend protests, while obtaining a college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam is associated with 
more frequent participation in internet forums related to homeland issues. 
 
Data and Methods 
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The purpose of this study is to identify variables that, when coupled, can be accurate 
predictors in determining the level of transnational activism undertaken by Vietnamese refugees 
living in California. These characteristics condition the likelihood that Vietnamese refugees will 
have the motivation and capacity to engage in transnational political activism. 
Research Design – A pilot study, which consisted of qualitative interviews, among the 
Vietnamese American population in Orange County, helped me to identify the types of 
transnational political activities – protesting, petitioning and participating in internet forums – 
most frequently undertaken by Vietnamese Americans. I was, thus, able to operationalize my 
dependent variable – political transnationalism – by creating three variables, Protests, Petitions 
and Internet Forums. A survey questionnaire was then developed to record the frequency of all 
three types of political transnational activities as well as obtain information pertaining to the 
specific independent variables as they may impact these activities. These factors were 
ascertained from the existing literature on transnationalism as well as my own qualitative 
findings. The dependent variables recorded were protests and demonstrations, signing petitions 
and letters to government officials, and participating in internet forums. The independent 
variables recorded were age, gender, education, place of college degree earned, arrival in U.S., 
English proficiency, employment status and income. 
The data for this analysis is drawn from my own research situated among the Vietnamese 
American community in Orange County, California. In Orange County, the cities of Garden 
Grove, Santa Ana, Anaheim and Westminster are recognized as the core of this ethnic 
community. The area is centrally anchored by the business and cultural district of Little Saigon 
in the city of Westminster, which has evolved to serve the needs of the Vietnamese. Located in 
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the heart of Orange County, the enclave of Little Saigon has the largest concentration of 
Vietnamese outside Vietnam. 
 
Sampling Strategy - The sample used for this research was a random convenience 
sampling consisting of both Vietnamese refugees who engage in political transnationalism and 
those who do not undertake transnational activities. One danger in the field of transnationalism is 
that empirical studies invariably sample on the dependent variables, focusing on those who take 
part in the activities of interest, to the exclusion of those who do not participate (Guarnizo et al. 
2003, p. 1213). Hence, I included respondents in my sample who do not engage in political 
transnationalism as well (by ensuring a random enough sample). 
A Vietnamese community center (providing economic, legal and cultural services) in 
Little Saigon maintains active files on Vietnamese refugees, who are members and utilize the 
services of the center on a weekly/monthly basis for meetings or other personal business. Since 
evidence within these files showed that this population is fairly well represented throughout the 
Orange County area, I assumed them to reflect the profile of the general population of 
Vietnamese refugees in Orange County, California and hence, chose this center to carry out my 
surveys. In addition, weekly meetings held for Vietnamese community members at two churches 
in Westminster (a Baptist church and a Fellowship church) provided the sample.  
The convenient sampling was obtained by asking Vietnamese Americans who were 
present at these locations on any given day to fill out the surveys. The process assumed that the 
Vietnamese refugees came to the community center and churches voluntarily, where they were 
randomly chosen to participate in the research. A total of 140 surveys were collected among 
Vietnamese American refugees and immigrants. Out of these, 3 respondents indicated that they 
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were born in the U.S.; thus, the survey forms that they filled out were not taken into account. In 
this analysis, I have included the survey response from 137 Vietnamese-born respondents who 
currently reside in the United States. Ordinal regression analysis was used to determine which 
demographic, incorporation and resource-dependent factors affect political transnationalism. 
 
Dependent variables 
The following questions in the survey recorded political transnationalism among 
Vietnamese refugees and immigrants:  
– “Do you take part in protests or demonstrations in Little Saigon?”, 
– “Do you write to government officials or sign petitions in support of a Vietnamese person or 
issue?”, and 
– “Do you participate in Internet discussion groups on issues important to Vietnam and 
Vietnamese people?” 
 
 The first dependent variable Protests is a categorical variable measured as “Never”, 
“Sometimes” and “Often”. As Table 2 below shows, 43.1% of the respondents never participate 
in protests or demonstrations, whereas 35% and 21.9% of the respondents engage in such 
activities sometimes and often, respectively. The modal category of the variable is Never, while 
the standard deviation in 0.781. 
Table 2. Protests 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
 
 
 
 
Never 59 43.1 43.1 43.1 
Sometimes 48 35.0 35.0 78.1 
Often 30 21.9 21.9 100.0 
Total 137 100.0 100.0   
 
 
Figure 7: Protests below shows a frequency distribution of the categories of the variable 
Protests. 
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The second dependent variable Petitions is also a categorical variable measured as 
“Never”, “Sometimes” and “Often”. As Table 3 below shows, 53.3% of the respondents never 
write to government officials or sign petitions, whereas 43.8% and 2.9% of the respondents 
engage in such activities sometimes and often, respectively. The modal category of the variable 
is Never, while the standard deviation in 0.557. 
 
Table 3. Petitions 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 73 53.3 53.3 53.3 
Sometimes 60 43.8 43.8 97.1 
Often 4 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 137 100.0 100.0   
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Figure 8: Petitions below shows a frequency distribution of the categories of the variable 
Petitions. 
 
 The final dependent variable Internet Forums is also a categorical variable measured as 
“Never”, “Sometimes” and “Often”. As Table 4 below shows, 47.4% of the respondents never 
participate in internet forums dealing with Vietnam and Vietnamese issues, whereas 38.7% and 
13.9% of the respondents engage in such activities sometimes and often, respectively. The modal 
category of the variable is Never, while the standard deviation in 0.71.  
 
Table 4. Internet Forums 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 65 47.4 47.4 47.4 
Sometimes 53 38.7 38.7 86.1 
Often 19 13.9 13.9 100.0 
Total 137 100.0 100.0   
 
 
OftenSometimesNever
Petitions
80
60
40
20
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Petitions
121 
 
Figure 9: Internet Forums below shows a frequency distribution of the categories of the 
variable Internet Forums. 
 
 On the whole, we see that most Vietnamese Americans participating in the survey 
reported never engaging in all three forms of transnational political activities, followed by 
sometimes participating in them. It is interesting to note that roughly the same percentage – 35% 
(protests), 43% (petitions), and 38% (participation in internet forums) – of respondents reported 
that they “sometimes” participated in all three forms of transnational political activities. While 
22% and 14% of respondents reported “often” participating in protests and internet forums 
respectively, only 3% of respondents sign petitions often. This suggests that perhaps organizing 
petitions to collect signatures is not as common a political activity in the Vietnamese American 
community as protesting or participating in internet forums. I will be discussing the nature and 
frequency of each form of activity in more detail in my qualitative chapter. Thus, members of the 
community do not have the occasion to engage in this form of transnational political activity 
often, but certainly participate in it sometimes (43%) when an opportunity to do so presents 
itself.  
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Independent variables 
                                 Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable         Percent          Mean           Mode 
Demographic     
          Age   3.07 35-49 
18-24  5.1   
25-34  17.5   
35-49  49.6   
50-64  21.2   
65+  6.6   
            Sex   0.42 Male 
Male  58.4   
Female  41.6   
          Education   2.93 College Degree 
HS or less  7.3   
Some college  18.2   
College degree  48.9   
Grad degree  25.5   
          Place of College degree   1.92 U.S. 
U.S.  46.7   
Vietnam  23.4   
Both U.S. and Vietnam  21.2   
No degree  8.8   
     
Contextual/ Incorporation     
          Arrival in U.S.    1985-95 
Pre-1975  0   
1975-1984  35.0   
1985-1995  43.8   
Post-1995  21.2   
          English Proficiency   2.81 Good 
Poor  2.2   
Fair  30.7   
Good  51.1   
Excellent  16.1   
     
Economic/ Resource dependent     
          Employment Status   1.5 Employed 
Employed  68.6   
Temporarily Unemployed  13.1   
Unemployed  18.2   
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                 Income   
 
 
2.77 
 
 
< $25,000 
<25,000  26.3   
25-40,000  21.2   
40-60,000  18.2   
60-75,000  18.2   
>75,000  16.1   
 
The following questions in the survey recorded demographic, incorporation and resource 
dependent variables.  
Demographic variables:  Respondents were asked, “Which age group do you belong to?” to 
measure the independent variable Age, coded as 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64 and 65+ years. A 
majority (48.2%) of respondents who participated in the survey belonged to the age group 35-49 
years. The next highest age category was 50-64 years (22.6%), followed by those who were 25-
34 years (17.5%). 6.6% of the respondents were 65+ in age, while 5.1% belonged to the age 
group 18-24 years. Gender was measured as Male=1, Female=2. 58.4% of the respondents were 
male while 41.6% were female.  
Education was measured in the survey as high school or less, some college, college 
degree and graduate education/degree. Looking at the level of education among those who 
participated in the survey, the majority of respondents (48.9%) held a college degree, followed 
by the category graduate school/degree (25.5%).  18.2% of respondents had some college 
experience, while 7.3% of respondents belonged to the category high school or less. Place of 
college degree received was considered separately – this was measured in the survey as No 
degree, Vietnam, U.S. and both. The majority (46.7%) of those who participated in the survey 
obtained their college degree in the U.S., followed by those participants (23.4%) who had earned 
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it in Vietnam. 21.2% of respondents had a college degree from both the U.S. and Vietnam, while 
8.8% of respondents had no college degree/experience. 
For ease of interpretation of regression results, I combined the two variables Education 
and Place of college degree into a single measure to create a new variable College Degree. This 
variable consists of the following categories: college degree or more in Vietnam (includes those 
who reported their education level as college degree or graduate education/degree and their place 
of degree received as Vietnam), college degree or more in the U.S. (includes those who reported 
their education level as college degree or graduate education/degree and their place of degree 
received as U.S.), college degree or more in both countries (includes those who reported their 
education level as college degree or graduate education/degree and their place of degree received 
as both U.S. and Vietnam) and no college degree (includes those who reported their education 
level as H.S. or less, or some college). For place of college degree, the survey instrument asked 
respondents, "If you have a college degree, where did you get it?". Hence, survey participants 
who had an education level of H.S. or less and some college did not respond to this question. For 
those participants with some graduate education/degree, their place of college degree pertains to 
their college (bachelors) degree and not any subsequent graduate education they may have 
obtained. 
 
Incorporation variables: Respondents were asked “In which time period did you arrive in the 
United States?” to measure the independent variable Arrival in U.S., coded as pre-1975, 1975-84, 
1985-95 and post-1995. Most respondents (43.8%) had arrived in the U.S. between 1985 and 
1995, followed by 35% of respondents who arrived between 1975 and 1985. Only 21.2% of 
those who participated in the survey arrived post-1995, while there were no respondents who had 
arrived in the U.S. before 1975. To assess the language skills of the Vietnamese refugees, they 
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were asked to rate their proficiency in English. English proficiency was measured on the Likert-
scale as Poor, Fair, Good and Excellent. A majority (51.1%) of those who participated in the 
survey reported a Good level of English proficiency, followed by 30.7% who rated their English 
proficiency as Fair. 16.1% of respondents reported an Excellent level of English proficiency, 
while 2.2% of respondents fell in the category of Poor. 
 
Resource variables: The last two variables regarded in the questionnaire were employment status 
and income. These point to refugees’ and immigrants’ economic incorporation and imply their 
gradually acquiring control over increasingly more resources. Respondents’ employment status 
was measured as employed, temporarily unemployed and unemployed. A majority of those who 
participated in the survey (68.6%) were employed, 18.2% were unemployed and 13.1% were 
temporarily unemployed. Respondents’ income was measured as <$25,000, $25-40,000, $40-
60,000, $60-75,000 and >$75,000. A majority of those who participated in the survey (26.3%) 
reported that their yearly income was less than $25,000, followed by 21.2% who reported an 
annual income of $25-40,000. The percentage of respondents who belong to both categories $40-
60,000 and $60-75,000 is 18.2%, while only 16.1% of respondents reported an annual income of 
more than $75,000.  
 There were only two variables with one missing value each. The variable Arrival in U.S. 
had a missing value, which was assigned the modal value of 1985-95 and the variable income 
also had a missing value, which was assigned the modal value of <$25,000. There were no 
missing values in any of the dependent or other independent variables since this is a relatively 
small dataset. Table 5 above shows the descriptive statistics - percentages, modes and means of 
all the independent variables. 
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Ordinal Logistic Regression 
I conducted the categorical data analysis in three stages, estimating models for 
participating in protests and demonstrations, signing letters and petitions, and participating in 
internet forums as measures of political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. Logistic 
regression can be used to predict a categorical dependent variable on the basis of continuous 
and/or categorical independents and to determine the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent; to rank the relative importance of independent variables; and to assess interaction 
effects. The impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios. Logistic 
regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit 
variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not). In this way, 
logistic regression estimates the odds of engaging in political transnationalism. 
It is interesting to note here that my dependent variables are ordinal, i.e. the values can be 
ranked but the real distance between categories is unknown. If the scale of outcome categories 
(e.g., never, sometimes, often) is arbitrarily collapsed into a binary measure (e.g., no, yes) to 
conduct logistic regression analysis, important information may be lost in the resulting binary 
model. (Chen and Hughes 2004) Similarly, using linear regression method to analyze an ordinal 
outcome may produce incorrect estimation and interpretation based on the violation of model 
assumptions of normality and constant variance. (Chen and Hughes 2004) Therefore, in order to 
study the effects of the explanatory variables on all levels of the ordered categorical outcome, as 
in this case, the ordinal regression method is a superior tool to obtain the valid research results.  
Ordinal regression is an extension of the binary logit model to ordinal categorical data. 
The ordinal logistic model for a single independent variable is  
ln(θj) = αj – βX 
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where j goes from 1 to the number of categories minus 1 (j being the number of categories of the 
ordered dependent variable). There is a minus sign before the coefficients for the predictor 
variables instead of the customary plus sign so that larger coefficients indicate an association 
with larger scores. (Norusis 2010, p. 71)  
The ordinal regression model is called the cumulative logit model because the model is 
built based on the cumulative response probabilities Pj (X) of being in category j or lower given 
the known explanatory variable. The ordinal regression model with the logit link is also known 
as the proportional odds model. (Chen and Hughes 2004) 
The PC-based version 19.0 of SPSS was used to perform the ordinal regression analysis. 
The primary focus of this chapter is the formulation of the ordinal regression model and the 
interpretation of study results. The political transnationalism survey questionnaire was analyzed 
by the ordinal regression method to achieve the following objectives: (a) identify the significant 
explanatory variables, i.e. demographic, incorporation and resource dependent factors; (b) to 
estimate constants and regression coefficients; and (c) to describe the direction and strength of 
the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables based on the sign (+ and -) and 
magnitude of the regression coefficients.  
In the ordinal regression model, the estimates labeled Threshold are the αj’s, the intercept 
equivalent terms. (Norusis 2010, p. 73) The estimates labeled Location are the coefficients for 
the predictor variables. (Norusis 2010, p. 73) A positive regression coefficient indicates that 
there is a positive relationship between the explanatory variable and the ordinal outcome and 
vice versa. The magnitude (odds or eß) of the coefficient of a specific explanatory variable 
indicates that a one unit change in that explanatory variable changes the odds of the event 
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occurrence (in this case, protesting, petitioning or participating in internet forums) by a factor of 
eß, holding all other significant explanatory variables as constant. 
 
Results and Interpretation 
Protests 
Table 6 below presents the logits from the ordinal regression analysis in which the 
dependent variable is participation in protests/demonstrations. The threshold estimates represent 
the response variable protests. In Model 1, for example, Protests = 1, i.e. respondents who had a 
value of -.88 or less, is the estimated cutoff value on the latent variable used to differentiate those 
who never protest from those who sometimes and often protest, when values of the explanatory 
variables are evaluated at zero. The threshold value for Protests=1 is significant (p < .05), which 
means that when values of explanatory variables are evaluated at zero, those who never petition 
are significantly different from those who petition sometimes and often. Similarly, Protests = 2, 
i.e., respondents who had a value of 1.29 or greater, is the estimated cutoff value on the latent 
variable used to differentiate those who never and sometimes protest from those who do it often, 
when values of the explanatory variables are evaluated at zero. Respondents who had a value 
between -.88 and 1.29 on the latent variable would be classified as those who protest sometimes. 
We can similarly interpret the threshold estimates for all the other models. 
Model 1 presents the baseline model which only includes the demographic variables. The 
-2 log likelihood (106.11) of this model provides model fit information – since it is significant (p 
< .001), we can reject the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients in the model are 
equal to zero and have no effect. In other words, including the explanatory variables improves 
upon a model with only an intercept to predict the categorical outcome variable protests. 
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Table 6. Logit Coefficients from the Regression of Participating in Protests on  
Selected Independent Variables 
Characteristic                           Demographic              Incorporation               Resources                  Full model 
                                     (Model 1)                     (Model 2)                  (Model 3)                   (Model 4)                                                                                             
Threshold 
Protests=1                                 -.88* (.29)                 1.63** (.63)                  .28 (.66)                      .25 (1.82) 
Protests=2                                  1.29 (.12)                 3.57*** (.69)               1.69* (.69)                   2.95 (1.83) 
                                                      
Demographic Characteristics 
Age¹                                           
        18-24                                -3.26* (1.32)                         ―                               ―                    -5.04** (1.93) 
        25-34                               -2.56** (.86)                          ―                               ―                       -2.26* (1.2) 
        35-49                                -1.55* (.72)                           ―                               ―                       -1.89 (1.05) 
        50-64                                 -1.01 (.77)                            ―                               ―                         -1.18 (1) 
Sex2                        
        Female                             -1.13** (.39)                         ―                               ―                      -1.53** (.48) 
College Degree³                       
     College degree or more in Vietnam    .89 (.59)                           ―                                ―                         1.34 (.71) 
     College degree or more in U.S.        -.15 (.48)                           ―                                ―                          .02 (.68) 
     College degree or more in Both          .13 (.56)                            ―                                ―                         .84 (.72) 
  
Incorporation Variables 
Arrival in U.S. 4                                    
        1975-84                                    ―                         1.37** (.51)                         ―                         .43 (.71) 
        1985-95                                    ―                           .87 (.52)                             ―                         .45 (.65) 
English proficiency5                                  
          Poor                                        ―                       3.32** (1.27)                         ―                      5.25** (1.68) 
          Fair                                         ―                        1.45** (.56)                          ―                          .77 (.87) 
          Good                                       ―                          .52 (.51)                              ―                        -.79 (.73) 
 
Resource Variables 
Employment Status6                        
        Employed                                ―                                  ―                         -.63** (.52)                  -.19** (.78) 
        Temp. Unemployed                 ―                                 ―                          1.07 (.61)                     2.47 (.86) 
Income7                                            
         <$25,000                                ―                                  ―                         -1.05 (.66)                     -1.37 (.96) 
         $25-40,000                             ―                                ―                           .75 (.57)                        .24 (.83) 
         $40-60,000                             ―                                ―                           .71 (.58)                      1.51* (.76) 
         $60-75,000                             ―                                  ―                           .19 (.57)                       .66 (.71) 
 
                                                                                                                                    
-2 log likelihood                         106.11***                       57.65**                       71.78**                     175.9*** 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; N=137. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests) 
1 The reference age group is 65+. 
2 The reference group is males. 
3 The reference group is those with No College Degree. 
4 The reference group is those who arrived Post-1995. 
5 The reference group is those whose English proficiency is Excellent. 
6 The reference group is those who are Unemployed. 
7 The reference group is those whose income is > $75,000. 
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The effect of age on the ordered log-odds of protesting is statistically significant in this 
model. The reference category is the age group 65+. The coefficient for age group 18-24 is -3.26 
which is significant (p < .05). We can say that, controlling for other significant demographic 
variables, compared to those who are 65+, the odds of protesting of Vietnamese Americans who 
are 18-24 years old decreases by 96.2% (exp-3.26). The coefficient for age group 25-34 is -2.56 
which is significant (p < .01). We can say that, controlling for other significant demographic 
variables, compared to those who are 65+, the odds of protesting of Vietnamese Americans who 
are 25-34 years old decreases by 92.3% (exp-2.56). Similarly, the coefficient for age group 35-49 
is -1.55 which is significant (p < .01). We can say that, controlling for other significant 
demographic variables, compared to those who are 65+, the odds of protesting of Vietnamese 
Americans who are 35-49 years old decreases by 78.8% (exp-1.55). Older Vietnamese American 
refugees and immigrants are thus more likely to participate in protests than younger ones. 
The effect of gender on the ordered log-odds of protesting is also statistically significant; 
in this case, the coefficient for women (-1.13) is negatively significant (p < .01), which means 
that compared to men, female Vietnamese Americans are less likely to participate in protests. We 
can say that, controlling for the other significant demographic factors, i.e. age, being female 
results in a 67.7% (exp-1.13) decrease in the odds of protesting compared to men. The variable 
college degree is not significantly associated with protesting among Vietnamese Americans.  
In Model 2, I test for incorporation variables. The -2 log likelihood (57.65) for this model 
is also significant (p < .01), so we can reject the null hypothesis that the model without 
explanatory variables is as good as the model with explanatory variables. In this model, the 
effect of both arrival in U.S. and English proficiency on the ordered log-odds of protesting is 
significant. The reference category for arrival in U.S. is those who arrived post-1995. The 
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coefficient for the period 1975-84 is positively significant at 1.37 (p < .01), which means that, 
controlling for proficiency in English, those who arrived in the U.S. between 1975 and 1984 are 
2.94 (exp1.37) times more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations compared to those 
who arrived post-1995.  
In the case of English proficiency, the reference category is Excellent. The coefficient for 
the category Poor  is 3.32 (p < .01) which means that, controlling for arrival in the U.S., those 
with poor English language skills are 26.66 (exp3.32) times more likely to protest than those with 
excellent English proficiency. Similarly, the coefficient for the category Fair  is 1.45 (p < .01) 
which means that, controlling for arrival in the U.S., the odds of protesting of those with fair 
English language skills is 3.26 (exp1.45) times greater than that for those with excellent English 
proficiency.  
In Model 3, I test for resource dependent variables. The -2 log likelihood (71.78) for this 
model is also significant (p < .01), which means that at least one of the regression coefficients in 
the model is not equal to zero. In this model, the effect of employment status on the ordered log-
odds of protesting is positively significant. The reference category is those who are unemployed. 
The coefficient for the category Employed is -.63 (p < .01), which means that compared to 
unemployed Vietnamese Americans, those who are employed are less likely to participate in 
protests and demonstrations by 47% (exp-.63). Income of Vietnamese Americans does not appear 
to have any significant effect on the ordered log-odds of protesting.  
Finally, in the full model (Model 4), the -2 log likelihood (175.9) for this model is also 
significant (p < .001), which means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is 
not equal to zero. We see that in the case of demographic, incorporation and resource variables, 
age, gender, English proficiency and employment status – the same explanatory variables as in 
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the nested models – continue to be significantly associated with protesting. However, arrival in 
the U.S., which was significant in the nested model, ceases to be significant in the full model. 
This suggests that when demographic and resource variables are added to the model, the effect of 
arrival in the U.S. on the log-odds of protesting is actually explained by the other significant 
variables.  
College degree of Vietnamese Americans did not appear to have a significant effect on 
the ordered log-odds of protesting in the nested models and this is also the case in the final 
model. However, income - which was not significant in the nested model - becomes significant 
in the final model. The reference category is those whose income is > $75,000. The coefficient 
for the category $40-60,000 is significant (p < .05), which means that, controlling for the other 
significant variables in the model, Vietnamese Americans whose annual income falls in the 
category $40-60,000 are 3.53 times (exp1.51) more likely to participate in protests and 
demonstrations, compared to those whose annual income is > $75,000. 
In supplemental analyses, I also tested the significance of a variable interacting two of the 
significant variables, age and sex. Since there are no females who are 65+ in the dataset, I 
collapsed the age categories of 50-64 and 65+ to create the category 50+. I then used this new 
variable measuring age to create the interaction term age*sex. The interaction coefficients 
represent the combined categories of the variable sex and the new recoded variable age. The 
interaction is not significant, which means that the effect of age on the odds of protesting is not 
different for men and women. Since the interaction of age and sex did not turn out to be 
significant, the interaction term was not included in the final model. 
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Petitions 
Next, I conducted ordinal regression analysis for the effect of explanatory variables on 
signing letters and petitions to government officials. Table 7 below presents the logits from the 
ordinal regression analysis in which the dependent variable is petitions. The threshold estimates 
represent the response variable petitions. In Model 1, for example, Petitions = 1, i.e., respondents 
who had a value of -1.45 or less, represents the estimated cutoff value on the latent variable used 
to differentiate those who never petition from those who sometimes and often petition, when 
values of the explanatory variables are evaluated at zero. Similarly, Petitions = 2, i.e., 
respondents who had a value of 2.17 or greater, is the estimated cutoff value on the latent 
variable used to differentiate those who never and sometimes petition from those who do it often, 
when values of the explanatory variables are evaluated at zero. The threshold value for 
Petitions=2 is significant (p < .05), which means that when values of explanatory variables are 
evaluated at zero, those who petition often are significantly different from those who never and 
sometimes petition. Respondents who had a value between -1.45 and 2.17 on the latent variable 
would be classified as those who petition sometimes. We can similarly interpret the threshold 
estimates for all the other models. 
Model 1 presents the baseline model which only includes the demographic variables. The 
-2 log likelihood (93.75) of this model provides model fit information – since it is significant (p 
< .01), we can reject the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients in the model are 
equal to zero and have no effect. In other words, including the explanatory variables improves 
upon a model with only an intercept to predict the categorical outcome variable petitions. 
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Table 7. Logit Coefficients from the Regression of Participating in Petitions on 
Selected Independent Variables 
Characteristic                         Demographic                  Incorporation                    Resources                    Full model 
                                                 (Model 1)                        (Model 2)                        (Model 3)                     (Model 4) 
Threshold 
Petitions=1                              -1.45 (.95)                      2.79*** (.77)                      .09 (.68)                        2.72 (1.93) 
Petitions=2                              2.17* (.91)                    6.16*** (.92)                   3.32*** (.79)                  6.61** (1.95) 
                                                      
Demographic Characteristics 
Age¹                                           
        18-24                               -3.65** (1.37)                        ―                                   ―                           -1.97 (1.69) 
        25-34                                -2.59** (.95)                         ―                                   ―                            -1.88 (1.2) 
        35-49                                -2.03* (.84)                           ―                                   ―                          -2.36* (1.06) 
        50-64                                 -1.63 (.89)                            ―                                   ―                          -2.14* (1.01) 
Sex2                        
        Female                                -.8* (.39)                            ―                                   ―                          -1.53** (.49) 
College Degree³                       
    College degree or more in Vietnam    -.36 (.62)                           ―                                   ―                               -.53 (.69) 
    College degree or more in U.S.         -.01 (.48)                           ―                                   ―                                .33 (.63) 
    College degree or more in Both            .03 (.57)                           ―                                   ―                               -.28 (.69) 
  
Incorporation Variables 
Arrival in U.S. 4                                    
        1975-84                                     ―                        1.19* (.52)                               ―                              1.07 (.71) 
        1985-95                                     ―                          .93 (.52)                                 ―                              1.11 (.64) 
English proficiency5                                  
          Poor/Fair                                 ―                        2.4** (.71)                               ―                          3.51** (1.02) 
          Good                                       ―                       1.98** (.67)                              ―                           2.68** (.86) 
 
Resource Variables 
Employment Status6                        
        Employed                                 ―                               ―                             -.36 (.52)                            .95 (.69) 
       Temporarily Unemployed         ―                               ―                             -.76 (.62)                            .01 (.78) 
Income7                                           
        <$25,000                                  ―                               ―                              -.28 (.64)                           -.45 (.88) 
         $25-40,000                              ―                              ―                               .65 (.59)                           -.36 (.83) 
         $40-60,000                              ―                              ―                                .28 (.6)                            -.67 (.76) 
         $60-75,000                              ―                               ―                              .66 (.59)                            -.19 (.72) 
 
 
-2 log likelihood                           93.75**                   38.72***                            51.14                              159.19*** 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; N=137. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests) 
1 The reference age group is 65+. 
2 The reference group is those who are male. 
3 The reference group is those with No College Degree. 
4 The reference group is those who arrived Post-1995. 
5 The reference group is those whose English proficiency is Excellent. 
6 The reference group is those who are Unemployed. 
7 The reference group is those whose income is > $75,000. 
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The effect of age and sex on the ordered log-odds of petitioning are statistically 
significant in this model. The reference category for age is 65+. The coefficient for the age group 
18-24 is -3.65 which is significant (p < .01). We can say that, compared to those who are 65+, 
the odds of petitioning of Vietnamese Americans who are 18-24 years old decreases by 97.4% 
(exp-3.65). The coefficient for the age group 25-34 is -2.59 which is significant (p < .01). We can 
say that, compared to those who are 65+, the odds of petitioning of Vietnamese Americans who 
are 25-34 years old decreases by 92.5% (exp-2.59). Similarly, the coefficient for the age group 35-
49 is -2.03 which is significant (p < .05). We can say that, compared to those who are 65+, the 
odds of petitioning of Vietnamese Americans who are 35-49 years old decreases by 86.9% (exp-
2.03). Older Vietnamese Americans are thus more likely to sign petitions and letters to 
government officials than younger ones.  
The effect of gender on the ordered log-odds of petitioning is also statistically significant; 
in this case, the coefficient for women (-.8) is negatively significant (p < .05), which means that 
compared to men, female Vietnamese Americans are less likely to participate in protests. We can 
say that, controlling for the other significant demographic factors, i.e. age, being female results 
in a 55.1% (exp-.8) decrease in the odds of petitioning compared to men. The variable college 
degree is not significantly associated with petitioning among Vietnamese Americans.  
In Model 2, I test for incorporation variables. The -2 log likelihood (38.72) for this model 
is also significant (p < .001), so we can reject the null hypothesis that the model without 
explanatory variables is as good as the model with explanatory variables. In this model, time of 
arrival in the U.S. is significantly associated with petitioning among Vietnamese Americans. The 
reference category for time of arrival is those who arrived post-1995. The coefficient for the 
category 1975-84 is 1.19 (p < .05) which means that Vietnamese Americans who arrived 
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between 1975 and 1984 are 2.29 (exp1.19) times more likely to sign petitions than those who 
arrived in the U.S. post-1995. The effect of English proficiency on the ordered log-odds of 
petitioning is also significant. For ease of interpretation of the variable English Proficiency and 
to ensure consistency with the coding of my interaction variable (specified below), I collapsed 
the categories of Poor and Fair to create the category Poor/Fair. The reference category is 
Excellent. The coefficient for the category Poor/Fair is 2.4 (p < .01) which means that, compared 
to those with excellent English proficiency, those with poor or fair English language skills are 
10.02 (exp2.4) times more likely to sign petitions. Similarly, the coefficient for the category Good 
is 1.98 (p < .01) which means that the odds of petitioning of those with good English language 
skills is 6.24 (exp1.98) times greater than that for those with excellent English proficiency.  
In Model 3, I test for resource dependent variables. In this model, neither of the 
explanatory variables, employment status and income, has a significant effect on the ordered log-
odds of petitioning. As expected, the -2 log likelihood (51.14) for this model is not significant 
(p > .05), which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model without 
explanatory variables is as good as the model with explanatory variables. 
Finally, in the full model (Model 4), the -2 log likelihood (156.65) for this model is 
significant (p < .001), which means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is 
not equal to zero. We see that age, gender and English proficiency which were the significant 
explanatory variables in the nested models continue to be significantly associated with 
petitioning in the full model, while arrival in U.S. ceases to be significant. This suggests that 
older Vietnamese Americans are more likely to petition than younger ones, men are more likely 
to petition than women and those who are not very proficient in English are more likely to 
petition than those with excellent English skills.  
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In my supplemental analyses, I also tested the significance of a variable interacting two 
of the significant variables, gender and English proficiency. Since there are no males whose 
English proficiency is Poor in the dataset, I collapsed the English proficiency categories of Poor 
and Fair to create the category Poor/Fair. I then used this new variable measuring English 
proficiency to create the interaction term sex*English proficiency. The reference category is 
Female*Excellent. The interaction is not significant, which means that the effect of English 
proficiency on the log-odds of petitioning is not different for men and women. Since the 
interaction term did not turn out to be significant, it was not included in the final model. 
 
Internet Forums     
Finally, I conducted ordinal regression analysis for the effect of explanatory variables on 
participating in internet forums. Table 8 below presents the logits from the ordinal regression 
analysis in which the dependent variable is participating in online forums dealing with 
Vietnamese American issues. The threshold estimates represent the response variable internet 
forums. In Model 1, for example, Internet Forums = 1, i.e., respondents who had a value of 1.01 
or less, represents the estimated cutoff value on the latent variable used to differentiate those who 
never participate in internet forums from those who do so sometimes and often, when values of 
the explanatory variables are evaluated at zero.  
Similarly, Petitions = 2, i.e., respondents who had a value of 3.49 or greater, is the 
estimated cutoff value on the latent variable used to differentiate those who never and sometimes 
participate in internet forums from those who do it often, when values of the explanatory 
variables are evaluated at zero. The estimate value 3.49 is significant (p < .001), which means  
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Table 8. Logit Coefficients from the Regression of Participating in Internet Forums on Selected 
Independent Variables 
Characteristic                      Demographic        Incorporation          Resources           Full model       Interaction Model 
                                               (Model 1)              (Model 2)             (Model 3)            (Model 4)               (Model 5) 
Threshold 
Internet Forums=1                   1.01 (.82)                 .89 (.6)               .32 (.65)            3.01 (1.74)               3.1 (1.87) 
Internet Forums=2                 3.49*** (.88)        3.02*** (.65)       2.46*** (.69)     5.73** (1.82)          5.91** (1.94) 
                                                      
Demographic Characteristics 
Age¹                                           
        18-24                                 .33 (1.03)                   ―                         ―                   .45 (1.35)               .17 (1.39) 
        25-34                                  .08 (.81)                    ―                         ―                  -.21 (1.07)              -.21 (1.09) 
        35-49                                  .77 (.71)                    ―                         ―                    .32 (.92)                  .4 (.95) 
        50-64                                -.001 (.78)                   ―                         ―                    -.49 (.9)                 -.63 (.92) 
Sex2                           
        Female                            -1.22** (.38)                ―                         ―              -1.79*** (.48)            -1.97* (.94) 
College Degree³                       
    College degree or more in Vietnam    .37 (.58)                  ―                         ―                   .39 (.64)                  1.27 (.82) 
    College degree or more in U.S.         .36 (.46)                  ―                         ―                   .28 (.61)                   .28 (.71) 
    College degree or more in Both        1.38* (.55)                ―                         ―                  1.09* (.66)                .69 (.75) 
  
Incorporation Variables 
Arrival in U.S. 4                                    
        1975-84                                   ―                  -.24 (.48)                    ―                  -.26 (.65)                   -.3 (.68) 
        1985-95                                   ―                   .12 (.47)                    ―                  -.04 (.56)                   -.15 (.6) 
English proficiency5                                  
          Poor                                       ―                1.19 (1.25)                   ―                 1.93 (1.56)                 2.05 (1.7) 
          Fair                                        ―                  .93 (.57)                     ―                  1.25 (.82)                  1.25 (.83) 
          Good                                     ―                1.56** (.53)                 ―                   1.2 (.69)                    1.34 (.72) 
 
Resource Variables 
Employment Status6                        
        Employed                               ―                       ―                    .14 (.49)                .59 (.65)                  .41 (.69) 
       Temporarily Unemployed       ―                       ―                   -.01 (.59)                -.19 (.7)                 -.46 (.74) 
Income7                                            
        <$25,000                                ―                       ―                     .29 (.6)                  .97 (.81)                1.14 (.83) 
         $25-40,000                            ―                    ―                   -.02 (.57)                 .14 (.77)                .09 (.78) 
         $40-60,000                            ―                    ―                    .61 (.58)                 .97 (.72)                 .84 (.73) 
         $60-75,000                            ―                       ―                   1.36 (.57)               1.47 (.69)                 1.3 (.7) 
 
Sex*CollegeDegree8                     
         Female*Vietnam                  ―                       ―                        ―                           ―                    -2.43 (1.61)    
         Female*U.S.                         ―                       ―                        ―                           ―                     .13 (1.09) 
         Female*Both                        ―                       ―                        ―                           ―                   1.75* (1.37)                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                          
-2 log likelihood                       95.18***               57.36*                 78.69                   198.27***             191.24*** 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; N=137. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests) 
1 The reference age group is 65+. 
2 The reference group is males. 
3 The reference group is those with No College Degree. 
4 The reference group is those who arrived Post-1995. 
5 The reference group is those whose English proficiency is Excellent. 
6 The reference group is those who are Unemployed. 
7 The reference group is those whose income is > $75,000. 
8 The reference group is Females*NoCollegeDegree. 
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that when values of explanatory variables are evaluated at zero; those who participate in internet 
forums often are significantly different from those who never and sometimes do so. Respondents 
who had a value between 1.01 and 3.49 on the latent variable would be classified as those who 
participate in internet forums sometimes. We can similarly interpret the threshold estimates for 
all the other models. 
Model 1 presents the baseline model which only includes the demographic variables. The 
-2 log likelihood (95.18) of this model provides model fit information – since it is highly 
significant (p < .001), we can reject the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients in 
the model are equal to zero and have no effect. In other words, including the explanatory 
variables improves upon a model with only an intercept to predict the categorical outcome 
variable internet forums. 
Age appears to have no significant effect on the ordered log-odds of participating in 
internet forums in this nested model. The effect of gender on participation in internet forums is 
statistically significant in this model. The coefficient for gender is -1.22, which is negatively 
significant (p < .01), which means that compared to men, female Vietnamese Americans are less 
likely to participate in internet forums. We can say that being female results in an 70.5% (exp-
1.22) decrease in the odds of participating in internet forums.  
College degree is the other significant variable in this model. The reference category for 
college degree is those with no college degree. The coefficient for the category College Degree 
or more in both countries is significantly associated with participation in internet forums (p 
< .05). This means that, controlling for gender, Vietnamese Americans who have a college 
degree or more and who obtained their college degree in both countries are 2.97 times (exp1.38) 
more likely to participate in internet forums than those with no college degree. Thus, those with a 
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college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam are more likely to participate in internet forums than 
those Vietnamese Americans without a college degree. 
 In Model 2, I test for incorporation variables. In this model, English proficiency has a 
significant effect on the ordered log-odds of participating in internet forums. The coefficient for 
the category Good is significantly associated with participation in internet forums (p < .01). This 
means that Vietnamese Americans whose proficiency in English is good are 3.76 times (exp1.56) 
more likely to participate in internet forums than those with excellent English proficiency. 
Arrival in U.S. does not have a significant effect on the ordered log-odds of participating in 
internet forums in this nested model. 
In Model 3, I test for resource dependent variables. In this model, neither of the 
explanatory variables - employment status and income, has a significant effect on the ordered 
log-odds of participating in internet forums. As expected, the -2 log likelihood (78.69) for this 
model is not significant (p > .05), which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
model without explanatory variables is as good as the model with explanatory variables, 
employment status and income. 
In the full model (Model 4), the -2 log likelihood (198.27) for this model is significant (p 
< .001), which means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to 
zero. In this model, gender and college degree continue to be significantly associated with 
participating in internet forums, while English proficiency ceases to be significant. This suggests 
that when demographic variables are added to the model, the effect of English proficiency on the 
log-odds of participation in internet forums is actually explained by the other significant 
variables, gender and college degree.   
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In the final model (Model 5), I also tested the significance of a variable interacting two of 
the significant variables in Model 4 - sex and college degree. The interaction coefficients 
represent the combined categories of the variables sex and college degree. The reference 
category is Female*No College degree. The interaction term turns out to be significantly 
associated with my dependent variable. The coefficient for the category Female*College degree 
in both countries is statistically significant (p < .05). This means that, compared to females who 
do not have a college degree, the log-odds of participating in internet forums among females 
with a college degree in both countries increases by 4.75 times (exp1.75). Thus, the effect of 
gender on the ordered log-odds of participating in internet forums is significantly different for 
Vietnamese Americans who do not have a college degree and those who obtained their college 
degree in both Vietnam and the United States. 
 
Overlaps across all three activities 
Another interesting aspect of the analysis would be to look at how groups overlap across 
the three forms of political transnationalism. For instance, are there respondents who report 
“never” or “sometimes” engaging in all three activities? If so, how do the demographic, 
incorporation and resource-dependent factors under consideration distribute among those 
“never” or “sometimes” engage in political transnationalism? To investigate this angle, I created 
a new variable Never that consists of only those cases where the respondents reported never 
participating in protests, petitions and internet forums – this variable contains 23 cases. I 
similarly created another variable “Sometimes”, containing 14 cases.11  I then conducted 
additional bivariate analysis for those respondents who reported participating “Never” and 
11 Since those who reported “Often” engaging in all three activities were only 3 respondents – a number too small 
for any form of statistical inference – they were left out of the analysis. 
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“Sometimes” on all three forms of political transnationalism, and explored whether the 
explanatory factors that were significant in my ordinal regression analysis hold true for this 
smaller, extracted dataset as well. The following are the results from my analysis: 
 
Age 
Figure 10        Figure 11 
        
As we see above in Figure 10, the highest percentage of Vietnamese Americans who 
never participate in political transnationalism belong to the age group 25-34 while no  
respondents who report never participating in all three activities are over 65 years of age. On the 
other hand, in Figure 11, 63.6% of those who sometimes participate in political transnationalism 
belong to the age group 35-49 while no Vietnamese Americans who report sometimes 
participating in all three activities belong to the 18-24 or 25-34 year old age category. Thus, my 
finding that older Vietnamese Americans are more likely to engage in transnational political 
activities holds true even in groups overlapping all three activities. 
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Gender 
As we see below in Figures 12 and 13, the majority (69.6%) of Vietnamese Americans 
who reported never participating in all three forms of transnational political activity are female, 
while 90.9% of respondents who reported sometimes participating in political transnationalism 
are male. Thus, this confirms my finding that among Vietnamese Americans men are more likely 
than women to participate in political transnationalism.  
 
Figure 12         Figure 13 
       
 
Education 
As we see below in Figure 14, as Vietnamese Americans’ level of education rises, the 
percentage of respondents who reported never participating in political transnationalism also 
increases. In fact, the majority (39.1%) of those who report never engaging in all three activities 
are respondents with a graduate degree or some graduate experience. This confirms my finding 
that, contrary to the theoretical literature higher levels of education do not correspond to greater 
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likelihood of participating in political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. In Figure 
15, the majority (54.5%) of respondents who reported sometimes engaging in all three activities 
are those Vietnamese Americans with a college degree, but this relationship is not statistically 
significant as shown in the ordinal regression analysis earlier in the chapter. 
  
    Figure 14                   Figure 15 
 
      
 
Arrival in U.S. 
As we see below in Figures 16 and 17, most respondents (45.1%) who report never 
participating in political transnationalism arrived in the later waves, especially post-1995. On the 
other hand, most Vietnamese Americans (91%) who reported sometimes participating in all three 
activities arrived in the first two waves (1975-85 and 1985-95). Among Vietnamese Americans 
who reported sometimes engaging in all three activities, none arrived before 1975 and only 9% 
came to the U.S. post-1995. This confirms my finding that refugees in the earlier waves (post-
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1975 evacuees, boat people and former political prisoners) are more likely to engage in political 
transnationalism than those who arrived later through family reunification programs. 
 Figure 16         Figure 17 
      
 
English Proficiency 
  Figure 18        Figure 19 
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As we see above in Figure 18, the majority of Vietnamese Americans who reported never 
participating in all three forms of transnational political activities (42.1%) also had an excellent 
level of English proficiency. In Figure 19, the majority (63.6%) of those who reported sometimes 
participating in political transnationalism selected a good level of English proficiency – nearly 
double of those (31.8%) who reported never participating in political transnationalism and also 
had a good level of English proficiency. It is also interesting to note that no Vietnamese 
Americans with an excellent level of English proficiency reported sometimes participating in all 
three activities – thus, contrary to the theoretical literature, those with higher levels of English 
language skills are less likely to be politically active. This finding is consistent with the results of 
the ordinal regression analysis that respondents who rated their level of English proficiency as 
poor are more likely to protest and petition. 
 
Employment Status 
 
  Figure 20        Figure 21 
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 As we see above in Figures 20 and 21, the majority of Vietnamese Americans who report 
both never as well as sometimes participating in all three activities are employed. 56.5% of those 
who never engage in political transnationalism are employed, while 91% of those who 
sometimes do so are employed. The ordinal regression analysis had shown that unemployed 
Vietnamese Americans are more likely than those employed to participate in protests and 
demonstrations. However, no clear effect of employment status on political transnationalism 
seems to be visible from the descriptive statistics. 
 
Income  
  Figure 22          Figure 23 
     
 As we can see above in Figure 22, the majority (56.5%) of those Vietnamese Americans 
who reported never participating in political transnationalism reported an income of < $25,000. 
On the other hand, the majority (56.5%) of those respondents who reported sometimes engaging 
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in all three activities reported an income of $60 – 75,000. This finding is consistent with the 
theoretical literature that as socio-economic status, of which income is a primary indicator, raises 
so does the likelihood of participation in transnational activities. However, this positive 
relationship between income and political transnationalism was not found to be statistically 
significant in the ordinal regression analysis. 
 
 This section examined how groups overlap across the three forms of transnational 
political activities. The purpose was to investigate how the demographic, incorporation and 
resource-dependent factors under consideration distribute among those who “never” or 
“sometimes” engage in political transnationalism. The results showed that in the case of age, sex, 
arrival in U.S. and English proficiency, the effect of these factors on political transnationalism is 
consistent with those found in the regression analysis. Even though, employed Vietnamese 
Americans were found to be less likely to engage in transnational political activities in the 
ordinal regression analysis, no clear effect of employment status on political transnationalism 
seems to be visible from the bivariate analysis. Contrary to the theoretical literature, lack of a 
college degree did not correspond to lower likelihood of participating in political 
transnationalism. The effect of income did seem to be consistent with the theoretical literature 
but the factor was not found to be statistically significant. 
 
Conclusion 
  In closing, the ordinal logistic analyses conducted confirm some hypotheses of the 
theoretical literature, but not others. Among demographic variables, age and sex are the two most 
significant factors. As hypothesized in the theoretical literature, age is positively associated with 
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political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans – older Vietnamese Americans are 
more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations as well as sign petitions than younger 
respondents (as I discuss in further detail in my qualitative chapter). Similarly, the evidence for 
gender as a significant factor confirms the hypothesis in the transnationalism literature that male 
immigrants are more likely to engage in transnationalism than women. Among Vietnamese 
Americans, men are more likely than women to protest, sign petitions as well as participate in 
internet forums as types of political transnationalism. 
 It is interesting to note that the explanatory variable for which there was overwhelming 
evidence in the transnationalism literature – college degree – turned out to not be a significant 
factor in predicting protesting and petitioning among Vietnamese Americans. In other words, 
lack of a college degree is not significantly associated with a lower likelihood of protesting and 
signing petitions. In the case of participating in internet forums, having a college degree is 
significant. The regression analyses suggest that what also matters is where the college degree 
was earned. Compared to Vietnamese Americans who do not have a college degree, those who 
obtained a college degree in both Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to participate in internet 
forums as a form of expression of political transnationalism.  
 Regarding incorporation variables, the time-period of arrival in the U.S. is significantly 
associated with protesting and petitioning in the nested models, but ceases to be significant in the 
full models. Proficiency in English is significantly associated with protesting and petitioning but 
not with participating in internet forums in the final model. As for arrival in the U.S., Vietnamese 
Americans who arrived in the earlier refugee wave of 1975-84 are more likely to participate in 
protests and sign petitions than those who arrived post-1995. However, while English 
proficiency is a significant factor in explaining political transnationalism, contrary to the 
150 
 
hypothesis in the theoretical literature, Vietnamese Americans with poor English proficiency are 
more likely to protest and petition than those with excellent English language skills.  
 Finally, resource dependent variables were hypothesized to be an important variable in 
determining the transnational political activities investigated in my research. Employment status 
and income turn out to be significantly associated only with protesting. However, contrary to the 
theoretical literature, unemployed Vietnamese Americans and those who have lower annual 
incomes are more likely to attend protests and demonstrations than those who are employed and 
earn > $75,000 annually. Employment status and income of Vietnamese Americans are not 
significantly associated with petitioning or participation in internet forums. 
Thus, Vietnamese Americans who are most likely to engage in protesting and sign 
petitions and letters to government officials dealing with Vietnamese issues are older males who 
arrived in the U.S. during the early waves of refugee influx and are not very proficient in 
English. Unemployed Vietnamese Americans who have lower incomes are also more likely to 
attend protests, while being female and obtaining a college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam 
is associated with more frequent participation in internet forums related to homeland issues.  
To sum up, in this chapter, I have conducted quantitative analysis to determine whether 
the demographic, incorporation and resource-dependent factors identified in the theoretical 
literature and confirmed in my interviews are found to be statistically significant and to what 
extent they are able to explain differences in the frequency of transnational political activities 
among Vietnamese Americans. With the help of the logit link to build the ordinal regression 
models, political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans was found to be significantly 
associated with age, gender, college degree, arrival in U.S., English proficiency, employment 
status and income.  
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Overall, the ordinal logistic analyses provide strong evidence that demographic variables 
are more useful than incorporation and resource dependent variables in predicting the likelihood 
of political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. A more detailed analysis of the 
results as well as possible rationalizations for outcomes relating to explanatory factors for 
political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans will be discussed in the qualitative 
analysis section in my next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Political Transnationalism among Vietnamese Refugees – A Qualitative Analysis 
Introduction 
 In looking at Asian-American diaspora, the content of their politics has emphasized 
transnational policy-making rather than domestic politics (Nakanishi 2003). The Vietnamese 
American community similarly appears to be invested not only in U.S. – domestic but also in 
homeland politics. In this chapter, I briefly outline the history of political activism in the 
Vietnamese American community in the early period of their resettlement in California. This is 
followed by an in-depth investigation of the transnational political activities currently undertaken 
by Vietnamese Americans in Orange County, California. This phase of the research was carried 
out by analyzing the interview data obtained in Phase I of my research and expanding on the 
information available by reading scholarly, newspaper and online accounts of various political 
events. Finally, I conduct a detailed qualitative analysis of the results obtained from ordinal 
regression (in Chapter 5) based on the survey data collected in Phase II of my research. 
 The main findings of this chapter are briefly highlighted here. An important finding from 
the initial years of political transnationalism is that the early period of transnational activism 
among Vietnamese Americans was fraught with violence, sometimes fatal. This wave of political 
violence peaked in the late 1980s, following which there was a gradual movement away from 
violence towards other non-violent forms of political activity and expression of disapproval of 
communists, especially protests, beginning in the 1990s. 
 Second, present-day transnationalism engaged in by Vietnamese Americans takes the 
form of indirect, non-electoral political activities. In other words, they do not appear to be direct, 
electoral transnational political acts such as voting in home country elections or active 
involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Rather, the kinds of transnational 
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political acts that Vietnamese Americans engage in are more of an indirect nature, such as 
participating in protests and demonstrations, signing petitions and letters to government officials 
as part of political campaigns as well as participating in various internet forums on homeland 
issues. 
 Finally, discussion of the ordinal regression results in the last section of this chapter 
indicates that political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans was found to be 
significantly associated with age, gender, college degree, arrival in the U.S., English proficiency, 
employment status and income.  One noteworthy finding is that the lack of a college degree is 
not significantly associated with lower likelihood of protesting and petitioning in the case of 
Vietnamese Americans. In the case of participation in internet forums, those with a college 
degree obtained in both the U.S. and Vietnam were found to be more likely to participate in 
internet forums as a form of expression of political transnationalism. A third remarkable finding 
in my research is that in the case of three of the significant independent variables – age, gender 
and arrival in the U.S. – the direction of the association with political transnationalism is 
consistent with expectations in the theoretical literature. However, in the case of two other 
explanatory factors – English proficiency, employment status and income – the opposite is true. 
In other words, contrary to the theoretical literature, Vietnamese Americans with poor English 
skills and those who are unemployed and have lower incomes are more likely to engage in 
political transnationalism. 
 
Transnational political activism in the early period of resettlement 
This section provides a brief overview of the history of political activism in the 
Vietnamese American community in the early period of their resettlement. The Vietnamese 
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Americans, as political refugees from the war, have always had ambivalent attitudes towards 
their homeland. The Vietnam War was a shattering experience that disrupted families and 
traditions. For those who remained for a while under Communist rule, the reforms of the new 
regime were equally, if not more, disruptive. At the same time, some Vietnamese refugees have 
mixed reactions about living in the United States, a country which abandoned them at war’s end, 
but then took them in as refugees, giving them political freedom and economic opportunities. 
While grateful to America, older Vietnamese fear that living in America leads to the loss and 
abandonment of their traditions and their remembered life in their ancestral lands (Freeman 
1995). Till date, the Vietnamese refugees retain a strong sentimental attachment to their 
homeland, customs and traditions, and to the many relatives they left behind in Vietnam and 
continue to maintain regular contacts with their homeland (Lien 2001). 
During the early years of refugee settlement in the United States, Vietnamese Americans 
worked to establish themselves. There was little time or resources to organize politically until 
they gained economic stability in the 1980s and 1990s. Due to the growth of sizeable urban 
refugee communities in Orange County, the development of refugee businesses and self-help 
groups grew. These groups, known as Mutual Assistance Associations (MAA), assisted refugees 
in securing employment, provided teachers for English and societal skills and encouraged the 
preservation of Vietnamese culture (Valverde 1994). As the MAAs became more established, 
they also became more politically powerful. They lobbied their congressional representatives 
concerning refugee issues and matters germane to Vietnam (Valverde 1994). They also formed 
some potentially powerful political action and advocacy groups, and raised money to support 
selected political action like pressuring Congress not to lift the economic embargo on Vietnam 
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(Rutledge 1992). The MAAs thus served as a medium for early political mobilization and 
activity for Vietnamese Americans. 
Vietnamese American transnational political activism in the early years proved violent 
and deadly. On July 21, 1981 in San Francisco, Duong Trong Lam, an anti-war activist, was the 
first Vietnamese assassination victim (Coburn 1983). A group calling themselves the Anti-
Communist Viets Organization (ACVO) took responsibility for the killing, claiming that Lam 
was assassinated because he was a communist agent who edited the Cai Dinh Lang newspaper to 
“bolster the image of the hated Vietnamese communist regime” (Coburn 1983). In another case, 
Doan Van Toai, head of the political group called Institute for Democracy in Vietnam, was shot 
and wounded near his home in 1989 (San Jose Mercury News 1989). Sources in the Vietnamese 
American community claimed he met with Hanoi officials and advocated U.S.-Vietnam dialogue 
and hence, wanted him dead (Valverde 1994, p. 105).  
The most publicized occurrence was the death of the journalist Tap Van Pham who was 
killed when arsonists set fire to his newspaper office located in Little Saigon on August 9, 1987 
for running advertisements for a company that specialized in money transfers to Vietnam and 
that was strongly suspected of having ties with the communist government of Vietnam (Kiger 
1987). As listed in the Orange County Register, assassinations also included the 1986 shooting 
of Van Khan Tran outside a Westminster shopping center for speaking in favor of establishing 
diplomatic relations with Vietnam (Brody 1987b) and the 1994 slaying of Nguyen Van Luy, 
honorary president of a pro-Hanoi group in San Francisco (Ha 2002). These incidents showed 
that voicing any kind of deviant opinion, or one vaguely critical of the refugee community, could 
be construed as pro-Communist. 
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There have also been varied forms of expressions of anti-communist sentiments. In the 
1980s, a vigilante group calling themselves the Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate the 
Communists and Restore the Nation (VOECRN) claimed responsibility for a string of arson 
attacks and summary executions of purported Communist propagandists (Ha 2002). On April 30, 
1980, the National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) was formed by 
Hoang Co Minh and Pham Van Lieu and has gained worldwide support among the Vietnamese. 
According to its Directorate, the Vietnamese Resistance, led by NUFRONLIV, aims to 
overthrow the totalitarian Vietcong regime and to return peace, freedom and democracy to the 
Vietnamese people (NUFRONLIV 1986).  
The task of the Vietnamese Freedom Fighters was aimed not only at overthrowing a 
brutal regime but also at reconstructing a free, democratic and progressive society based on 
justice, freedom and humanity and rebuilding an economy of free enterprise (NUFRONLIV 
1986, pp. 44-45). From overseas, Vietnamese refugees have made many efforts to support the 
struggle for liberation of their homeland. This group supposedly trained fighters on the border of 
Thailand with the intention of taking back Vietnam by force (Valverde 1994). In 1987, a group 
of 200 fighters from NUFRONLIV attempted to enter Vietnam but failed; 104 of the invaders 
were killed, another 65 were captured (Grossman 1988, p. 6). 
 Eventually, the wave of political violence peaked in the late 1980s and then subsided as 
organizations like VOECRN and NUFRONLIV disappeared and showed no further signs of 
activity. The next instance of political activity occurred in the 1990s when protests against 
suspected communist sympathizers continued even though the violence disappeared. For 
example, at the end of 1994, Thanh Lan, a famous Vietnamese singer, was scheduled to sing in 
the United States. However, her concert was picketed by Vietnamese Americans accusing her of 
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being an agent of Communist Vietnam (Jung 1994). Since then, Vietnamese political 
participation has run the gamut from conventional to unconventional activities, ranging from 
boycotts and demonstrations to dramatic protest events. 
 
Transnational Political Activism Today 
This section begins with a few general observations on homeland sentiments prevailing in 
the community based on my interviews and then goes on to describe in detail the transnational 
political activities currently undertaken by Vietnamese Americans, based on my interviews and 
supported with additional information from scholarly, newspaper and online accounts of political 
events in Orange County, California. The Vietnamese American community appears to be 
invested not only in U.S. – domestic but also homeland politics. Despite the fact that all the 
leaders in Orange County are naturalized U.S. citizens (their nationality is technically 
American), half of them describe their nationality as “Vietnamese” or “Vietnamese American” 
(Nguyen, M. H. 1984, p. 209). This reflects a lingering attachment to national identity that is 
both possible and advantageous in the context of political organizing in the Vietnamese 
American community (Valverde 1994). For instance, the community often expresses strong anti-
Communist sentiments – in a poll conducted for the Orange County Register in 2000, an 
overwhelming majority of 600 Vietnamese Americans surveyed in Orange County ranked 
fighting communism as “very important” (Collet 2000). Thus, because they are a fairly 
mobilized refugee group and because homeland concerns are particularly salient, much of their 
political energy is devoted to issues dealing with their homeland, Vietnam.  
In order to investigate the kind of transnational political activism undertaken by 
Vietnamese Americans in the present day, I conducted a thorough qualitative review and analysis 
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of the 27 interview transcripts. A copy of the interview questionnaire is presented in Appendix 
A. This section describes the most popular forms of transnational political activism undertaken 
by Vietnamese Americans, as expressed to me during the course of the interviews and 
supplemented with newspaper and online accounts of these activities. I begin with a few general 
observations based on the interviews and then move on to describe specific transnational 
activities. 
A common thread running through all the interviews was that of pride in Vietnamese 
culture and nostalgia for “the old days” before the fall of Saigon. Many of the interviewees told 
me that although they were now living in the United States and some had never even returned to 
visit Vietnam, their hearts still lay with their homeland. Their attitude towards the motherland 
(by which they invariably mean South Vietnam) is one of cultural pride and strong attachment. 
One respondent brought with him to the interview the South Vietnamese “heritage flag” to show 
me after I had asked him about the protests over display of the communist flag in our previous e-
mail correspondence. Other interviewees were similarly eager to share tid-bits about their 
traditions, asked me if I had sampled Vietnamese phό and invited me to attend the annual Tet 
parade in his neighborhood.  
As to the matter of impetus for their involvement in transnational politics, the motivation 
of many Vietnamese Americans to remain politically active despite their busy lives seems to be 
the fact that “most Vietnamese abroad do not consider themselves as belonging to a Vietnam that 
is unified under communism”. One respondent, for instance, declared that the years of separation 
from his family (brother and sister) that he had to endure did not let him forget his anger and 
motivated him to attend anti-communist protests whenever he could.  
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With regard to the question of why anti-communist sentiment is still so strong among the 
Vietnamese American community in Little Saigon, after the interviews I was compelled to once 
again revisit the early instances of violent political expressions of hatred towards communists, 
which included several actual and attempted assassinations (as described in the previous section) 
that rocked the community. Compared to those times, when there was a constant fear and 
suspicion of the presence of communist spies amongst themselves, red-baiting is nowhere nearly 
as common now. Thus, there has been a definite shift in Vietnamese political transnationalism 
from its earliest, violent form to present-day, non-violent activities. 
Based on my archival research and interviews, most transnational political activity by the 
Vietnamese Americans is confined to Little Saigon, the ethnic enclave where they have 
coalesced through secondary migration within the U.S. In fact, as Brody (1987a) has written, 
Little Saigon, named for the former capital of South Vietnam, is considered “the capital of the 
Vietnamese in exile”. Finally, transnational political participation is generally measured by 
electoral indicators, for example membership in a political party or active involvement in 
political campaigns in the polity of origin. However, migrants and refugees also seek to be 
represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections 
(Guarnizo et al. 2003). The Vietnamese Americans in Orange County present one such case 
where the political transnationalism pursued is of a non-electoral, indirect nature. In other words, 
as to specific transnational political activities undertaken by Vietnamese Americans, they do not 
appear to be directly transnational political acts such as voting in home country elections or 
sending political remittances to community-based political organizations in their hometown. 
Rather, the kinds of transnational political acts that Vietnamese Americans engage in are more of 
an indirect nature, such as protests, and petitions. In almost all the interviews, participants 
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vividly remembered the HiTek protest of 1999 (described in detail below) and several described 
the politically charged atmosphere they experienced at the incident. While several respondents 
recalled lending their signatures at a Vietnamese Buddhist temple to a letter-writing campaign to 
free imprisoned Vietnamese dissidents, others mentioned their pride in seeing the “heritage” flag 
of South Vietnam being displayed at official functions (at a high school graduation one 
respondent attended) after flag resolutions were adopted by several Orange County cities 
following petitions for the same. 
An analysis of the interviews also led me to discover another indirect, yet novel form of 
transnational political activism, one that I had not thought of before embarking on my research. 
A majority of the respondents claimed to use the Internet frequently, while several professed to 
visiting websites related to their homeland, Vietnam. They enthusiastically mentioned “going on 
the internet” to keep themselves updated of news from “home” and some expressed surprise that 
I was not aware of the popular blogging site, The Bolsavik. One particular interviewee (name 
withheld) proudly showed me his remarks in the comments section of a Vietnamese language 
blog that he visited frequently. Thus, blogging and expressing dissent on English as well as 
Vietnamese language internet forums turned out to be an unexpected form of indirect 
transnational political activism among Vietnamese Americans. The following sections describe 
in details the three transnational political activities among Vietnamese Americans – protesting, 
petitioning and participating in internet forums. 
Protests 
Participating in protests and demonstrations is by far the most popular mode of political 
participation, as depicted in my interview data; it is quite conspicuous that protest plays a central 
role in many of the Vietnamese American political demands and expressions of grievances in the 
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1980s and well into the 1990s. This trend was also reflected in a 2000 Orange County Register 
poll (Collet 2000). According to one interviewee, Mr. Do12, participating in demonstrations does 
not require a higher degree of civic skills, and it is an easier task to accomplish because 
participants only have to decide to get themselves to the event and follow instructions on how to 
participate.  
For a refugee group like the Vietnamese, who come from a repressive polity, the relative 
tolerance offered to protestors by authorities in the United States was inviting. The interviews 
portray that for Vietnamese Americans protesting and the very fact of being able to do so 
demonstrates not only the openness of American politics, but also, by contrast, the repressive 
nature of the regime they have fled. The following section gives an account of the more high 
profile protests that took place in recent years in and around Little Saigon.   
Recent Protests 
 The majority of Vietnamese protests in Orange County take place in Westminster or 
Garden Grove, an area which coincides with the ethnic enclave of Little Saigon and where large 
numbers of Vietnamese Americans have settled. The concentration of protests here is supported 
by the notion that increased political mobilization comes from the establishment of an ethnic 
community that can support such political activism (Ong and Meyer 2004).  
As the cycle of political violence waned in the mid-1990s, Vietnamese Americans took to 
protesting, especially around 1994 when they demonstrated frequently to show their disapproval 
of normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam and lifting of the 20 year embargo on the 
communist government of Vietnam. Angry Vietnamese refugees gathered to protest the lack of 
democracy and human rights abuse record of the Vietnamese government. Supporters of the 
12 Not respondent’s real name. Personal interview conducted February 11, 2009. 
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embargo argued that normal trade relations between the two countries could be used as 
propaganda by the Communists and could destroy their dream of returning to a free Vietnam (Ha 
2002).  
Even today, in an ethnic enclave like Orange County, the lion’s share of Vietnamese 
Americans protests are homeward-looking that deal with a world thousands of miles away and 
tend to overshadow the relatively fewer protests dealing with immigrant issues in the U.S. In 
June, 2007, Vietnamese-American protesters demonstrated outside Vietnamese President 
Nguyen Minh Triet's hotel in Dana Point, California, during his visit to the U.S. (Johnson 2007). 
His trip sparked protests in Little Saigon and across the country, given what many Vietnamese 
Americans described as the regime’s poor human rights record and recent crackdown on pro-
democracy groups and activists in Vietnam. 
Other high profile protests which stemmed from conflicts in the Vietnamese American 
community have been similarly rooted in differences over Vietnam-related issues. For instance, 
Truong Van Tran became infamous for inciting the largest anti-communist demonstrations in 
Little Saigon’s history when he displayed a Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s flag along with a 
portrait of Ho Chi Minh in his HiTek TV and Video store. Over the course of two and a half 
months of political rallying, tens of thousands of Vietnamese protestors flooded the retail plaza 
in front of his business to denounce both Truong Tran and the communist government of 
Vietnam (Jolly 1999). In protest of his display, they claimed it as an affront to their refugee 
experiences and to American ideals of freedom and democracy (Nguyen, M T. 2005).  
A cross-section of the Vietnamese community attended the protests: men and women of 
all ages from different social classes and regions of Vietnam were represented. Although 
peaceful, the emotional charge behind the protests was very real (Ha 2002). Almost all 
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Vietnamese Americans I interviewed brought up the HiTek incident and described the charged 
atmosphere of the protest. Mr. Nguyen13 recalled scenes where people were “denouncing the 
Communist government of Vietnam on megaphones, burning macabre effigies of Ho Chi Minh 
and waving along with their children South Vietnam’s yellow flag with the three red stripes”. 
Soon, the protest expanded to a demonstration and became a movement. T. Diem14, the owner of 
a mom and pop store only a couple of blocks away from the scene of the protests, recalled how 
almost overnight, protestors plastered the store and surrounding strip mall with thousands of 
South Vietnamese flags. American and South Vietnamese flags also appeared on the rooftops of 
every shopping center in Little Saigon. Tony Lam, then Westminster councilman, also endured a 
one-month long protest outside of his family’s restaurant for not publicly opposing the 
Vietnamese flag display at the HiTek video store (Ong and Meyer 2004). Thus, even when 
activists picked more proximate targets, the latter were virtually always used as a proxy for the 
communist government of Vietnam. 
While the protests were going on, Daniel C. Tsang, in an article published in the Los 
Angeles Times, wrote that “newer generations of Little Saigon seem less and less interested in the 
old politics of division and the history that sustains it. Increasingly, these Vietnamese-Americans 
are U.S.-born” (Tsang 1999). In response to Tsang’s article, in a show of unity, more than 25 
Vietnamese youth (student and religious) groups organized the largest rally at the HiTek store 
(Ha 2002). The mobilization of youth came after Tsang’s claim that ardent anti-communist 
feelings were retained only by the older generation of Vietnamese-Americans. In an impressive 
display of solidarity with their elders, Vietnamese-American youth claimed both membership 
and leadership in their community. Inspired by Vietnamese language radio and mainstream 
13 Not respondent’s real name. Personal interview conducted on March 2, 2009. 
14 Not respondent’s real name. Personal interview conducted on March 4, 2009. 
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national television coverage of the HiTek incident, sympathetic protests were organized by 
Vietnamese-American communities in San Jose, California (Houle 2006). Although separated by 
thousands of miles, these Vietnamese American demonstrators were united by their grief, hate, 
passion, and idealism.  
During the protests, people told and retold horrific tales of the violence, abuse and loss 
they endured at the hands of the Communists. As one protestor, Dung Huynh narrated, “I saw 
my friends killed by the Communists. Every time I see the flag, I get so mad. I still see it; I still 
hear the gunshots. I cannot forget” (Warren and Tran 1999). This story and others like it 
provided the emotional fuel that kept the demonstrators coming back. For the protestors, the 
important thing was that the community had appeared united, had used a collective voice in 
giving utterance to the assumption that theirs was a community founded by political exiles who 
had all suffered under and hate the Communists Not only were the protests attended and 
supported by Vietnamese from diverse social groupings, but one of the defining moments of the 
protests occurred when competing leaders of the Vietnamese community of Southern California 
shook hands (Ha 2002). Thus, in the short term, the controversy served to unite disparate 
interests and to move the community towards a greater sense of political empowerment. 
In November 2007, the controversy over the HiTek protest surfaced again when VAX, 
short for Vietnamese American eXposure, (an English-language TV show broadcast on Saigon 
TV) aired clips from this event in a half hour show. In a hip MTV-documentary style program 
that featured diverse aspects of the Vietnamese community in southern California, VAX ran a 
retro look at the protest and, as part of the program, showed CNN footage of the protest which 
includes 5 seconds of the close up of Truong Tran’s altar — i.e. the offending Ho Chi Minh 
portrait in the HiTek incident. Half a dozen angry protestors showed up at Saigon TV and 
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accused VAX of being communist sympathizers and received support from right-wing radio 
hosts such as Viet Dzung, regarded as the voice of protests big and small (Bolsavik 2009). As a 
result, Saigon TV canceled the remainder of VAX’s 12-week contract.  
Protests on the same theme still occur whenever there are visits from Vietnamese 
officials, formation of sister-city ties with Vietnam, local art exhibitions or performances by 
Vietnamese artists and similar events. One such protest was in January 2009, when dozens of 
members of the local Vietnamese American community gathered at Cypress College to protest 
what they said was the college's display of “communist propaganda”. The Vietnamese Arts & 
Letters Association (VAALA) opened a group exhibition, “Fresh off the Boat II: Art Speaks” at 
the Orange County college and the protestors’ ire was stoked by one image in particular (Chang 
2009a). Brian Doan’s photograph, “Thu Duc, Viet Nam”, contained imagery depicting a 
Vietnamese young woman wearing a shirt similar to the communist Vietnamese flag, posing next 
to a bust of Ho Chi Minh, which some viewers thought was pro-communist (Chang 2009b). 
The protesters, mainly older Vietnamese residents of Orange County and Southern 
California, chanted slogans and denounced the curators and organizers of the exhibit. Several 
dozen protesters waved U.S. and Vietnamese flags and chanted “Down with Communists!” and 
“Shame on you, Brian Doan!” – a shot at the photographer who took the photo (Mello 2009). 
Visitors urged the curators of the exhibit to take it down, while some reportedly scratched at the 
photo’s glass surface and spit on the image. The Union of Vietnamese Student Associations of 
Southern California released a statement urging Doan and Cypress College to “be sensitive to the 
feelings of thousands of Vietnamese Americans” and “consider removing the display in order to 
have a discussion with members of the community” (Chang 2009b). Ultimately, the Vietnamese 
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artists’ group VAALA closed down the controversial exhibit prematurely after the Little Saigon 
community activists threatened to launch a large-scale protest (Bharath 2009). 
It’s fascinating that one photo can still evoke so much emotion. In the summer of 2007, a 
small group of anti-communist protesters began to make life a living hell for the publishers of a 
Little Saigon newspaper, Nguoi Viet Daily News, a media outlet accused of being an agent of 
Hanoi. Nguoi Viet Daily News made the costly mistake of publishing an image of a foot spa 
(foot-bathing bin) painted in the colors of the South Vietnamese flag (also known as the heritage 
flag) in a special edition of the newspaper (Chang 2009a). The photograph was actually a tribute 
to the artist's immigrant mother-in-law, who put her kids through college thanks to her nail salon 
business. However, the publication sparked angry protests; a handful of protesters lead by Ngo 
Ky, former South Vietnamese military official Trung Doan, spent months picketing Nguoi Viet 
Daily News (Schou 2009). Ultimately, their protests led to the dismissal of the two top editors of 
that newspaper who approved the supposedly offensive photograph (Chang 2009a; Schou 2009). 
Annual political events are also occasions for making anti-communist denunciations, 
notably the anniversary of the Army of Republic of South Vietnam on June 19th and the 
commemoration of the fall of Saigon on April 30th, also known as the Black April ceremony. 
Traditionally, Southern California Vietnamese American community groups led by the 
Vietnamese American Community of Southern California – a conglomeration of groups that 
includes students, seniors and veterans – have organized Black April commemoration events at 
the Sid Goldstein Freedom Park in Orange County every year. Typically, the event includes 
speeches by veterans and community members and a solemn ceremony (Bharath 2010). 2010 
marked the 35th anniversary of the refugees' arrival to the United States, particularly to 
California, after the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. 
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Protests and demonstrations that give vent to the political agenda of the Vietnamese 
American community also extend to the socio-cultural realm. Even the musical taste of 
Vietnamese Americans reflects their political ideology – their music evokes nostalgic sentiments 
and is often accompanied by lyrics that have themes of a lost nation, patriotism and the refugee 
experience (Valverde 2003). Given that the single ideology of anti-communism has been central 
to every facet of Vietnamese American life, including community institutions, political 
organizations and cultural production, there are still many in the Vietnamese American 
community who will never accept music or art produced under the communist Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. Some staunchly anti-communist refugees take the extreme line of boycotting 
anything related to Vietnam; even cultural productions are seen as propaganda tools of the 
socialist government. As such, Vietnamese Americans boycott music from Vietnam, ostracize 
Vietnamese-American singers who work in Vietnam and protest Vietnamese artists when they 
perform in the United States. Thus, by imposing severe social sanctions on all Vietnamese 
cultural productions, Vietnamese Americans use social and cultural settings to achieve a greater 
sense of political empowerment. 
Political Significance of Protests 
Scholars see social movements in general, and protests in particular, as an extension of 
more conventional politics, that is, an additional means for any constituency to make political 
claims (Tilly 1984). According to Meyer and Tarrow (1998), in general, people who protest are 
likely to engage in conventional political activity on the same issues, including writing letters to 
elected officials, contributing money and time to campaigns, voting and running for office. 
Protests can offer clear benefits as part of a larger political strategy. At once, colorful protests are 
more attractive to mass media than less dramatic political action, allowing a relatively small 
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group of people to project their concerns to a larger audience (Gitlin 1980). For a relatively small 
ethnic community, protesting represents a strategy that demonstrates political concerns and 
commitment, and offers the promise of keeping the issue alive while waiting for better political 
opportunities (Ong and Meyer 2004). Beyond that, staging a protest event is one way to build an 
organization and feelings of political efficacy among participants. 
Protesting, the most accessible form of political participation to the Vietnamese refugees 
in the early days of their resettlement as well as today, has eventually served as an initial 
platform for opening other forms of participation in the earlier part of this decade, such as 
writing letters to elected officials or more recently, blogging and participating in online political 
forums. 
In conclusion, from the pattern and content of protests, we can see that the ethnic enclave 
of Little Saigon, Orange County is home to most of the protests, and the most frequent target of 
protests is the government of Vietnam. Sometimes, proxies for that government, for example, 
advocates of normalizing relations, are targets, but Vietnam always looms large on the horizon. 
Identified protest leaders have mostly been passionate and committed individuals, rather than 
established organizations. To many Vietnamese-Americans, protests came to represent the 
potential power they wielded as a political unit. Indeed, the HiTek incident has, especially, been 
successful in fostering a spirit of cohesion and political activism. 
 
Petitions and letters to government 
 Political contributions to awareness campaigns about the human rights situation in 
Vietnam (in the form of signing petitions and letters to local Congressional representatives), and 
petitioning to local legislatures on issues pertaining to Vietnamese are yet another form of 
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political expression by Vietnamese Americans. The tactics employed by Vietnamese Americans 
remarkably closely follow the same patterns as those of transnational advocacy networks, albeit 
on a much smaller scale. Although less in numbers than protestors, several interviewees reported 
signing petitions and letters, particularly the 2009 petition to free Father Ly. This section 
describes the most recent, high profile campaigns and petitions undertaken by Vietnamese 
Americans and their political significance.  
Recent Petitions / Campaigns 
Heritage flag – One of the most popular and cherished causes taken up by Vietnamese 
Americans is the recognition of the South Vietnamese flag in America. According to one 
interviewee Mr. Diem15, “overseas Vietnamese exiles consider the red-bar-on-golden flag (the 
heritage flag) is much more symbolic of the nation of Vietnam than the Communist yellow star” 
and believe that “the heritage flag will be restored whenever the communist regime ends in 
Vietnam”. Another interviewee, Mr. Huynh16, when asked about the heritage flag said that “most 
Vietnamese anti-Communist patriots hope that their flag of liberty and democracy will be 
honored everywhere in the land of freedom, America”. Most anti-communist Vietnamese reject 
the yellow star flag that was originally the flag of the Vietnam Communist Party since the 1940s. 
In early 2003, the Virginia state legislators introduced and approved legislation that 
would require the display of the former South Vietnamese flag instead of the current 
government’s flag at official state-sponsored functions in deference to the refugees from that 
country who sacrificed and resisted communist aggression (Lewis 2003). The bill was sponsored 
in the U.S. Senate by Virginia Robert Hull, but ultimately, the measure did not come to a vote 
and was killed (Legislative Information System 2003). Inspired by this legislation, several 
15 Not respondent’s real name. Personal interview conducted on April 13, 2009. 
16 Not respondent’s real name. E-mail interview conducted in March 2009. 
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members of the Vietnamese community in Little Saigon petitioned their local city councils, 
calling the current Vietnamese flag an inauthentic “blood flag”, a communist rather than a 
national banner, and comparing it to the Nazi swastika (Nguyen, M. T. 2005). Letters submitted 
to city and state legislators arguing for recognition of the defunct South Vietnamese national flag 
described the current socialist republic as a “reign of terror” and thereby sought to invalidate its 
territorial claim to nationality. 
Soon afterward, in February 2003, Westminster and Garden Grove City Councils in 
California, taking a cue from their counterparts in Virginia, both proposed and passed resolutions 
authorizing the use of the South Vietnam flag at all of their official functions and also banning 
any use of the communist flag (Ferry 2004). The same year, the Vietnamese American Public 
Affairs Committee, a political advocacy group based in California, launched a national campaign 
mobilizing Vietnamese American activists all over southern California to petition local 
government bodies (legislatures and municipalities) to recognize the pre-1975 South Vietnamese 
national flag as the “official” flag of the Vietnamese American community, to be flown on city 
property and at city-sponsored events when the occasion called for representation (Nguyen, M. 
T. 2005). As the campaign gathered momentum, flag resolutions in various forms were passed in 
over twenty cities, including Westminster and Garden Grove in Orange County; along with 
Milpitas, San Jose and San Francisco in northern California (Tran 2003; Nguyen, M. T. 2005). 
The flag resolutions contained strong language condemning the government of Vietnam for 
human rights violations of religious freedoms.  
College Vietnamese Student Associations in California also requested that administrators 
sanction the use of the former South Vietnamese national flag at graduation ceremonies 
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(Nguyen, M. T. 2005). Two of the respondents I interviewed, Thanh and Wendy17, were 
members of the Vietnamese American Association at a prominent university in Orange County 
who responded to my e-mail enquiries and, in course of their interviews, expressed their reasons 
for supporting the South Vietnamese flag, “The Vietnamese refugees living in the United States 
came here seeking freedom from the communists. They violated our human rights, they 
oppressed us. So when we see the communist flag, we naturally get upset” while Wendy said, 
“The communist flag is immoral…No, the communist government does not represent us”. 
Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act - Another prominent campaign in the Vietnamese 
American political radar has been the Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act (H.R. 4007). The 
majority of Vietnamese Amerasians that made it to the United States were not U.S. Citizens. 
Citizenship classes have not been productive since the majority of Vietnamese Amerasians were 
illiterate when they arrived. As a result, they were unable to take the US citizenship examination. 
This cause was taken up by Vietnamese Americans in California and elsewhere in the country; as 
a result of their lobbying efforts, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren sponsored a bill in Congress in 
October 2007 which, if passed, would allow some Vietnam-era Amerasians to obtain automatic 
U.S. citizenship. H.R. 4007 (Library of Congress 2007) would amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to provide automatic citizenship for certain children of United States servicemen 
born overseas during the Vietnam and Korean Wars (Washington Watch 2006-2010). 
Unfortunately, this bill, which was proposed in a past session of Congress, has never become 
law. Congressional sessions usually last for two years and at the end of each session, those 
17 Not respondents’ real names. Personal interview conducted on October 28, 2008. This interview was part of the 
initial pilot study I conducted when I was still establishing my contacts in the Vietnamese community. The interview 
was not taken into account during qualitative analysis since both respondents are 2nd generation Vietnamese 
Americans. (I have limited my sample to 1st generation Vietnamese Americans who arrived as refugees and 
immigrants in this study.) 
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proposed bills and resolutions that have not been passed are cleared from the agenda (GovTrack 
2007-2008). Nevertheless, the bill garnered a lot of attention among the Vietnamese American 
community. 
Human Rights Campaigns - More recent campaigns by Vietnamese Americans have 
tended to focus on appeals for democracy and improved human rights in Vietnam through 
peaceful means. One such informal campaign took place when leaflets were distributed at the 
annual Tet Festival 2010 held in Little Saigon appealing all intellectuals, students, workers and 
farmers, in Vietnam and abroad, to wage a non-violent struggle for democracy.  Other more 
formal, organized campaigns include the petition launched by Amnesty International USA and 
supported by Vietnamese in Orange County for the release of dissident Vietnamese poet Nguyen 
Chi Thien, who was imprisoned at the notorious BaSao prison in Hanoi. He was adopted as a 
Prisoner of Conscience by Amnesty International and throughout the late 1980s, Vietnamese 
Americans in California organized events to bring to light Thien’s plight, who was serving 
twenty-seven years in Communist prison, eight of them in solitary darkness. Thanks to their 
efforts, Thien, by then famous as the “prison poet”, was released in November 1991 after twenty-
seven total years in prison (Thien 2008). 
Poet Thien now, in turn, leads the Amnesty International USA (AIUSA) petition 
campaign among Vietnamese people in Orange County and in San Jose, asking for the release of 
all political prisoners in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, specifically, the Reverend Nguyen 
Van Ly, who has been in solitary confinement for two years since his public trial on March 30, 
2007 (VietAm Review 2007). The petition also names Thich Quang Do, who has been in 
detention at the Thanh Thien Vien Pagoda in Saigon for over twenty-five years. The campaign 
collected over 150 signatures at the Unified Buddhist Church of Viet Nam pagoda in Orange 
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County on April 19, 2009 inspiring similar petitions in northern California (VietAm Review 
2009). The bilingual petition campaign was sent to the Vietnamese government on May 2, 2009 
and requested that Father Ly and other political prisoners be released in recognition of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council periodic review of Vietnam that took place in Geneva on May 8, 
2009 (VietAm Review 2009). Copies of the petition letter (Appendix 1) were also sent to the 
U.S. State Department as well as the American Embassy in Vietnam. In March 2010, Radio Free 
Asia announced that “Father Ly, Individual at Risk prisoner adopted by Amnesty International 
USA Groups 19 and 67, was temporarily released from prison on March 15, 2010 due to ill 
health” (Hieu 2010). 
Another campaign currently underway is Free Thuy – Nhan – Nghien organized by the 
Vietnam Reform Party (Viet Tan). Working with other pro-democracy groups inside Vietnam 
and among the diaspora, the organization aims to mobilize the power of the people to overcome 
dictatorship, achieve a sustainable democratic transition for Vietnam and demand human rights 
for the Vietnamese (Viet Tan 2010a). In June 2007, Diem Do, then chairman of the Viet Tan, 
joined members of the National Congress of Vietnamese Americans in a meeting with House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi before she met with Vietnam’s visiting President. Their aim, as Diem Do 
put it was to “to impress upon the Vietnamese president that he must respect human rights, 
particularly freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and association, and must release the 
peaceful dissidents” (Orange County Register 2007). 
Viet Tan’s Free Thuy – Nhan – Nghien campaign is part of its movement for Freedom for 
Prisoners of Conscience, which actively challenges the arbitrary detention of Vietnam’s greatest 
intellects and independent voices, and lobbies for international pressure on the regime to release 
all prisoners of conscience. The campaign lobbies for the release of novelist Tran Khai Thanh 
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Thuy (3.5 years imprisonment), human rights lawyer Le Thi Cong Nhan (3 years imprisonment) 
and democracy activist Pham Thanh Nghien (4 years imprisonment followed by house arrest) 
(Diem 2010). All three were active bloggers and cyber activists who have peacefully campaigned 
for human rights and social justice, and against corruption in Vietnam. They were arrested for 
disseminating propaganda and petitioning to hold a peaceful demonstration (Diem 2010).  
Internet Freedom Campaigns - Viet Tan’s other campaign, the Internet Freedom 
Campaign, challenges legal statutes restricting freedom of expression in Vietnam, and supports 
citizen journalists and imprisoned prominent journalists and cyber activists in the country. The 
campaign declared that “Blogging Is Not a Crime” on its page Internet Freedom and reported 
that the Committee to Protect Journalists calls Vietnam one of the “10 worst countries to be a 
blogger” while Reporters Without Borders lists the Vietnamese government as an “enemy of the 
internet” (Viet Tan 2010c). The campaign also drafted a letter (Appendix 2) to be used as a 
template, urging members of the Vietnamese American community to write to their 
Congressional Representatives to co-sponsor the Vietnam internet freedom resolution (Viet Tan 
2010c).  
Political Significance of Petitions / Campaigns 
Vietnamese American campaigns to legislate government recognition of a defunct 
national flag, release imprisoned democracy activists and protest restrictions on internet in 
Vietnam compel us to acknowledge that the transnational activism undertaken by Vietnamese 
Americans expresses their disapprobation and rejection of the communist government of 
Vietnam to this day. In a sense, these proposals and resolutions hope to mandate state 
identification of the Vietnamese in America as a “displaced or usurped nation” (Nguyen, M. T. 
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2005). Through these political and ideological practices, the national fortune of ‘Vietnamese 
America’ is construed as oppositional to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  
Due to their large numbers in most political constituents of Orange County, Vietnamese 
Americans use their votes as lever to gain recognition on their efforts on homeland issues. The 
community is not afraid of getting their voice heard in Washington D.C. by lobbying their local 
representatives with the promise of votes in forthcoming local elections. Their lobbying efforts 
have won them official support from their local representatives on several homeland issues, 
including the release of detained prisoners and their campaign on internet freedom in Vietnam. 
The advantage in U.S. – domestic politics that translates into political significance in the arena of 
transnational homeland activism of Vietnamese Americans is highlighted in the following 
paragraphs. 
In January 2009, representatives of the Vietnamese American community expressed 
solidarity with their constituencies by writing to an organization that displayed the communist 
flag in an art exhibit and asked them to immediately remove the offensive materials. The 
document was signed by Van Tran, representative of the 68th district (cities with large 
Vietnamese population - Westminster, Garden Grove and Fountain Valley); Margie Rice, mayor 
of Westminster; Tri Ta, mayor pro tem of Westminster, several city council members, and 
Andrew Nguyen, a school district trustee at Westminster (Mello 2010). The Free Thuy – Nhan – 
Nghien campaign was supported by Senator Barbara Boxer and two members of Congress, 
Loretta Sanchez and Zoe Lofgren, who wrote to the President of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam to convey their concern regarding the detentions (Library of Congress 2009). As a 
result of the efforts of the Internet Freedom Campaign, Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez 
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introduced House Resolution 672 on July 23, 2009 calling on the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam to release imprisoned bloggers and respect Internet freedom (Hoang 2009).  
As recently as April 2010, Senator Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana), whose district includes 
Orange County’s Little Saigon, refused to be on the State Senate Floor for the introduction of a 
visiting delegation from the communist government of Vietnam and staged a walkout protest in 
support of the local Vietnamese American community. He said, “I proudly represent central 
Orange County and Little Saigon, the home of the largest concentration of Vietnamese outside of 
the country of Vietnam” (Joseph 2010). Correa walked off of the Senate Floor just moments 
before the State Senate formally welcomed the Judiciary Committee of the National Assembly 
for Vietnam. Correa also filed a written protest with Senate Leader Darrell Steinberg (D-
Sacramento) stating that, “There are numerous published reports that describe continuing human 
rights abuses of Vietnamese citizens by the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” 
(Joseph 2010). 
In conclusion, from the pattern and content of the petitions, we see that Vietnamese 
American campaigns reflect the most compelling homeland issues of the time that serve as a 
mobilizing factor among the population. For instance, while images of the former South 
Vietnamese flag conjure a shared historical past, the flag resolutions also sought to usurp the 
place of the current and official Vietnamese national flag in public ceremonies and institutions – 
this was also reflected in the interviews. In this way, their flag was claimed as a natural and 
national heritage against the possible unity of the socialist state as an entity and thus, established 
their position as a formidable transnational diaspora. Similarly, my interviews showed that 
campaigns to release imprisoned activists and bloggers and demand greater internet freedom in 
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Vietnam arouse feelings of political efficacy among those who sign petitions and letters to local 
government officials.  
 
Internet Forums 
We have already seen in the previous section how Vietnamese Americans 
enthusiastically launch campaigns and lobby their local representatives for support as an 
expression of their political will.  Blogging about latest developments in the human rights 
situation in Vietnam and expressing strong anti-communist sentiments on online forums are yet 
another form of political expression by Vietnamese Americans. The following section examines 
the political significance of online forums and traces some of the most popular blogs / 
Vietnamese websites that are sites for transnational political expression. 
Popular online forums 
While organized protests was the most common way of expressing their denunciation of 
the communist government in the 1990s, today such dissent is most prolific on internet forums 
such as blogs. There are several blogging sites, both in Vietnamese and English that are authored 
by Vietnamese Americans living in Orange County and are active forums for discussing 
homeland politics. In this section, I highlight three of the most prolific and well-visited English-
language blogs that came up repeatedly during the course of the interviews. 
EthnoBlog - Vietnam-born American writer Andrew Lam in his blog, called EthnoBlog, 
draws attention to the climate of increasingly harsh political repression in Vietnam. In his 
January 2010 blog post, he feared that in the lead-up to a key Vietnamese Communist Party 
congress in 2011, the Vietnamese government would intensify its campaign to silence 
government critics and curb social unrest in an effort to quell any potential challenges to its one-
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party rule. He drew attention to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2010, titled Vietnam: 
Repression Intensifies Prior to Party Congress (Human Rights Watch 2010) at the release of 
which Asia Director, Brad Adams said, “With its treatment of peaceful critics, the Vietnamese 
government seems determined to stand out as one of the most repressive countries in Asia” (Lam 
2010). In this way, Lam’s EthnoBlog serves as an intermediary means via which visitors of the 
blog, Vietnamese American and otherwise, are regularly informed of Human Rights Watch’s 
interest in their homeland. 
Vietnam Human Rights Journal - Stephen Denney is another blogger who highlights 
homeland issues in his blog, Vietnam Human Rights Journal. In his posts, he brings to light the 
current human rights situation in Vietnam. For example, in his July 15, 2009 post titled Truong 
Quoc Huy petition circulated, he informs his diaspora readers about Reporters without Borders 
circulating a petition for Truong Quoc Huy, a cyber-dissident imprisoned since August 18, 2006. 
Huy had been accused of using the internet to try to “overthrow the government”; his activities 
that led to his arrest included participating in a pro-democracy chat forum (Denney 2009a). 
Denney also keeps his readers updated about other organizations that join Vietnamese Americans 
in denouncing the Vietnamese government. For instance, in his March 10, 2009 post, he reported 
that Reporters without Borders had named Vietnam Communist Party Secretary General Nong 
Duc Manh a “predator of press freedom” – a category the organization reserves for political 
leaders who suppress freedom of the press in a harsh or systematic manner. (Denney 2009b) 
Bolsavik – This is perhaps the most popular and widely known blog currently active 
among Vietnamese Americans in Orange County. The author, Hao-Nhien Vu, writes about 
political protests and marches in other parts of the country to keep the Vietnamese community in 
southern California informed. For example, in his blog post Demonstrations Against Vietnam’s 
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General Consulate, Vu, who himself has become well-known in the Little Saigon Vietnamese 
American community as Mr. Bolsavik himself, informs his readers about hundreds of 
Vietnamese coming out to protest the inauguration of Vietnam’s general consulate by Vietnam’s 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in Houston. He wrote, “An official presence of the 
representatives of the communist government in the heart of the third-largest Vietnamese enclave 
obviously was not appreciated by the community of refugees who had risked life and limb 
fleeing communism” (Vu 2008). 
The Bolsavik is a blog with many avid followers who also make use of the comments 
section for heated discussions on homeland politics. For instance, regarding the F.O.B. II 
incident mentioned in the previous sections, Jung Kim, a regular visitor of the online forum, 
wrote, “The motivation of this art exhibit propaganda only helped revisit the past pain suffered 
by our Viet community members”, and in another comment, “We have general agreement that 
this exhibition was an agression [sic.] against our anti communist community” (User comment 
2009a). Another visitor, who calls himself XYZ, wrote, “A bust of former communist leader Ho 
Chi Minh is tantamount to a slap in the face… Everyone who were victims of communist 
brutality, suffered injuries to their human core at certain degree. Even to this day, there are many 
people still grapple with a mixture of fear, sadness, anger, incomprehension, and loss. And not 
everyone would insist on going to have an open dialogue, not everyone would think that such a 
dialogue will secure liberty and democracy for the less fortunate Vietnamese at homeland” (User 
comment 2009b). 
Other blog visitors employ the comments section to express their own political views, 
even if they are not always related to the topic of the posts. For instance, one user Tim666, in the 
comments section of the Bolsavik, wrote his own post titled Pro-Communist Senator “Hanoi” 
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John Kerry: Stop Supporting Oppressive Communist Vietnam By Putting On Hold In The Senate 
The 2009 Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 1969). He wrote, “Senator “Hanoi” John Kerry, now 
is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is always known as a good, loyal friend 
of communist Vietnam, not only for his important role in Vietnam war’s antiwar movement, but 
also for his great efforts to put Vietnam Human Rights Acts on hold twice in the Senate in 2001 
and 2003 after they were passed by a large margin in the House of Representatives” (User 
comment 2010). 
As with all online forums, there exist in the Vietnamese blogosphere voices of dissent. 
Some bloggers write about homeland politics but also criticize the anti-Communist protestors for 
red-baiting. For example, with reference to the Nguoi Viet Daily News protests, Nick Schou in 
his blog Little Saigon Follies writes that the photograph of a foot-bathing bin painted in the 
colors of the South Vietnamese flag, whose publication in Nguoi Viet Daily News triggered off 
the protests that culminated in the dismissal of the editor was actually a tribute to the artist's 
immigrant mother-in-law, who put her kids through college thanks to her nail salon business, and 
was in no way remotely connected to communist propaganda. Schou wonders “what kind of 
punishment will bother a group of folks who don't mind sitting on the same street-corner in a 
little-traveled cul-de-sac for months on end, waving placards at the few passing motorists who've 
long forgotten what their beef is” (Schou 2009). Of course, user comments on other blogs reflect 
opposing opinions. A visitor to The Bolsavik, who calls herself Trina, writes, “There are ways to 
stimulate dialog about Viet identity and politics without bludgeoning people with communist 
images… There is something wrong when Vietnamese Americans protest hateful/ harmful/ 
disrespectful expressions and they are (wrongly) accused of being censors of free speech” (User 
comment 2009c). 
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Some online sites also carry links to campaigns, such as the active community on 
Facebook called “Release Nguyen Tien Trung – say 1000s and 1000's of Vietnamese on FB”. 
The online group states its aim as the release of the pro-democracy blogger and creator of the 
Association of Young Vietnamese for Democracy, Nguyen Tien Trung (Release Nguyen Tien 
Trung Facebook Group). Trung, an active member of the Vietnam Democratic Party, was 
arrested on 7 July, 2009, just a few hours after being discharged from the army for refusing to 
take an oath (Reporter Without Borders 2009).  
Political commentary – Other than blogs, pro-democracy movements such as the 
Vietnam Reform Party (Viet Tan, 2010b) also publish political commentary on their websites. In 
a press release titled Freedom of Speech Outlawed in Vietnam, Viet Tan claims that contrary to 
its denials, the Hanoi regime does in fact hold political prisoners. In an open letter to all 
Vietnamese abroad posted on its website titled Open Letter for Liberty, Democracy and 
Territorial Integrity, Viet Tan’s Chairman Duy Hoang calls on all Vietnamese to continue rising 
up, using all forms of non-violent action against the Hanoi dictatorship and promises to continue 
mobilizing its members in Vietnam and abroad (Hoang 2010). 
Viet Tan’s website also contains links to external articles on its page on Internet 
Freedom: Digital Activism: A Tool for Change in Vietnam (4/03/2010), Vietnam Internet Users 
Fear Facebook Blackout (11/17/2009) and Vietnam’s Restrictions Threaten Progress (3/12/2009) 
and United States House Demands Vietnam Free Bloggers (10/21/2009). Moreover, in response 
to reports of Vietnam’s government blocking access to several sites, Viet Tan recently posted 
links on “How to Access Facebook in Vietnam” for internet users in Vietnam as well as 
members of the Vietnamese American community who are traveling to their homeland (Viet Tan 
182 
 
2010d). Viet Tan provides a list of methods to not only access Facebook but also other fire-
walled websites in Vietnam. 
Significance of internet forums 
According to Bos and Nell (2006), transnationalism and new media need not broaden or 
dissolve geographical identity or connectivity, but may reinforce it. The online lives of diaspora 
groups often reveal extensions of their offline activities; their Internet usage indicates the extent 
to which territoriality channels these groups’ online practices. This is certainly true in the case of 
Vietnamese American blogs and other internet forums.  
The internet provides an easily accessible platform to those politically active Vietnamese 
who are not able to afford the time and resources to devote to attending a protest march or 
participating in a letter-writing campaign. Expressing their anti-communist sentiments or 
engaging in heated political debates on blogging sites gives them a sense of political 
empowerment. In this way, homeland-oriented politics helps maintain the Vietnamese ethnic 
identity by reproducing wartime memories and by reviving their history as a refugee community. 
Transnational surfing of Vietnamese Americans not only provides the basis of ethnic 
identification but also allows for expression of opinions and dissemination of information 
regarding homeland issues.  
 In conclusion, blogs about homeland politics are not just a means for their authors to post 
their opinions or inform readers about diaspora events occurring elsewhere; rather, visitors to 
these blog sites also utilize their comments sections to voice their own views. Moreover, while 
some online sites carry links to campaigns, others publish political commentary on their 
websites. Thus, we see that bloggers, visitors to blogs and other online forums and diaspora 
organization websites all utilize the World Wide Web to express political opinions and inform 
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others in the Vietnamese American community about protests and demonstrations they can 
attend as well as about latest developments in the human rights situation in the country. 
 
Discussion of the Regression Analysis Results 
In the following section I discuss in detail the regression results obtained in Chapter 5. I 
first reiterate which of the demographic, contextual and resource variables turn out to be 
significant, and then offer possible rationalizations for outcomes relating to explanatory factors 
for political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. In addition to the significance of 
the association, I also discuss its direction – in other words, the sign of the regression 
coefficients. This tells us whether the effect of the significant demographic, contextual and 
resource-dependent explanatory factors increase or decrease the likelihood of participating in 
political transnationalism. For instance, do the odds of engaging in transnational political 
activities increase or decrease among older Vietnamese Americans? Next, I discuss how the 
explanatory factors are distributed in relation to groups of respondents who overlap across all 
three activities (as analyzed in Chapter 5) and whether these results confirm my findings from 
the regression analysis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion on whether my findings are in 
conformity with or contrary to the hypotheses put forth in the theoretical literature of 
transnationalism. 
 
Significance and Direction of Independent Variables  
The regression results in the previous chapter provided evidence that demographic 
variables are more useful than incorporation and resource dependent variables in predicting the 
odds of political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. Among demographic variables, 
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age and gender are the two most significant factors. Age is positively associated with and is a 
significant factor in explaining variance in political transnationalism among Vietnamese 
Americans. Older respondents are more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations as 
well as sign petitions than younger respondents. This is probably explained by the fact that older 
Vietnamese Americans were young adults rather than babies when they fled Vietnam after the 
fall of Saigon and hence, still find it difficult to forget the trauma of flight and hardships of the 
early years as uprooted, struggling refugees. 
Moreover, the older Vietnamese American age group includes those who were held by 
the communist regime as political prisoners for many years under extremely harsh conditions 
and still bear the emotional scars from their incarceration in re-education camps – these older 
refugees and immigrants are more likely to attend a protest rally against communism in Little 
Saigon or sign a petition to free pro-democracy activists still imprisoned in Hanoi. It is possible, 
then, that in the case of Vietnamese Americans traumatic experiences while fleeing from 
Vietnam and as political prisoners appear to operate through age. However, operationalizing 
appropriate variables that measure the level of psychological trauma or negative experiences 
among Vietnamese Americans is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, conceptualizing 
and investigating such factors for significance certainly presents opportunities for further study 
in the field of political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. Moreover, another 
plausible explanation for why age is a significant factor is that older people find it harder to 
adjust to their surroundings in a new country and forget their past. As hypothesized in the 
theoretical literature, older Vietnamese Americans are more likely to continue to maintain ties 
with their country of origin rather than severing all contact, as they feel nostalgic towards their 
homeland. Hence, these older refugees and immigrants are more likely to attend a protest rally 
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against communism in Little Saigon or sign a petition to free pro-democracy activists still 
imprisoned in Hanoi.  
The evidence for gender as a significant factor confirms the hypothesis in the 
transnationalism literature that male immigrants are more likely to engage in transnationalism 
than women. Among Vietnamese Americans, the ordinal logistic analyses suggest that men are 
more likely than women to engage in all three forms of political transnationalism - protests, 
signing petitions as well as participation in internet forums. One possible explanation in the 
literature is that since men experience occupational downward mobility upon relocation, they 
tend to mobilize around activities that focus on the country of origin in order to compensate for 
the loss of economic status in the host country. Women's experience tends to go the opposite 
way, as many of them become paid workers for the first time in the United States. They are, 
therefore, more likely to shift their orientation towards the host state and less likely to become 
involved in transnational activities.  
This then suggests that socioeconomic status is actually the significant factor here and 
appears to be playing out through gender. This study has appropriate variables for measuring 
socio-economic status among Vietnamese Americans, namely employment status and income. 
Hence, if it were the case that socioeconomic status was actually playing out through gender, 
then the coefficient for gender would cease to be significant as soon as measures for 
socioeconomic status – employment status and income – were added to the model. However, we 
see that in the case of all three transnational activities, gender remains highly significant in the 
final model even after the variables employment status and income have been added to the 
regression equation, while employment status (except in protests) and income remain 
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insignificant in determining the odds of engaging in political transnationalism among 
Vietnamese Americans.   
Hence, the difference in participation between men and women is actually a function of 
gender and not any underlying socioeconomic causes. This can be explained by the fact that 
while women are more likely to engage in cultural transnationalism by adhering to the traditions 
of their homeland culture or enrolling their children in training programs for their native 
language, male immigrants express their transnational identities by engaging in political 
activities. Among Vietnamese Americans, the ordinal logistic analyses suggest that men are 
more likely than women to protest, sign petitions as well as participate in internet forums.  
It is interesting to note that the one explanatory variable for which there was 
overwhelming evidence in the transnationalism literature as well as in my qualitative research 
interviews was college degree. One Vietnamese American I interviewed, Mr. Huynh18, 
commented that, “I think it will be very interesting to see the role that education plays out, 
especially in keeping informed of the human rights situation in Vietnam. If I were you, I would 
have more than one category for education: college education in Vietnam, college education in 
the U.S. and maybe a third category for both”. Surprisingly, however, the lack of a college 
degree did not turn out to be significantly associated with lower likelihood of protesting and 
signing petitions among Vietnamese Americans. One possible explanation for this is that anti-
communist sentiments are so strong in Little Saigon that when political fervor reaches a feverish 
pitch, as in the case of the HiTek incident, Vietnamese Americans gather in large numbers to 
protest or rally in support of imprisoned pro-democracy activists irrespective of their college 
educational qualifications. Also, the protests and petitions are generally organized at a grassroots 
18 Not respondent’s real name. E-mail interview conducted in March 2009. 
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level in the malls and churches of Little Saigon and, therefore, do not require a superior degree 
of political sophistication necessitating a college degree. Thus, while having a college degree 
was found to be significant in predicting U.S. – domestic political participation and 
transnationalism in the theoretical literature, among Vietnamese Americans it was not a 
significant factor due to the nature of the types of transnational political activities under 
consideration in this study. 
In the case of participating in internet forums, the regression analyses suggest that what 
matters is where the college degree was earned. Compared to Vietnamese Americans who do not 
have a college degree, those who obtained a college degree in both Vietnam and the U.S. are 
more likely to participate in internet forums as a form of expression of political transnationalism. 
Vietnamese Americans who obtained a college degree in both countries are more likely to be 
familiar with the internet, as well as aware of and exposed to online political forums as avenues 
of political expression. They are, therefore, more likely to participate in online forums dealing 
with homeland issues than those who received their college degree only in Vietnam. Thus, once 
again, given the nature of the transnational political activity under consideration, i.e. 
participation in internet forums, it is not level of education per se, but the place where the college 
degree was obtained that is significant in predicting political transnationalism among Vietnamese 
Americans. 
 Regarding incorporation variables, the time-period of arrival in the U.S. is significantly 
associated with protesting and petitioning. Vietnamese Americans who arrived in the earlier 
refugee waves are more likely to protest and petition than those who arrived in the later waves. 
This can probably be explained by the fact that those who arrived in the early waves either 
escaped the communist regime in the early days after the fall of Saigon, often with only a few 
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hours’ notice, or crossed over as boat people – both groups fled not due to economic reasons but 
because of a genuine fear of persecution at the hands of the communist authorities. In contrast to 
these refugees, those who arrived later came as immigrants, often as part of family re-unification 
programs and did not experience the same persecution and hardships that the earlier refugees had 
to face. As a result, those arriving at a later time-period might not be as emotionally invested in 
homeland politics as those who arrived earlier as refugees. It is interesting to note that while 
time-period of arrival in the U.S. is significantly associated with protesting and petitioning in the 
nested models, it ceases to be significant in the full models. This suggests that the effect of time 
of arrival in the U.S. is actually explained by other significant variables in the full model, i.e. 
age, gender, English proficiency and employment status. 
Level of English proficiency is significantly associated with protesting and petitioning 
but not with participation in internet forums. Respondents who rated their level of English 
proficiency as poor are more likely to protest and petition. This suggests that those who are 
highly proficient in English are either younger Vietnamese Americans who learnt the language in 
school or are assimilated in the host country to such an extent that they now distance themselves 
from homeland politics. It is interesting to note that English proficiency is not a significant 
explanatory factor in accounting for variance in participation in internet forums among 
Vietnamese Americans. This is probably due to the fact that while gaining college education in 
the U.S. exposes Vietnamese Americans to different websites and online forums (such as blogs) 
as an avenue of political expression, once they become aware of these various mediums, a high 
level of proficiency in English is not a pre-requisite for participation. A large number and wide 
variety of Vietnamese language blogs, websites and internet forums abound that offer 
opportunities for even Vietnamese Americans with poor English language skills to post their 
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political opinions and calls for action as guest blogs or user comments. This explains why 
English proficiency does not have a significant effect on participation in internet forums, while 
place of college degree earned does. 
Finally, regarding resource dependent variables, employment status is significantly 
associated with protesting; unemployed Vietnamese Americans are more likely to attend protests 
and demonstrations than those who are employed. This is comprehensible since protests which 
are long-drawn, such as the HiTek protest or the 2007 picketing of Nguoi Viet Daily News 
(discussed above), often stretch out into the work week. This makes it easier for unemployed 
Vietnamese Americans to attend these protests; if the protests continue into the weekend, they 
are then joined by those who are otherwise employed during the rest of the week. The 
employment status of Vietnamese Americans is not significantly related to petitioning or internet 
forums, suggesting that both activities are carried out by employed and unemployed Vietnamese 
Americans alike.  
Similarly, income of Vietnamese Americans is significantly associated only with 
protesting; Vietnamese Americans with lower incomes are more likely to attend protests and 
demonstrations than those whose income is higher. This is perhaps best explained by the fact that 
the types of transnational political activities I focused on do not necessitate the expenditure of a 
lot of financial resources. Vietnamese Americans who engage in protests, sign petitions or 
participate in internet forums are not required to invest in a lot of resources other than their time. 
Income would probably have been a more significant explanatory variable if the kind of political 
transnationalism under study was making monetary donations to the pro-democracy movement 
in Vietnam or organizing widespread campaigns to spread awareness about the human rights 
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situation in Vietnam – in other words, if the scope of my study had been organizational rather 
than at the individual level. 
 
Overlaps across all three activities 
 Next, I analyzed how the explanatory factors discussed in the previous section are 
distributed in relation to groups of respondents who overlap across all three forms of 
transnational political activities (as analyzed in Chapter 5) and whether these results confirm my 
findings from the regression analysis. The purpose was to investigate how the demographic, 
incorporation and resource-dependent factors under consideration distribute among those 
“never” or “sometimes” engage in political transnationalism. The results showed that in the case 
of age, gender, arrival in U.S. and English proficiency, the effect of these factors on political 
transnationalism is consistent with those found in the regression analysis. In the case of age, my 
finding that older Vietnamese Americans are more likely to engage in transnational political 
activities holds true even in groups overlapping all three activities. Similarly, the bivariate 
analysis confirms my finding that among Vietnamese Americans men are more likely than 
women to participate in political transnationalism. In the case of arrival in U.S., my finding that 
refugees in the earlier waves (post-1975 evacuees, boat people and former political prisoners) are 
more likely to engage in political transnationalism than those who arrived later through family 
reunification programs holds true even in groups overlapping all three activities. Similarly, the 
results of the bivariate analysis (although contrary to the theoretical literature) are consistent with 
the results of the ordinal regression analysis that respondents who rated their level of English 
proficiency as poor are more likely to protest and petition. 
Education, the one variable for which overwhelming evidence existed in studies on U.S. 
– domestic politics did not turn out to be statistically significant in predicting protesting and 
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petitioning. Contrary to expectations from the theoretical literature, lack of a college degree did 
not correspond to decreased likelihood of participating in political transnationalism. As we saw 
in the bivariate analysis, as Vietnamese Americans’ level of education rises, the percentage of 
respondents who reported never participating in political transnationalism also increases. In fact, 
the majority of those who report never engaging in all three activities are respondents with a 
graduate degree or some graduate education.  
In the case of employment status, even though employed Vietnamese Americans were 
found to be less likely to engage in transnational political activities in the ordinal regression 
analysis, no clear effect of employment status on political transnationalism seems to be visible 
from the bivariate analysis. As we saw in Chapter 5, the majority of Vietnamese Americans who 
report both never as well as sometimes participating in all three activities are employed. The 
effect of income in the bivariate analysis did seem to be consistent with the theoretical literature 
that as socio-economic status, of which income is a primary indicator, raises so does the 
likelihood of participation in transnational activities. However, it is important to reiterate that 
this positive relationship between income and political transnationalism was not found to be 
statistically significant in the ordinal regression analysis, except in the case of protesting.  
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, both the qualitative as well as quantitative parts of my study have yielded 
some important conclusions. In this section, I briefly summarize the major findings from each 
phase of the research. 
 
Qualitative conclusions 
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An important finding from the qualitative analysis is that the early period of transnational 
political activism among Vietnamese Americans was fraught with violence, sometimes fatal. 
This wave of political violence peaked in the late 1980s, following which there was a gradual 
movement away from violence towards other non-violent forms of political activity and 
expression of disapproval of communists, especially protests, beginning in the 1990s. 
Second, present-day transnationalism engaged in by Vietnamese Americans takes the 
form of indirect, non-electoral political activities. In other words, they do not appear to be direct, 
electoral transnational political acts such as voting in home country elections or active 
involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Rather, the kinds of transnational 
political acts that Vietnamese Americans engage in are more of an indirect nature, such as 
participating in protests and demonstrations, signing petitions and letters to government officials 
as part of human rights campaigns as well as participating in various internet forums on 
homeland issues. 
From the pattern and content of protests, we can see that the ethnic enclave of Little 
Saigon, Orange County is home to most of the protests, and the most frequent target of protests 
is the government of Vietnam. Identified protest leaders have mostly been passionate and 
committed individuals, rather than established organizations. As for petitions, Vietnamese 
American flag resolutions and campaigns to release imprisoned activists and bloggers and 
demand greater internet freedom in Vietnam reflect the most compelling homeland issues of the 
time that serve as a mobilizing factor among the population. Similarly, bloggers, visitors to blogs 
and other online forums and diaspora organization websites all utilize the World Wide Web to 
express political opinions and inform others in the Vietnamese American community about 
protests and demonstrations they can attend as well as about latest developments in the human 
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rights situation in the country. In this way, to many Vietnamese-Americans, protesting, 
petitioning and participating in internet forums have come to represent the potential power they 
wield as a political unit. 
 
Quantitative conclusions 
As for the quantitative part of my results, the majority of findings from my ordinal 
regression analysis (in Chapter 5) as well as the bivariate analysis above are consistent with 
expectations from the theoretical literature. Previous studies have suggested that older migrants 
are more likely to continue to maintain ties with the country of origin rather than severing all 
contact. In the case of Vietnamese Americans, nostalgia for the homeland does translate into 
motivation for transnational political action. Thus, older Vietnamese Americans are more likely 
than younger ones to protest as well as sign petitions. Similarly, the hypothesis that male 
migrants are more likely than female migrants to engage in political transnationalism holds true 
for all three types of transnational political activities under consideration in the case of 
Vietnamese Americans as well. 
A significant discovery of my research that is contrary to the theoretical literature is that 
college degree is not significantly related to protesting and signing petitions. The positive 
relationship between higher education and political participation is one of the most frequently 
identified in the theoretical literature – however, this association does not hold true in case of the 
Vietnamese Americans. In other words, lack of a college degree is not significantly associated 
with decreased likelihood of protesting and petitioning. For those Vietnamese Americans who 
have a college degree, place of college degree obtained is significant in the case of internet 
forums – those who have earned a college degree in both Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to 
utilize this medium as a form of transnational political expression. 
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There were two competing hypotheses in the case of arrival in the U.S. – while one 
argued that longer periods of U.S. residence lead to progressive disengagement from home 
country loyalties and hence, less likelihood of political transnationalism, the other claimed that 
longer periods of U.S. residence should lead to more frequent, organized forms of transnational 
activity. In the case of Vietnamese Americans, the latter hypothesis holds true – those refugees 
arriving in the U.S. in the earlier waves are more likely to participate in protests and sign 
petitions. 
In the case of English proficiency, employment status and income, the results from the 
ordinal regression analysis are contrary to the theoretical literature. As per the literature, I 
expected to see higher levels of English proficiency leading to subsequently more intense 
participation in political transnationalism – however, in the case of Vietnamese Americans those 
who rated their level of English proficiency as poor are more likely to protest and sign petitions. 
Similarly, according to the theoretical literature, those who engage in transnational practices are 
likely to be the most economically successful immigrants. However, the opposite is true in the 
case of Vietnamese Americans - unemployed Vietnamese Americans and those with lower 
incomes are more likely to attend protests and demonstrations than those who are employed and 
whose income is high. Employment status and income are not significantly associated with 
petitioning or participation in internet forums. 
In closing, with the help of the logit link to build the ordinal regression models, political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans was found to be significantly associated with 
age, gender, place of college degree, arrival in U.S., English proficiency, employment status and 
income. From the ordinal regression analysis results, it can be supposed that Vietnamese 
Americans who are most likely to engage in protesting and sign petitions and letters to 
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government officials dealing with Vietnamese issues are older males who arrived in the U.S. 
during the early waves of refugee influx and are not very proficient in English. Unemployed 
Vietnamese Americans who have lower incomes are also more likely to attend protests, while 
obtaining a college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam is associated with more frequent 
participation in internet forums related to homeland issues.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
A transnational perspective has brought new vistas on international migration and 
political participation. It has questioned conventional analyses that focus exclusively on 
assimilation in the host society, neglecting migrants’ ties and ongoing relations with their 
countries of origin. Dearth of knowledge about the scope, and determinants of such practices has 
been a consistent weakness in studies of political transnationalism (Guarnizo et al. 2003). This 
study, in providing clear operational definitions as well as empirical evidence of the scope and 
determinants of political transnational activism among Vietnamese Americans, has sought to 
address these shortcomings. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the presence and nature of political 
transnationalism among the Vietnamese American community in Orange County, California as 
well as determine the demographic, contextual and resource-dependent factors that explain 
differences in the frequency of participation in transnational political activities among individual 
Vietnamese Americans. The research for this study was carried out in two phases. In phase I – 
the qualitative phase – I conducted archival research and in-depth, open ended interviews with 
members of the Vietnamese American community in order to explore the most common types of 
transnational political activities. In phase II – the quantitative phase – I carried out a survey 
among randomly selected Vietnamese Americans, designed to collect information on potential 
explanatory factors. 
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Conclusions based on qualitative analysis 
My first major conclusion based on the qualitative research is that the scope of political 
transnationalism among individual Vietnamese Americans is not as widespread as originally 
thought when I had first started the project. In other words, individual Vietnamese Americans in 
Orange County do not engage in a broad array of transnational political activities, such as 
sending remittances to political organizations back home like Mexican immigrants (Xochitl 
2003, Smith and Bakker 2008) or participating in electoral politics in the home country like 
Dominican immigrants (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Itzigsohn 2000). Forming exile governments and 
attempting to overthrow the communist leaders in Vietnam has been a popular form of political 
transnationalism in the past, but it was at the organizational (for example, Government of Free 
Vietnam) rather than individual level.  
Secondly, an important conclusion from the initial years of political transnationalism is 
that the early period of transnational activism among Vietnamese Americans was fraught with 
violence, sometimes fatal. This period was fraught with attempted and actual assassinations and 
acts of arson against anyone that was suspected of having ties with the communist government of 
Vietnam. Several organizations (National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam) and 
vigilante groups (Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate the Communists and Restore the 
Nation) gained worldwide support among the Vietnamese. This wave of political violence 
peaked in the late 1980s, following which there was a decline in violent political acts and a 
gradual movement away from violence towards other non-violent forms of political activity and 
expression of disapproval of communists, especially protests, beginning in the 1990s. 
Qualitative analysis of the interviews leads to the conclusion that among Vietnamese 
Americans, nostalgia for the old days before the fall of Saigon runs deep. Their attitude towards 
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the motherland (by which is invariably meant South Vietnam) is one of cultural pride and strong 
attachment. The motivation of many Vietnamese Americans to remain politically active despite 
their busy lives seems to be the fact that most Vietnamese abroad do not consider themselves as 
belonging to a Vietnam that is unified under communism. Vietnamese Americans do not believe 
the nature of the relationship between the communist state of Vietnam and the Vietnamese 
diaspora to be the same as that which exists between two governments or two sovereign nations 
as is the case of the two Koreas, or between mainland China and Taiwan. 
Based on my archival research and the interviews, most present-day transnational 
political activity by the Vietnamese Americans is confined to Little Saigon, the ethnic enclave 
where they have coalesced through secondary migration within the U.S. This leads me to my 
next major conclusion that present-day transnationalism engaged in by Vietnamese Americans 
takes the form of indirect, non-electoral political activities. In other words, they do not appear to 
be direct, electoral transnational political acts such as voting in home country elections or active 
involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Rather, the kinds of transnational 
political acts that Vietnamese Americans engage in are more of an indirect nature, such as 
participating in protests and demonstrations, signing petitions and letters to government officials 
as part of political campaigns. 
An analysis of the interviews also led me to discover another indirect, yet novel form of 
transnational political activism, one that I had not thought of before embarking on my research. 
A majority of the respondents claimed to use the Internet frequently, while several professed to 
visiting websites related to their homeland, Vietnam. They enthusiastically mentioned “going on 
the internet” to keep themselves updated of news from “home”. Thus, blogging and expressing 
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dissent on English as well as Vietnamese language internet forums turned out to be an 
unexpected form of indirect transnational political activism among Vietnamese Americans. 
Protests – From the pattern and content of protests, the ethnic enclave of Little Saigon, 
Orange County seems to be home to most of the protests, and the most frequent target of protests 
appears to be the government of Vietnam. Sometimes, proxies for that government, for example, 
advocates of normalizing relations, are targets, but Vietnam always looms large on the horizon. 
Identified protest leaders have mostly been passionate and committed individuals, rather than 
established organizations. To many Vietnamese-Americans, protests came to represent the 
potential power they wielded as a political unit. Indeed, the HiTek incident has, especially, been 
successful in fostering a spirit of cohesion and political activism. 
Petitions – From the pattern and content of the petitions, we see that Vietnamese 
American campaigns reflect the most compelling homeland issues of the time that serve as a 
mobilizing factor among the population. For instance, while images of the former South 
Vietnamese flag conjure a shared historical past, the flag resolutions also sought to usurp the 
place of the current and official Vietnamese national flag in public ceremonies and institutions – 
this was also reflected in the interviews. In this way, their flag was claimed as a natural and 
national heritage against the possible unity of the socialist state as an entity and thus, established 
their position as a formidable transnational diaspora. Similarly, my interviews showed that 
campaigns to release imprisoned activists and bloggers and demand greater internet freedom in 
Vietnam arouse feelings of political efficacy among those who sign petitions and letters to local 
government officials. 
Internet forums – As for participating in internet forums, blogs about homeland politics 
are not just a means for their authors to post their opinions or inform readers about diaspora 
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events occurring elsewhere; rather, visitors to these blog sites also utilize their comments 
sections to voice their own views. Moreover, while some online sites carry links to campaigns, 
others publish political commentary on their websites. Thus, we see that bloggers, visitors to 
blogs and other online forums and diaspora organization websites all utilize the World Wide 
Web to express political opinions and inform others in the Vietnamese American community 
about protests and demonstrations they can attend as well as about latest developments in the 
human rights situation in the country. 
 
Conclusions based on quantitative analysis 
In keeping with the above findings as well as existing literature, my primary focus in the 
quantitative analyses has been on the determinants of transnational political activities in which 
respondents were involved, namely, protests, petitions and participation in internet forums. 
Questionnaire items measuring involvement in each of these three types of political activities 
provided three response categories: “never”, “sometimes” and “often”. While such an 
operationalization identifies those Vietnamese Americans who are most committed to 
transnational political action, at the same time, the transnational field is also nurtured by the 
more occasional activities of other Vietnamese Americans, and I also pay attention to them. 
My first set of findings is related to determinants of these practices in relation to 
predictions stemming from different theoretical schools and my own qualitative research. 
Ordinal regression results led me to conclude that political transnationalism among Vietnamese 
Americans was found to be significantly associated with age, gender, place of college degree, 
arrival in U.S., English proficiency, employment status and income.  One noteworthy finding is 
that having a college degree, a factor for which there was overwhelming evidence in the 
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literature on domestic political participation in the U.S., is not significantly associated with 
protesting and petitioning in the case of Vietnamese Americans. In other words, lack of a college 
degree is not significantly associated with decreased likelihood of protesting and signing 
petitions. For those Vietnamese Americans who have a college degree, place of college degree 
obtained is significant in the case of internet forums – those who have earned a college degree in 
both Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to utilize this medium as a form of transnational 
political expression.  
A second remarkable finding in my research is that in the case of three of the significant 
independent variables – age, gender and arrival in U.S. – the direction of the association with 
political transnationalism is consistent with expectations in the theoretical literature. However, in 
the case of three other explanatory factors – English proficiency, employment status and income 
– the opposite is true. In other words, contrary to the theoretical literature, Vietnamese 
Americans with poor English skills, those who are unemployed and have lower income levels are 
more likely to engage in political transnationalism. I discuss my findings in relation to 
expectations from the theoretical literature in further detail below. 
 
Significance and Direction of Explanatory Factors 
 My quantitative analyses provide strong evidence that demographic variables are more 
useful than contextual and resource dependent variables in predicting the odds of political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. Among demographic variables, age and gender 
are the two most significant factors. Age is positively associated with and is a significant factor 
in explaining variance in political transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans. Older 
respondents are more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations as well as sign petitions 
than younger respondents. Among Vietnamese Americans, the ordinal logistic analyses suggest 
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that men are more likely than women to protest, sign petitions as well as participate in internet 
forums as forms of political transnationalism. 
  It is interesting to note that the one explanatory variable for which there was 
overwhelming evidence in the transnationalism literature as well as in my qualitative interviews 
was education. The positive relationship between higher education and political participation is 
one of the most frequently identified in domestic politics in the U.S. – however, this association 
does not hold true in case of the Vietnamese Americans. In other words, lack of a college degree 
is not significantly associated with decreased likelihood of protesting and petitioning. In the case 
of participating in internet forums, while lack of a college degree continues to be insignificant, 
the regression analyses suggest that for those respondents with a college degree, what matters is 
where the college degree was earned. Vietnamese Americans who obtained their college degree 
both in Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to participate in online forums dealing with 
homeland issues. 
 Regarding incorporation variables, the time-period of arrival in the U.S. is significantly 
associated with protesting and petitioning. Vietnamese Americans who arrived in the earlier 
refugee waves are more likely to protest and petition than those who arrived in the later waves. 
Similarly, level of English proficiency is significantly associated with protesting and petitioning 
but not with participating in internet forums. Respondents who rated their level of English 
proficiency as poor are more likely to protest and petition. 
Finally, regarding resource dependent variables, employment status and income are 
significantly associated with protesting; unemployed Vietnamese Americans and those with 
lower incomes are more likely to attend protests and demonstrations than those who are 
employed and whose income is higher. The employment status and income of Vietnamese 
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Americans is not significantly related to signing petitions or participating in internet forums, the 
other transnational political activities investigated in my research.  
Bivariate analyses were additionally carried out to examine how groups overlap across 
the three forms of transnational political activities. The results showed that in the case of age, 
sex, arrival in U.S. and English proficiency, the effect of these factors on political 
transnationalism is consistent with those found in the ordinal regression analysis. Contrary to 
expectations from the theoretical literature, lack of a college degree did not correspond to 
decreased likelihood of participating in political transnationalism. As we saw in the bivariate 
analysis, as Vietnamese Americans’ level of education rises, the percentage of respondents who 
reported never participating in political transnationalism also increases. As for employment 
status, even though employed Vietnamese Americans were found to be less likely to engage in 
transnational political activities in the ordinal regression analysis, no clear effect of employment 
status on political transnationalism seems to be visible from the bivariate analysis. The effect of 
income in the bivariate analysis did seem to be consistent with the theoretical literature but the 
factor was not found to be statistically significant, except in the case of protesting. 
 
Expectations from theoretical literature 
 While the majority of findings from my ordinal regression analysis results are consistent 
with expectations from the theoretical literature, in the case of three of my independent variables, 
the findings diverge from the literature.  
Age: The transnationalism literature suggests that older immigrants and refugees find it harder to 
adjust to conditions in the country of settlement and integrate into its culture. Thus, older 
migrants are more likely to continue to maintain ties with the country of origin rather than 
severing all contact. In the case of Vietnamese Americans, nostalgia for the homeland does 
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translate into motivation for transnational political action. Older Vietnamese Americans are more 
likely than younger ones to protest as well as sign petitions.  
Gender: Literature on the relationship between gender and immigration tells us that males 
experience occupational downward mobility upon relocation while women's experience tends to 
go the opposite way, as many of them become paid workers for the first time in the United States 
(Jones-Correa 1998, Guarnizo et al. 2003). The hypothesis then is that as men, on average, tend 
to experience a loss in social status as opposed to women, they are more likely to engage in 
political transnationalism. The hypothesis holds true for all three types of transnational political 
activities under consideration - protests, petitions and participation in internet forums - in the 
case of Vietnamese Americans. 
Education: The positive relationship between education and political participation is one of the 
most frequently identified in the theoretical literature (Verba, Schlozmana & Brady 1995, La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, Guarnizo et al. 2003, Tarrow 2005). The hypothesis then is that 
higher levels of education create the human capital resources that lead to increased engagement 
in political transnationalism. However, this association does not hold true in case of the 
Vietnamese Americans. Lack of a college degree is not significantly associated with decreased 
likelihood of protesting and petitioning. For those Vietnamese Americans who have a college 
degree, place of college degree obtained is significant in the case of internet forums – those who 
have earned a college degree in the U.S. or both in Vietnam and the U.S. are more likely to 
utilize this medium as a form of transnational political expression, compared to those who have 
obtained their college degree in Vietnam only. 
Arrival in U.S.: There were two competing hypotheses in the case of arrival in the U.S. The first 
one argues that recent immigrant arrivals are more likely to maintain ongoing relationships with 
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the country of origin; over time political transnationalism weakens as migrants shift from a 
homeland-oriented politics to a receiving-society politics (Smith and Bakker 2008, Guarnizo et 
al. 2003). The hypothesis then is that longer periods of U.S. residence lead to progressive 
disengagement from home country loyalties and hence, less likelihood of political 
transnationalism. The competing argument is that new immigrant arrivals lack the financial 
resources and social networks vital to transnational engagement, which are acquired over time 
(Al-Ali N, Nadje, R. Black, and K. Koser 2001). The corollary hypothesis then is that longer 
periods of U.S. residence should lead to more frequent, organized forms of transnational activity. 
In the case of Vietnamese Americans, the latter hypothesis holds true – those refugees arriving in 
the U.S. in the earlier waves are more likely to participate in protests or demonstrations and sign 
petitions or letters to government officials. 
English proficiency: English proficiency is one of the most crucial factors in facilitating a 
refugee’s assimilation and socioeconomic success in the United States. The hypothesis then is 
that we can expect to see higher levels of English proficiency leading to greater socio-economic 
success, and subsequently, more intense participation in political transnationalism. However, in 
the case of Vietnamese Americans those who rated their level of English proficiency as poor are 
more likely to protest and petition. 
Employment status and Income: Employment status and income are the most cited efforts of 
resettlement programs, as a refugee cannot be considered to be successfully resettled if he or she 
continues to receive social support (Strand and Jones 1985, Alkire 2006). According to the 
theoretical literature, those who engage in transnational practices are likely to be the most 
economically successful immigrants. The hypothesis then is that being employed and higher 
income levels lead to more intense political transnationalism. However, the opposite is true in the 
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case of Vietnamese Americans - unemployed Vietnamese Americans and those with lower 
incomes are more likely to attend protests and demonstrations than Vietnamese Americans who 
are employed and those who have higher incomes. Thus, in the case of employment status and 
income too, the results from the ordinal regression analysis are contrary to the theoretical 
literature. 
To sum up, from the ordinal regression analysis results, it can be supposed that 
Vietnamese Americans who are most likely to engage in protesting and sign petitions and letters 
to government officials dealing with Vietnamese issues are older males who arrived in the U.S. 
during the early waves of refugee influx and are not very proficient in English. Unemployed 
Vietnamese Americans who have lower incomes are also more likely to attend protests, while 
obtaining a college degree in both the U.S. and Vietnam is associated with more frequent 
participation in internet forums related to homeland issues. 
My final conclusion is that the presence and dynamics of political transnationalism 
among all Vietnamese Americans is not uniform. Although there are common forces bearing on 
all members of the community, the particular circumstances of each individual also affect the 
extent and character of these activities. For some refugees, transnational politics is a means to 
maintain an active presence in homeland politics; for others, it is a practice to be avoided in order 
to leave a violent and unsettling past behind. 
Thus, contrary to classical views of immigrant assimilation, my results indicate that 
transnational political activities are not the refuge of economically marginalized, downtrodden, 
poorly educated immigrants or recent arrivals. While the determinants of this phenomenon of 
political transnationalism contradict a normative view of the assimilation process that places a 
premium on the rapid shedding of old loyalties and identities, this does not however mean that 
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acculturation to the host society is not occurring or that transnational activism necessarily 
precludes successful integration. Thus, my research demonstrates that a stable and significant 
transnational field of political action connecting Vietnamese Americans with their country of 
origin does exist.  
 
Limitations 
Of course, no analysis of the ordinal regression model can be complete without 
mentioning the potential limitations of the study. The drawbacks of my model are obviously 
connected with the limitations of working with data collected in a limited time frame (2009-10). 
Although the survey data have been gathered in Little Saigon over the period of several months, 
the sample size was still too small to yield the high power of the statistical test given that many 
explanatory variables entered the equation for analysis. My study was also limited to three types 
of transnational political activities at the individual level – protesting, petitioning and 
participating in internet forums. There are several other kinds of transnational activities, 
especially at the organizational level of analysis, for example, organizing human rights 
campaigns in the U.S. and worldwide, sending remittances to and active involvement in pro-
democracy groups in Vietnam that are undertaken by some Vietnamese Americans organizations 
and even individuals not included in my study.  
Finally, the selection of explanatory variables in the final model depended upon my 
qualitative research interviews based on existing literature, intuition and a trial and error 
approach. Other potential factors that could influence political transnationalism and explain some 
of the variance are – respondents’ level of political activism in the home country Vietnam that 
would make them predisposed towards homeland politics, respondents’ activism in host state 
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politics, respondents’ networks at present and at the time of arrival in the U.S., whether 
respondents identify themselves as an ethnic minority and so on. These would be interesting 
explanatory variables to consider if one is to conduct further research in this area.  
Overall, this study is an important first step in exploring the relationship between political 
transnationalism among Vietnamese Americans and multiple explanatory variables concerning 
demographic, incorporation and resource dependent factors. The knowledge gained from this 
study would be beneficial to Vietnamese Americans themselves as well as scholars studying this 
particular population. The goal was to obtain information from respondents to establish 
benchmarks that could be helpful to scholars of transnationalism researching other populations. 
For example, scholars studying other refugee groups that have fled political persecution could 
compare the two populations to examine whether significant factors in political transnationalism 
among Vietnamese Americans, such as age, gender, time period of arrival in the U.S. and 
English proficiency (in the case of non-English speaking populations) hold true across refugee 
populations. Alternately, scholars conducting their research among the Vietnamese American 
population say, five or ten years down the line could do a time series analysis and observe 
whether the significant explanatory variables in political transnationalism among this group 
remain constant over time. 
 
Changing nature of Vietnamese political transnationalism 
In the first decade following the mass exodus of the 1975 refugees, official regard by the 
Vietnamese government for the Vietnamese American refugees was one of vituperation and 
portrayal as the very dregs of society. In fact, both groups expressed extreme hatred and distrust 
of one another. This hatred manifested itself in the form of dogmatic, anti-communist actions by 
the Vietnamese refugees. Burning with grief over the loss of their country, many first-wave 
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refugees believed that Communists would soon be overthrown and that they would return to 
Vietnam within a few months. From overseas, Vietnamese refugees made many efforts to 
support the overthrow of the communist regime and liberate their homeland. Within the 
Vietnamese American community in Orange County, expressions of anti-communist sentiments 
and political activism in the early years often proved violent and deadly. Vigilante groups like 
VOECRN and NUFRONLIV claimed responsibility for a string of arson attacks and summary 
executions of purported Communist propagandists or those suspected of having ties with the 
communist government of Vietnam. In those early years, voicing any kind of deviant opinion, or 
one vaguely critical of the refugee community, could be construed as pro-Communist. Thus, for 
the first decade after the refugees’ arrival, the will to conform and to force others to conform to a 
political and ideological imperative of anti-communism generated a subterranean history of anti-
communist Vietnamese death squads, paramilitary training for armed return to Vietnam, and 
organized boycotts brought to bear upon both public and private transactions. 
All this changed with the advent of the doi moi and Vietnam’s free market reforms in 
1986. After the U.S. lifted its economic embargo, Vietnam launched its campaign to attract 
overseas Vietnamese tourists and investors. The Vietnamese Communist Party and State has 
since affirmed that overseas Vietnamese are an inseparable part of the Vietnamese nation. This 
changing attitude of the Vietnamese government regarding the refugees was accompanied by the 
wave of political violence peaking in the late 1980s and then subsiding as vigilante organizations 
showed no further signs of activity. The next instance of political activity occurred when protests 
against suspected communist sympathizers continued even though the violence disappeared. 
Political protests emerged as a new form of political activity condemning Communism in the 
1990s. For instance, in 1999, five years after diplomatic ties between the United States and 
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Vietnam were re-established, massive anti-communist demonstrations and political rallying took 
place over the course of two and a half months over the display of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam’s flag of Ho Chi Minh’s portrait in a store in Little Saigon, California.  
On the political front, anti-communist passion suggests that exilic political sentiments are 
still strong. This will persist as long as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam exists, but has 
undoubtedly lost its historical fervor. Like other immigrant groups before them, the Vietnamese 
refugees retain feelings of loyalty to their country of birth, but realize that a gulf of more than 
thirty five years now separates them from Vietnam. The younger generation of Vietnamese-
Americans sometimes perceives the virulent anti-communism of the community as a divisive 
force with destructive potential. They view events like the HiTek protest as red-baiting (branding 
people as Communists) and intolerance towards nonconformists. Compared to the mid-1980s, 
when there was a constant fear and suspicion of the presence of communist spies amongst 
themselves, red-baiting in the Vietnamese American community in Orange County is nowhere 
nearly as common now.  
Nevertheless, the community often expresses strong anti-Communist sentiments and a 
large number of Vietnamese Americans continue to have a strong disdain for the current 
government in Vietnam. Because they are a fairly mobilized refugee group and because 
homeland concerns are particularly salient, much of their political energy is devoted to issues 
dealing with Vietnam. Present-day transnationalism engaged in by Vietnamese Americans takes 
the form of indirect, non-electoral political activities such as participating in protests and 
demonstrations, signing petitions and letters to government officials as part of human rights 
campaigns as well as participating in various internet forums on homeland issues. Thus, there has 
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been a definite shift in Vietnamese activism from its earliest, violent form to present-day, non-
violent transnational political activities. 
 
Future of Vietnamese political transnationalism  
Since the mid-1980s, with the advent of doi moi (renovation policy), the Vietnamese 
government has realized the great potential of overseas Vietnamese in bringing about a bright 
future for the country. Despite their having a different political viewpoint, the communist leaders 
affirm their appreciation for the capital and intellectual capacity of overseas Vietnamese. In fact, 
overseas Vietnamese have already made important contributions to the economy of Vietnam – in 
2001, remittances by nearly three million overseas Vietnamese, through both official and 
unofficial channels, were estimated at US$3 billion, almost one-eighth of Vietnam’s GDP (Khoa 
2002). 
Today, the Vietnamese Communist Party and State affirm that overseas Vietnamese are 
an inseparable part of the Vietnamese nation. Once considered traitors (Viet-Gian) and labeled 
My Nguy (American puppets) by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, those who left Vietnam have 
today been elevated to the status of Viet Kieu (overseas Vietnamese) and are now referred to by 
names like Kieu Bao (people coming from the same embryonic sack or womb). Indicative of 
how semantics can reflect politics, this change in vocabulary signified the government’s more 
open attitude towards Vietnamese Americans that directly coincided with Vietnam’s need for 
economic investment and its desire to join the global market. Thus, official regard by the Hanoi 
leadership for the overseas Vietnamese has undergone a complete circle over the last thirty five 
years from vituperation as the very dregs of society to solicitation as potential saviors of the 
current political system. 
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While many Vietnamese Americans have now come to believe that participation in the 
renovation process, not confrontation or violence is the best way to bring freedom and 
democracy to Vietnam, they cannot ignore the continuing human rights abuses going on in the 
country. To this end, transnational political acts like protests, petitions and participation in 
internet forums seek to involve overseas Vietnamese in the struggle for human rights and 
transform it into a cause. At the same time, there still exist many staunchly anti-communist 
Vietnamese Americans, who have never trusted the good will or sincerity of the communist party 
leaders. One Vietnamese American I interviewed, Mr. Ha19, emphasized that Vietnamese 
communist leaders must at least accept political opposition and initiate a dialogue with other 
political leaders from inside and outside the country. In view of their bitter experiences with the 
communists, the term “national reconciliation” is, therefore, still taboo to many Vietnamese 
Americans.  
What this means is that even today Little Saigon is a hotbed of political activism, offering 
everything from backyard candlelight vigils to large-scale protests, from peaceful hunger strikes 
to violently anti-communist floats in the annual Têt parade. Representations of the suffering, 
pain and loss due to the Communist overthrow of Saigon are constantly reproduced through the 
media, successfully keeping a 35-year old experience fresh in the minds of the refugees. Pop 
culture recreates war scenes through music and images. These induced recollections of sorrow 
and loss still play an important role in the lives of older first-generation refugees; they find a 
blurry of comfort-sadness in these reproductions of their homeland. 
At the same time, as Vietnamese Americans are showing even higher levels of 
socioeconomic progress, Vietnam directly appeals to this community for their capital and 
19 Not respondent’s real name. Personal interview conducted on April 20, 2009. 
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technical skills. As a result, Vietnamese Americans are now in a unique position of being able to 
support Vietnam economically while contesting it politically. This only goes to show the 
strategic role that homeland politics has played in the incorporation of a refugee group that 
arrived thirty-five years ago at the bottom of America’s socioeconomic ladder and now boasts of 
numerous successful businessmen and publicly elected officials. Today, political transnational 
engagement, combined with the new economic and domestic political opportunities enjoyed by 
Vietnamese Americans in the U.S. democratic system, is redefining the new nation of Little 
Saigon. 
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Appendix A. Interview Questionnaire 
 
Determinants of Political Transnationalism among Vietnamese-Americans 
 
Q1: Could you specifically describe any political activities you have recently engaged in, which 
were related to your country of origin, Vietnam? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q2: Have you recently made any payments/donations to any pro-democracy movement or local 
community organization aimed at bringing about change in Vietnam?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q3: Could you describe any grassroots Vietnamese-American political organizations/voluntary 
associations in the U.S. that you have recently led or been an active member of?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
Q4: Have you recently attended any protests or demonstrations (eg. HiTek protest)in Little 
Saigon aimed against the Vietnamese government?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q5: Have you recently carried out any political activities, such as voting or campaigning, 
directly in Vietnam?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q6a: In what ways has your education played a role in stimulating political activism across 
borders?  
 
Answer: 
Next Page 
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Q6b: Would you say your education level is high school or less, college education or graduate 
degree or higher? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q6c: Have you received any formal education (other than English language classes) or 
undergone any vocational training in the United States? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q7: Which of the following factors have affected the level and frequency of your political 
activism aimed at influencing politics in Vietnam?(Age, gender, employment status, income, 
length of stay in the U.S., English proficiency, satisfaction with life in the U.S.)  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
Q8: Please add any further observations about your cross-border political activism. Are there 
any factors (other than the ones I mentioned) that influence it significantly? 
 
Answer: 
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Appendix B. Survey Instrument 
 
1. Please select your gender: 
  Male    Female  
 
2. Which of the following age groups do you belong to? 
18-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65 +
 
 
3. When did you arrive in the U.S.? 
   
Before 1975
  
1975-1984
  
1985-1995
  
After 1995
 
 
4. What is your level of education? 
High School or less   Some college  
College degree   Graduate school/degree  
 
5. If you have a college degree, did you get it in: 
the U.S.
  
Vietnam
  
Both
 
 
6. How would you describe your English language skills? 
Poor
 
Fair
 
Good
 
Excellent
 
 
7. How would you describe your employment status? 
Employed
 
Temporarily unemployed
   
Unemployed
 
 
8. Which income category would you fall under? 
< $25,000   $25 - 40,000         $40 - 60,000  
$60 - 75,000   > $75,000  
 
9. Have you taken part in protests or demonstrations in Little Saigon? 
Never
  
Sometimes
  
Often
 
 
10. Have you written to government officials or signed a petition in support of a person or issue? 
Never
  
Sometimes
  
Often
 
 
11. Have you participated in Internet discussion groups on issues important to Vietnamese people?           
Never
  
Sometimes
  
Often
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Appendix C. Petition 
 
His Excellency Nguyen Minh Triet 
President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
c/o Ambassador Nguyen Tam Chien 
Embassy of Vietnam 
1233 20th Street N.W. Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 200369 
                    May 2, 2009 
Your Excellency, 
 
 I have the honor and the duty to send you 780 signatures on petitions calling on you to honor your 
international human rights obligations by releasing all prisoners of conscience, including the Reverend 
Nguyen Van Ly, who has already spent around 17 years in prison for peacefully criticizing government 
policies on religions and advocating for greater respect for human rights since the late 1970s.  Amnesty 
International names him as an Individual at Risk.  
 We have gathered these signatures on petitions in hope that you will release the prisoners of 
conscience in recognition of the United Nations Human Rights Council Review scheduled for May 8, 
2009 in Geneva. 
 Amnesty International states for the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review that 
Article 69 of the 1992 Constitution of Viet Nam affirms the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association, but only ‘in accordance with the provisions of the law.’  These laws, often enacted after 1992, 
are explicitly in breach of international human rights treaties that Viet Nam has ratified.  
 Our volunteers’ experience is a humbling one because of the outpouring of support for the release 
of prisoners of conscience in Viet Nam by our Vietnamese friends, neighbors, co-workers and fellow 
citizens.  We have translated the petition into Vietnamese with their appreciation and support.  Please 
notice that a large majority of the signatures are Vietnamese.   
 At the head of the list, a political prisoner for twenty-seven years in Viet Nam between 1961 and 
1991, dissident poet Nguyen Chi Thien, has personally gathered hundreds of the names. He was rescued 
from imprisonment when he was near death from deliberate starvation in 1991. 
 
With sincere thanks for your attention, 
 
Amnesty International Group 19 
California 
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Appendix D. Letter Writing Campaign  
 
Ask your Member of Congress to support the Vietnam internet freedom resolution 
(To find the contact information for your Congressional Representative, 
visit http://www.congress.org/congressorg/dbq/officials/ 
or http://capwiz.com/democracyforvietnam/dbq/officials/)  
 
July 23, 2009 
Dear Representative ___________, 
I am writing to ask you to co-sponsor H. Res. 672 calling on the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam to release imprisoned bloggers and respect Internet freedom. 
The Government of Vietnam is taking a step backward by imposing restrictions on the internet and 
imprisoning bloggers and cyber activists who peacefully express their views. 
The Committee to Protect Journalists calls Vietnam one of the “10 worst countries to be a blogger.” 
Reporters Without Borders lists the Vietnamese government as an “enemy of the internet.” 
Internet censorship is not only a violation of freedom of expression—a basic human right—but also a 
serious impediment for Vietnam’s economic development and integration into the world community. 
Please support H.Res 672 to send a strong message that the US Congress supports the right of Vietnamese 
citizens to share and publish information over the internet. 
Sincerely, 
___________ 
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